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ABSTRACT
Kalfas, Martin. M.A., Department of Political Science, Wright State University, 2016.
Chinese Soft Power Promotion in the United State: 2005-2014.
This thesis focuses on two research questions regarding the impact of economic
crises on states’ soft power strategies. Specifically, can economic crises lead states to
abandon generating soft power within countries affected by the resulting economic
changes? And, does a shift away from soft power promotion policies represent a change
in a state’s foreign policy strategy? To answer these questions, this thesis utilizes a case
study focusing on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from 2005 to January 1, 2015,
investigating soft power generating efforts by China in the United States before and after
the 2007 Financial Crisis. Research into Chinese soft power promotion activities in the
realms of economics, people-to-people exchanges, and the arts reveals no definitive
trends as to whether states abandon soft power promotion strategies in response to
economic crises and illustrates what was once considered soft power generating can be
later regarded as reducing soft power.
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Chapter One: Introduction
Chinese New Year, New Thesis Focus:
Walking into Xin Hui’s home, I instantly felt welcome. I had been friends with
her and her family since my first stay in Taiwan, but this would be the first time I would
be able to celebrate the Chinese New Year with them. Stepping into the dining area, Xin
Hui’s family all excitedly said hello and 新年快乐 (xin nian kuai le: happy new year) and
we sat down to eat. After a wonderful meal filled with traditional Chinese dishes, I
remained at the table with Xin Hui’s brothers-in-law, as they produced numerous bottles
of previously unseen alcohol and looked at me with mischievous grins on their faces.
“Do you like to drink?” they asked, as their wives looked on with disapproving glances.
Not wanting to offend and not being one to pass up a chance for a good time, I told them
I did, and we proceeded to open the bottles.
After several of these bottles had been emptied, a family friend (I never learned
his name) began to ask me why I was in Taiwan studying Chinese. I told him of my
studies in the United States and how I was currently working on my Master’s Degree,
focusing on Chinese soft power promotion among rivals. Immediately upon mentioning
China, the man became animated and explained that he often did business in China. As
he poured me another glass of strawberry wine, he told me about his impression of China
at that time letting me know that he worked for an American company that had been
doing business in China for many years. Taking a hearty sip from his glass, he exclaimed
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that the Chinese had become so rude over the past couple of years, not willing to show
even the slightest respect to him or his American partners.
Intrigued, I asked him what he meant and he told me about how, in the past, the
Chinese had always been deferential to their American guests, always standing when they
entered the room and eager to hear any advice they had to give. According to my new
friend, however, this behavior changed rapidly following the global financial crisis in
2007, as the Chinese became much colder to the Americans. They became much more
assertive, willing to question their American partners’ suggestions and even offering their
own. By the time we met in 2015, my friend told me that the Chinese did not even stand
when the Americans entered the room, some not even willing to put out their cigarettes.
It was then that my new friend told me that he felt this was a much more
interesting question for my thesis and that I should begin investigating whether the
financial crisis had some sort of impact on China’s disposition toward the United States.
Here, Xin Hui and her sisters told him that he should leave me alone and that he should
not tell me what to write my thesis about. As the conversation turned to other topics,
however, I found myself pondering on what the man had said, considering whether there
was any truth to it.
In many ways, it seemed sensible. With the relationship between the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) and the United States becoming more contentious over the
years, it seemed likely that the Chinese would take advantage of the issues caused by the
crisis and the resulting recession. In fact, it has been well documented by numerous
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researchers that China’s diplomatic posture toward the United States had shifted from
being conciliatory to one of aggression in recent years. According to Thomas J.
Christensen (2011), starting in 2009, China had become more bellicose in defending its
territorial claims, harassing the USS Impeccable in international waters, demanding an
apology and compensation from the Japanese in 2010 following an accidental collision
between a Chinese fishing boat and a Japanese Coastguard ship in the East China Sea, to
again warning the United States against joint naval drills with South Korea in
international waters close to its territory. David Shambaugh (2011) even noted that the
global financial crisis led to many in China criticizing that the “state monopoly
capitalism” of the United States “had finally brought the world economy to the brink of
disaster” arguing that perhaps China’s economic model should be adopted in response (p.
14).
Pairing this information with China’s declaration of an Air Defense Identification
Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea and its highly publicized construction of artificial
islands in the South China Sea and it seems clear that China’s recent behavior had been
much more aggressive than in the past. Did this mean that my friend was right? Was it
true that the financial crisis made the Chinese change their stance toward the United
States?
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Chinese Soft Power and the Economic Crisis:
In many ways, a change in diplomatic posture seemed counter to China’s soft
power strategy, which has received much attention in literature focused on Chinese
international relations. Shambaugh (2011) in the same piece where he discussed the
growing belligerence of the Chinese state even illustrates that the Chinese leadership
traditionally believed that the relationship between the United States and the People’s
Republic of China represented the “key of keys” and that “maintaining harmonious ties
with Washington should be the top priority in Chinese diplomacy” (p. 14). This line of
thinking coincided perfectly with Chinese Hu Jintao’s push for a warmer foreign policy
where an increase in soft power was equated as being equally important to maintaining
the state’s military, economic, and technological power (Ma, as cited in Li, 2008, p. 5).
Hu himself was influenced by Wang Huning, who is purported to have written the first
article on soft power (ruan shi li 软实力) in China in 2003, leading to increasing
popularity of the concept among China’s leadership (Wang, as cited in Li, 2008).
From this point, the Chinese tenaciously embraced soft power, using it as the key
symbol that “China desire[d] stability and peace with all countries” (Kurlantzick, 2007,
P. 37). With the strategy in place, the Chinese began working to assuage any fears that
its neighbors possessed about its growing economic clout and ensured the world that
China intended to rise peacefully (Paradise, 2009). For the most part, this “charm
offensive” as it is called by Joshua Kurlantzick (2007) was successful, and in Southeast
Asia, the initial target of China’s soft power initiatives, began to change their views
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toward China seeing it as “a constructive actor—and, potentially, as the preeminent
regional power” (p. 8). As this strategy was tied to China’s growing economic power,
however, the financial crisis seemed bound to impact the Chinese leadership’s
consideration of whether to continue a strategy of appeasement; especially toward the
United States. As Friedberg (2010) notes, increased economic ties with the US stymied
any moves toward a more rivalry-like relationship but that the “current crisis may mark
the end of a period in which trade served to stabilise Sino-American relations” (p. 37)
The impact of the financial crisis was felt in both the US and the PRC despite its
origination in the collapse of the subprime mortgage industry in the United States in 2007
(Raicu et al., 2012). In fact, both countries had much the same reaction to the crisis as
aggregate demand dropped for each, causing them to enact “large-scale stimulus
programmes designed to boost demand and restore growth” (Friedberg, 2010, p. 32).
However, the difference came in the results, as the US faced a staggering recession with
its effects still being felt to this day (Blecker, 2014; Friedberg, 2010; and Lardy, 2012).
As Blecker (2014) states:
[A]lthough what was called the Great Recession of 2008-9 officially ended in July
2009, the US economy has never fully recovered from the severe downturn during
that recession and remains in a semi-depressed state (p. 696).
Blecker (2014) goes on to argue that by August 2013, the United States’ “total number of
jobs had not yet returned to its previous peak level, but instead remained about 2 million
lower than it was at the end of 2007,” making it the longest period with employment not
improving in the United States since the Great Depression (p. 697). The results of this
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crisis can also be seen in US international policy as Americans started to shy away from
“foreign adventures,” making them less willing to support expensive endeavors that were
not seen as aiding the US economy (Rachman, 2011).
China, on the other hand, while it experienced slow growth in 2009, “the
slowdown was quite modest, especially when compared with the absolute shrinkage in
global output” (Lardy, 2012, p. 1). Lardy (2012) attributes this result to the large-scale
and sophisticated nature of the stimulus package initiated by the Chinese, which did not
face the same level of criticism as the stimulus in the United States did. Eventually,
China returned to the high levels of growth it enjoyed before the crisis and which was in
stark contrast to the dismal performance of the economies of Japan, Europe, and the
United States (Lardy, 2012). With such a clear difference in economic output, the
stimulus vindicated the actions of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership and led
to a sense that, between the American and the Chinese economic systems, the PRC had
emerged the “winner” (Friedberg, 2010, p. 32). This perception has been strongly felt in
China where Lardy (2012) notes that many lower level officials and the nationalist
commentators in the media have “exaggerated China's rise in influence and the declining
power of the United States,” creating the perfect situation for China to supplant the
United States in the international system (p. 5).
Such a shift in international strategy runs counter to the findings of Randall
Schweller and Pu Xiaoyu (2011), who argued that China has sought to “accommodate[]
U.S. hegemony, on the one hand, while it contests the legitimacy of U.S. hegemony, on
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the other” (p. 52). They assert that China has adopted a strategy of “rightful resistance”
towards the United States where there is an acceptance of the existing system but a
concerted effort to work within it to challenge the head of the system (O’Brien & Li, as
cited in Schweller & Pu, 2011, p. 52). Such a strategy goes well with China’s adoption
of soft power, as it does not promise an overthrow of the regime through possible violent
methods, but through a growing appreciation for the Chinese and a gradual shift toward
acceptance of its way of doing things. But, as Chinese economic power continued to
surge while the American economy declined, is it possible that the Chinese have decided
that they no longer need to act within the system and that it is time for them to
proactively modify it?
There have been some attempts to investigate into this possibility, with David
Shambaugh’s “Coping with a Conflicted China” and Thomas J. Christensen’s “The
Advantages of an Assertive China Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy” both
serving to illustrate the increasing aggressiveness of China following the financial crisis.
Shambaugh (2011) focuses his attention on the various schools of thought that make up
the Chinese leadership, identifying those which espouse a more nationalist line as having
gained greater acceptance over the years and leading to China’s new found assertiveness.
Christensen (2011) provides a more in-depth analysis of CCP legitimacy following the
Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, forcing the CCP to adopt an increasingly
nationalistic tone and utilize “othering” techniques in order to ensure the continued
support of the Chinese people. While both of these studies provide fascinating research,
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they do not address the seeming contradiction between China’s new aggression and its
previous policy of accommodation, with neither providing data on whether this policy
has been truly abandoned or not. This is important not just due to the fact that one must
always conduct extensive research before making claims but because, as Shambaugh
(2011) himself states argues “China’s foreign policy often exhibits diverse and
contradictory emphases,” illustrating the necessity for further research (p. 7).

Research Questions:
After investigating the impacts of the financial crisis on China’s posture toward
the United States, it becomes clear that such economic shocks have a large effect on the
international system. With states still relying on the interdependence of the economic
system and the growing role of soft power to increase one’s power in that system, the
question of when states abandon the promotion of soft power among other nations and
adopt more aggressive policies which could lead to greater rewards for one’s own state
becomes more salient than ever. Indeed, scholars such as Shambaugh and Christensen
have begun to seemingly assume that this is the case without first applying exhaustive
research to confirm their claims. As such further research is required on the impact of
economic crises on a states’ soft power promotion strategy and on the status of soft
power generation as a tactical choice in pursuing a strategy of cooperative relations with
states in the international system. With this in mind, this thesis will endeavor to answer
two questions: can economic crises lead state officials to abandon policies of generating
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soft power within countries affected by the resulting economic changes? Does a shift
away from soft power promotion policies represent a change in a state’s foreign policy
strategy? I expect the research to indicate that economic crises can lead to states to shift
away from soft power strategies and that states may take advantage of the possible
economic re-alignment to rebalance their policy toward the affected state.

Premises:
With its focus on soft power promotion and the recent economic situation
seemingly granting it an opportunity to move away from the pragmatic approach of
supplanting the United States within the current international system, China offers an
appealing case to study the effect of economic crises on soft power. A study such as this
rests on three premises: aggressive actions on the part of the state indicate a shift away
from soft power policies due to the intricate connection between the state and soft power
in China; the PRC began to decrease its efforts to generate soft power within the United
States following the 2007 financial crisis; and acceptance by Chinese elites that China
emerged from the economic crisis relatively unscathed because of proper action by the
state leading to a surge in confidence and a belief that China should supplant the United
States in the international system. This reflects the assumption that Chinese foreign
policy is fundamentally opportunistic and recalls the question of whether the PRC has
shifted away from a positive-sum opportunistic strategy to one that is more zero-sum.
However, before the methodology of such a study can be elaborated the concepts of
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economic crises and soft power must be operationalized in order to ensure that results
will remain consistent throughout the research.

Operationalization of Terms:
Economic Crisis:
When discussing economic crises I intend to follow the trend present within the
literature of combining the term with the concept of economic recession. According
Geoffrey Moore (1958), whose research served as the basis for the National Bureau of
Economic Research’s (NBER) methods for measuring recessions, identification of
recessions starts with “peak dates” which see “expansion of aggregate economic activity
culminated[e] and contraction began[in]” and end with “trough dates” which “specify
when contraction culminated and expansion began” (pp. 259-260). From this description,
Moore (1958) goes on to highlight recent recessions and states, “[a]t the top of the list of
recent contractions, obviously, is the contraction that began in 1929-the longest and
deepest” (p. 262). Here it is clear that Moore included the economic shock of the stock
market crash in his measurements of the Great Depression, combining the economic
crisis with the resulting recession that it led to. This conflation of the two concepts is
seen in the work of Raicu et al. (2012) as well as in their investigation of business cycles
they argue that periods of growth are naturally followed by economic downturns and
once again refer to the Great Depression in its entirety as a sustained economic crisis.
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In addition to these studies, researchers focusing on the financial crisis of 2007
also show a tendency to concentrate on the resulting recession that it produced.
Friedberg (2010) states quite clearly in his notes that the term “crisis” in his research
refers to both to “the wave of bank failures triggered by the bursting of the American
real-estate bubble and the sharp and sustained slowdown in global growth that followed”
(p. 49, note 1). This allows him to recognize that the greatest effect of the crisis on the
United States is more likely to be one of “lingering debilitation than radical
destabilization,” increasing his scope to contain events beyond simply the economic
shocks felt in the economy in 2007 (Friedberg, 2010, p. 35). Blecker (2014) follows this
line of thinking noting that the United States’ economy, despite the recession officially
ending in 2009, has “never fully recovered from the severe downturn during that
recession and remains in a semi-depressed state” as of his writing in 2014 (p. 696). This
combination of crisis and recession is thus important because it illustrates that the crisis
itself is partially defined by its effects. This not only includes the damage done to the
economy but also investigations into how states reacted to economic distortions and the
effectiveness of the actions taken; reflecting that research into economic crises is focused
on a chain of events as opposed to just a single incident.
This conceptualization, therefore, is applicable to this research as the crisis itself
was felt similarly in both the United States and the PRC, with the only differences
coming in how the economies adjusted following action taken by state. Whereas the
Chinese economy was able to continue its impressive growth the United States’ economy
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only experienced sluggish growth, directly impacting resulting US policy. Specifically,
Rachman (2011) notes that the recession left Americans with little desire to continue
supporting “foreign adventures” and that the military budget would certainly “come
under pressure in this new age of austerity” (p. 4). This is important because the effect of
the financial crisis and the recession which government initiatives could not avoid has
been to effectively tie the United States’ hands in foreign policy making it more difficult
to present aid to other states or to challenges those acting against its interests. Friedberg
(2010) even contends that the recession will influence United States policy towards China
as it may cause the US to “lack not only the resources to conduct a sustained rivalry with
China but the inclination to do so” (p. 36).
This assertion coincides with the perception of the Chinese leadership toward the
crisis as they recognize that their efforts to ameliorate its effects were much more
effective than those of the United States. Lardy (2012) notes that the Chinese economy
was “the first globally significant economy to begin to recover from the global economic
recession”, allowing it to project a strong image to the rest of the world especially in
relation to the United States (p. 11). It was here that China was presented the opportunity
to position itself as a potential leader of the economic world and the appeal of its
economic model grew throughout the world. Considering this, it is clear that the Chinese
would not view the financial crisis of 2007 as an isolated event and would consider any
discussion of it as including an investigation into the resulting Great Recession which
pushed it even closer to the forefront in economic affairs.
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Soft Power:
Before discussing how soft power will be defined in this study it is important to
note that I will be using terms such as soft power “generation,” “creation,” “promotion,”
etc. as opposed to words that refer to soft power use. This distinction is minor but
important, as it establishes the difference between the act of creating soft power in other
states as opposed to using the soft power that has been created in those states. By
utilizing the term “use” the researcher infers that the soft power reserves in those
countries already exist while also implying that soft power’s usage is in service to the
pursuit of a goal outside of simply increasing one’s appeal in that state. In many ways,
this idea of “cashing in” one’s soft power in order to get something out of it may be
counter to the act of producing soft power, as it illustrates that the crafting of an
appealing image had ulterior motives. In contrast, soft power generation does not carry
this implication and focuses solely on the creation of soft power in a target state and not
on what that soft power will enable one’s country to do upon the building up of sufficient
reserves of it. This also reconciles the prospect of, for example, building a Confucius
Institute in a target country. This action does not necessarily immediately lead to China
gaining sufficient soft power in that country to encourage it to be more cooperative to
China therefore making it impossible for China to “use” its newfound soft power for
anything. In effect, all this action can do is increase the appeal of China in that state,
highlighting its purpose of producing soft power in that state and not its use.
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As is implied here, soft power refers to a country’s appeal in another state, with
the term’s creator Joseph Nye (1990) arguing that this attractiveness is what can lead to
other countries to want what the country with the soft power wants through means
outside of hard power, usually in the form of military action. Nye (1990) first defined
this term in reaction to the increasing level of interconnectedness found in the
international system claiming that “the direct use of force for economic gain is generally
too costly and dangerous for modern great powers” (p. 159). Recognizing that states
would still endeavor to “[get] others to want what you want” Nye came up with the
concept of soft power as a new avenue open to modern states that still had a coercive
element found in traditional hard power without the increased costs (Nye, 1990, p. 31).
Tying the concept with the actions of non-governmental organization and other non-state
actors, soft power soon became very popular in the realm of international studies, even
finding many devotees among leadership of nations throughout the world (Nye, 2004)
However, soon after the concept’s inception scholars began arguing over the
vague nature of Nye’s definition leading to Colin S. Gray (2011) to describe soft power
as “heroically imprecise” (p. 28). Among the competing conceptualizations, some go
against Nye’s argument that soft power cannot be generated by states investigating efforts
by a country’s leadership to increase its appeal in the world (Ding, 2013; Sun, 2012).
Others include economic actions such as investment, loans, and trade agreements as other
ways which a state’s soft power can be increased; further combining soft power with hard
power and the actions of the state (Gill & Huang, 2006; Kurlantzick, 2007; Lum et al.,
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2008; Schmidt, 2008). In response to these assertions, Nye remains steadfast that the
source of soft power remains in the actions of non-governmental organizations due to the
lack of suspicion that they are acting to gain leverage as a state would (Nye & Wang,
2009). Regarding the relationship between hard and soft power, however, Nye (2004)
provides a somewhat vague distinction, arguing that there is a relationship between hard
and soft power, but that “soft power does not depend on hard power” (p. 9). On the basis
of this assertion, Nye (2004) claims that “Hard power and soft power sometimes
reinforce and sometimes interfere with each other”, making their exact relationship
difficult to define (p. 25).
The distinctions between hard and soft power and whether governmental actions
can generate soft power becomes particularly difficult in the case of China. In the
Chinese state, almost all domestic and international actions are controlled by the state or
at the very least require the authorization of the state. This presents the issue of how
China can generate soft power at all as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the
country must have the authorization of the government to operate, with many even being
organized by the Chinese government itself. This lead to Nye and Wang (2009) arguing
that China lacks the capacity to use these organizations to generate soft power. Despite
these issues, Chinese scholars present critical interpretations of Nye’s work, with Yan
Xuetong arguing that “soft power lies in the political power of political institutions,
norms, and credibility, rather than culture” (Yan, as cited in Li, 2008, p. 295). Others
goes so far to claim that “soft power and hard power are mutually complementary” where
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hard power can be use in some cases such as moving troops away from a border to
illustrate a state’s benign intentions (Zhu & Yu, as cited in Li, 2008, p. 295). Still, the
Chinese also note that the target of soft power promotion must accept those actions,
recognizing that soft power has different definitions to different peoples and that one’s
effort to generate it must be done so in accordance with the target state’s sensibilities
(Zhu, as cited in Li, 2008).
Considering these arguments by Chinese academics and understanding the
varying interpretations of what constitutes soft power, my definition of the concept will
be informed by those actions which the Chinese leadership deems as efforts to improve
its image internationally. Therefore, economic incentives such as trade agreements will
be investigated as attempts to increase China’s soft power despite arguments by scholars
that such actions are more related to a state’s hard power. Here I am following the views
of Kurlantzick (2007) who utilized such economic measures during his own investigation
into Chinese attempts to generate soft power. According to Kurlantzick (2007) soft
power equates to “anything outside the military and security realm” for the Chinese,
arguing that economic incentives are simply much more direct ways to ensure an
improved image among other countries (p. 6). While this may run counter to the
assertions of scholars that such incentives are an aspect of hard power, the quantity of
information provided by Kurlantzick regarding the efforts of Chinese leaders to provide
payments, loans, or investments to targets of soft power promotion convinces me that the
Chinese leadership considers such actions as part of promoting soft power.

17

However, due to an acceptance by the Chinese leadership of the relative nature of
soft power promotion, I also intend to focus on Chinese efforts to promote an
appreciation for Chinese culture. In the case of the United States, Chinese economic
actions such as buying US debt or the investment in domestic US companies may give
China “undue leverage” and an increase in ideas that China presents a “threat—to the
well-being of foreign companies, to U.S. security, to peace and stability, and to human
rights” (Paradise, 2009, p. 656). As such, promotion of Chinese culture within the United
States is often seen as a more effective means to promote soft power to a US audience
and therefore forms a more important aspect of soft power creation within the United
States than economic activity. To address these culture-based efforts, I plan to
investigate efforts to encourage people-to-people exchanges and the advancement of
Chinese culture through art exhibitions and musical performances.

Methodology:
The structure of my investigation into Chinese efforts to generate soft power
within the United States will follow that of a before and after comparative case study.
The initial period will focus on Chinese efforts to generate soft power during the
Presidency of Hu Jintao from the years of 2005 through 2007 and the beginning of the
economic crisis. Following this I will investigate the rest of Hu Jintao’s presidency from
2008 to 2012 to investigate the effects the crisis and the resulting recession in the United
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States had on the Hu administration’s calculations regarding whether they should
continue to promote soft power within the United States.
The division of Hu’s time as president along these lines will clearly illustrate the
effects of the crisis on his leadership as he was the originator of China’s peaceful rise
strategy and was committed to promoting:
a peaceful and stable international environment; a neighbourly and friendly
environment in surrounding regions; a cooperative environment based on equality
and mutual benefits; and an objective and friendly media environment (Li, 2008,
p. 300).
To achieve this vision, Hu wholeheartedly embraced the concept of soft power and often
spoke of the term in his speeches to Chinese government, leading to a flurry of interest in
soft power all across China (Li, 2008). With such a public commitment to a soft power
promotion strategy the effects the financial crisis in the United States presents a
fascinating challenge to Hu’s pursuit of better relations and can demonstrate whether
even soft power’s strongest proponent in China was affected by the new opportunity
China found itself in after the crisis. Such a division also works to counter any questions
whether the difference in policy is simply due to the transition of leadership from Hu to
Xi Jinping.
In many ways, one can argue that the ascendancy of Xi Jinping to the Presidency
is in itself a rejection of soft power generation in the United States and other countries
throughout the world as the current President is often described in terms as being the
exact opposite of Hu Jintao (Osnos, 2015). Xi is often characterized by his manly
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attitude and a predilection for aggressive foreign policy (Osnos, 2015) This is illustrated
by his statements regarding American companies acting as “warriors” for the US
government within China, China’s announcement of an Air Defense Identification Zone
in the East China Sea, and recent actions on the part of the Chinese navy in the South
China to construct man-made islands in an attempt to promote China’s territorial claims
in the area (Osnos, 2015, para. 51). While these public actions have led many to
conclude that Xi has abandoned any efforts to promote a harmonious relationship with
the US, there still has been no formal study dedicated to the investigation of whether soft
power initiatives targeted at the United States have decreased during his administration.
The duration of this research will go from 2005 to January 1, 2015, presenting ten
years of data. The project will stop at January 1, 2015 as opposed to continuing to the
present not only to reflect a lack of information regarding the year of 2015 in US-China
relations but also in reference to China’s recent economic issues. Starting in 2015,
China’s economy experienced several shocks and has seen its growth rates fall well
below their previous levels leading to speculation that China has entered a period of
economic downturn (Bradsher, 2015; Ali, 2015). While this presents an opportunity to
investigate whether the Chinese will increase their efforts to create soft power in the
United States after possibly losing their economic edge over it, such speculation is
beyond the purview of this study.
The research will focus on China’s economic agreements with the United States,
the support of people-to-people exchanges, performances by national Chinese
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performance troops, and exhibitions of cultural artifacts. For economic agreements
between the two countries I will investigate annual reports from 2005 to 2015 from the
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), the U.S.-China Joint
Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), and reports from the annual U.S.-China
Strategic Economic Dialogues (SED) and later the Strategic and Economic Dialogues
(S&ED). I will specifically investigate whether new economic agreements have been
signed and if any previous agreements have ended or not. Information on people-topeople exchanges will come from data on the building of Confucius Institutes using
reports from China’s Confucian Institute Headquarters or Hanban and through the annual
reports on the U.S.-China High-Level Consultation on People-to-People Exchange (CPE)
starting in 2010. With performances, I will investigate those held at the Kennedy Center
in Washington D.C. Not only does the Kennedy Center have an excellent database of
events of Chinese origin going back to 2005, but I also believe that it serves as the
clearest method for the Chinese leadership to generate soft power throughout the United
States by focusing on the premier arts center in the nation’s capital. In addition to this I
will investigate those Chinese themed exhibitions held at the Metropolitan Museum of
Art in New York City. Perhaps the most well-known museum in the United States,
exhibitions held there are likely to be viewed by a multitude of visitors providing a large
audience for Chinese artifacts meant to promote Chinese culture abroad. While
analyzing these performances and exhibitions I will not only be focusing on the
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frequency of events but also analyzing their duration, to determine if intensity of the
Chinese efforts has experienced any decline after the crisis.

Chapter Outline:
Chapter two will first provide a brief description Hu Jintao and his administration,
focusing on his approach to foreign relations and his efforts to promote good neighbor
diplomacy. Following this, the results of research from 2005 to 2007 will be presented.
Chapter three will start with an exploration into whether the diplomatic posture of Hu’s
administration toward the United States changed at all during this time, noting any
changes in rhetoric or increases in aggressive behavior. This will lead into data for the
years from 2008 to the end of Hu’s administration in 2012 to see if any changes have
occurred in China’s soft power generation efforts. Chapter four will move on to Xi
Jinping’s administration beginning in 2012 to January 1, 2015. At the beginning this
chapter, similar to chapter one, I will provide information regarding Xi’s stance toward
the United States and his vision for Chinese foreign policy during his tenure as president.
This will be followed by the final set of data on Xi’s efforts to generate soft power in the
United States and an investigation into any changes present within in it. Finally, I will
conclude with a discussion of the results and their impact on the study of soft power,
paying special attention to the possible implications of soft power as a tactical tool in a
state’s diplomatic strategy towards other countries. I will also investigate whether the
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data provides any possibilities for future research on the relationship between soft power
and economic crises and identify possible areas worthy of study.
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Chapter Two: Hu Jintao 2005-2007
Hu Jintao and Soft Power:
During his 2006 visit to the United States, the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
President Hu Jintao, attended a banquet held in his honor by the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, the National Committee of U.S.-China Relations, and the U.S. China
Business Council. Shortly after dinner, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger,
famous for his efforts to normalize relations between China and the United States, stood
up to introduce President Hu. Kissinger made clear that in the international system
“[t]here is no more important relationship than that between China and the United States”
and that the two sides must work together in order to guarantee continued peace and
development in the world (C-Span, 2006). And while Kissinger noted that issues existed
between the two countries, particularly the question of Taiwan, he expressed confidence
that the two countries could reach an understanding with one another (C-Span, 2006).
Much of this optimism centered on President Hu himself whom Kissinger claimed had
“positive and constructive meetings with [US] leaders, including a personal friendship
with President Bush,” helping to ameliorate any tensions between the two countries (CSpan, 2006). Kissinger also praised Hu’s goal “of a harmonious society in China” and
for a “harmonious world,” stressing that such an outlook would be invaluable in
managing the US-China Relationship (C-Span, 2006).
Following this warm introduction, President Hu took the stage and reiterated
China’s commitment to a peaceful and stable world (C-Span, 2006). Promoting a united
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international community, Hu stated the “international community should work together to
promote progress and development in international society,” encouraging a stable
environment to not only aid the continued growth of China, but also for the world (CSpan, 2006). Hu made plain China’s commitment to peaceful development, arguing that
only through “promoting development domestically, and maintaining world peace and
promoting common development internationally” could China “meet the goal of
developing itself” (C-Span, 2006). Going even further, Hu stated China’s benevolent
intentions maintaining that “peaceful development embodies the national trait fostered in
China’s culture over several thousand years” and the Chinese people would never do
anything to disrupt the international system for the sake of their own development (CSpan, 2006).
From here, Hu turned to China’s relationship with the United States, which he
acknowledged as being of great importance to the future of the international system.
Since normalization, Hu asserted that “despite twists and turns” the United States and
China had preserved their shared obligation of upholding peace in the international
system (C-Span, 2006). President Hu expressed optimism over the future of the
relationship believing that the two countries shared “increasing common interests and
[could] cooperate in more and more areas” (C-Span, 2006). Hu went on to state that
“[e]xchanges in cooperation in culture, education, and in science and technology serve as
a bridge for enhancing friendship between our two peoples” and that these bridges would
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be instrumental in building stable and peaceful relations between the two countries (CSpan, 2006).
To build this sort of relationship, Hu outlined several goals for the US-China
relationship. President Hu argued that China and the United States must encourage
“high-level exchanges, maintain and expand visitation at all levels, pursue strategic
dialogue, foster strategic mutual trust, and promote two-way cooperation” (C-Span,
2006). This cooperation must also extend to the realm of economics, which Hu identified
as the “pillar sustaining China-US relations” and that “strong business ties” must
continue to be built between the two countries (C-Span, 2006). In addition to
strengthening communication and increasing connections between China and the United
States on these higher levels, Hu also asserted the importance of encouraging connections
between the peoples of the two countries. Hu declared exchanges should persist in
academia and that the two states should make special efforts to “strengthen exchanges
among our young people and thus provide new momentum to sustain China-US
relations” (C-Span, 2006). The President also called for the two sides to recognize the
differences between each other and that as long as the two “respect each other” and “treat
each other as equals” that they would be successful in building a strong and mutually
beneficial relationship (C-Span, 2006).
Throughout the entire speech, Hu was exceptionally deferential toward his host,
using respectful language and even opened himself up to questions once the speech was
over. President Hu also seemed to make a point to avoid any topics which might
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engender tension between himself and his American audience, making an exception only
when discussing the issue of Taiwan. Here, Hu repeated China’s position that it would
never accept an independent Taiwan, but did not go so far as to discuss US arms sales to
Taiwan or its commitment to responding to any aggressive actions on the part of the
mainland to reclaim Taiwan with force (C-Span, 2006). Further impressing his desire for
friendly relations with and respect for the United States, Hu ended his speech by quoting
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who said “the world can be changed by man’s endeavor, and
that this endeavor can lead to something new and better” (C-Span, 2006). According to
Hu, China and the United States had the opportunity to build “something new and better”
by working together, leading to a “harmonious world of durable peace and common
prosperity” (C-Span, 2006).
The contents of this speech are very much in line with the diplomatic stance of
China at this time, beginning its embrace of soft power and improving it through what
Joshua Kurlantzick (2007) would later refer to as a “charm offensive.” Writing for the
Council of Foreign Relations, Esther Pan (2005) noted that China concentrated on
promoting a peaceful image of itself in 2005. Quoting from the Xinhua News Service,
which has very close ties to the CCP, Pan (2005) wrote that “China is actively pursuing a
foreign policy of ‘peace and development to bring harmony, security, and prosperity to
all’” (in “Diplomacy para. 2). Pan (2005) also observed that both Hu Jintao and his
Premier, Wen Jiabao, dedicated themselves to promoting an image of a benevolent
China, reaching out to neighboring countries as part of Beijing’s “friendly neighborhood
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policy” (para. 2). Outside of meetings between heads of state, China actively worked to
generate its soft power through support of cultural exchanges and working to encouraging
the creation of Chinese language programs throughout the world (Pan, 2006). To
facilitate this goal, China not only provided scholarships for foreign nationals to study in
China but also increased its contacts with foreign universities in an effort to encourage
the development of Mandarin Chinese programs abroad (Pan, 2006). Considering these
efforts and the speech given by Hu during his visit to the United States, it is clear that at
this time China was dedicated to promoting a peaceful image of itself and was actively
using soft power to accomplish this goal.

Economic Relations:
Approaching 2005, the United States and China had substantial economic ties,
with trade totaling $231 billion between the two (U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, 2005). This resulted in China being the United States’ third largest
trading partner and the largest outside of the Western Hemisphere (USCC, 2005). In fact,
China had already surpassed most of the nations in North and South America in exports
to the United States, trailing only Canada with $197 billion worth of exports in 2004
(USCC, 2005). This staggering figure led to the United States accounting for “33 percent
of China’s total exports” that year, illustrating the vast importance of the US market to
the Chinese economy (USCC, 2005, p. 26). The United States was also an important
source of imports for the PRC, with US exports to China totaling $35 billion in 2004
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(USCC, 2005). By 2007, exports and imports had increased dramatically with US
exports to China jumping to $65.07 billion and imports from China growing to $321.69
billion (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2008). These figures
illustrate that the economic relationship between the US and China continued to grow
throughout 2005 to 2007 and that the countries were even more closely linked by the time
of the 2007 financial crisis.
Despite these impressive economic ties, the United States and China faced many
issues in their economic relationship from 2005 to 2007 which became the main items of
discussion at meetings between the two. Considering economic actions as a means to
create soft power, the large value of US-China trade is not a strong enough indicator for
Chinese soft power promotion in the United States and it must be paired with other
economic policies enacted by China directed toward the United States. When analyzing
what these policies might be, the annual reports of the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Commission (USCC) prove effective at identifying which issues the United States
considered most important and Chinese actions to address them can be seen as attempts
to improve its image in the eye of its American partners.
In 2005, these issues focused on several facets of what the United States side
referred to as being a “responsible nation” in the international system (U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, 2006). For the United States, countries had
to abide by certain principles in order to be recognized in the international system,
requiring that “[r]esponsible nations abide by the rules—both the letter and the spirit of
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agreements into which they enter, whether bilateral or multilateral” (USCC, 2006, p. 22).
This willingness to follow international agreements extends to the economic realm, as
responsible countries accept international trade agreements while promoting free and fair
trade between states (USCC, 2006). These principles illustrate that economic actions
taken by China which follow or promote trade agreements and do not limit free and fair
trade would be viewed as proper by the United States; leading to an improved opinion of
China on the international stage.
While these form general guidelines for countries interacting with the United
States, the Commission also pointed to specific areas where they felt Chinese policy was
lacking. Chief among these was the trade deficit between the United States and China
which was $201.6 billion in China’s favor in 2005 (USCC, 2006). While the United
States did not expect the Chinese to simply export less to the United States, the
Commission (2006) did outline numerous areas which contributed to the imbalance with
one of them being subsidies provided by the Chinese government to industries in China.
While China agreed to eliminate a number of these subsidies in accordance with its
agreement to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Commission (2006) found
that many of the businesses in China were able to receive favorable loans from Chinese
banks which were “predominantly state-owned or state-controlled” with the loans usually
forgiven by the government (USCC, 2006, p. 26). Considering that it was estimated that
there were nearly 127,000 state-owned enterprises (SOE) in China in 2007 and that there
could be many more due to the “great lengths” Beijing goes to hide SOEs, such debt
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forgiveness represents a huge concession to local Chinese industries (Bai, as cited in
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2007; USCC, 2007, p. 39).
China also attempted to encourage foreign businesses to relocate to China with “15
percent and 24 percent income tax rates to foreign-based affiliates operating in China”
(USCC, 2006, p. 29). This increased China’s export capacity as 58 percent of China’s
exported goods are produced by foreign-funded firms which “directly harms U.S.
manufacturers and results in the loss of U.S. manufacturing jobs” (Ministry of Commerce
People’s Republic of China, as cited in USCC, 2006; USCC, 2006, p. 31).
In addition to subsidies, Chinese policy toward intellectual property rights (IPR)
continued to be a large concern from 2005 to 2007, with estimates that “[a]cross all
copyright industries, piracy rates in 2005 remained between 85 and 93 percent” (U.S.
Trade Representative, as cited in USCC, 2006, p. 34). These staggering numbers created
numerous challenges for US firms, as 55 percent reported they were hurt by IPR
violations in 2006 (AmCham-China, as cited in USCC, 2006, p. 26). These
infringements resulted in estimates that China accounted for 70 percent of the counterfeit
goods market in the 2005 through 2006 period, with the US Chamber of Commerce
estimating that 750,000 jobs were lost due to counterfeiting (Fishman, as cited in USCC,
2006; U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, as cited in USCC, 2006).
The Commission (2006) found China to be severely lacking in enforcement of
IPR noting that many in the central government did not take the issue seriously, seeing it
as the “typical path for developing nations attempting to foster economic development”
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(p. 36). Lack of enforcement was particularly prevalent at the local level, where
provinces often relied on the economic performance of industries actively involved in
violating IPR (USCC, 2006). This led to a growing number of voices in China urging for
non-enforcement as crackdowns against copyright infringement could devastate local
economies (USCC, 2006). It seems that this line of thinking was accepted by the
government as in 2004 more than 99 percent of cases related to copyright and trademark
infringements were channeled into “administrative systems,” with an average fine of
$620 per case; of which only 96 of 51,851 cases were “referred for criminal prosecution”
(USCC, 2006, p. 38).
Another factor which the USCC identified as contributing to the trade imbalance
between the United States and China was Chinese monetary policy. China does not
allow the value of the Renminbi (RMB) to be determined by the market, with the
government being responsible for setting its exchange rate (USCC, 2006). In 2005, it
was estimated that the Renminbi was undervalued by as much as 40 percent, resulting in
great difficulties for US industries to compete with Chinese manufacturers due to Chinese
goods being much cheaper than American ones (Goodman, as cited in USCC, 2006).
The Commission (2006) argued that the practice of “artificially” selecting the value of
the Renminbi “[violated] both the letter and the spirit of the rule of the WTO and the
International Monetary Fund” (p. 52).
Violations against its agreement to join the WTO formed the last category that the
USCC asserted Chinese policy needed to change. In many ways, this area relates back to
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the Commission’s previous complaints that in China’s accession agreement with the
WTO China guaranteed it would change policies related to subsidies and other actions
which favor Chinese producers over foreign competitors (U.S. Trade Representative, as
cited in USCC, 2006). The USCC found that these practices continued after the PRC
joined the WTO, with subsidies increasing and limiting access to Chinese markets by
foreign manufacturers continuing (U.S. Trade Representative, as cited in USCC, 2006).
The USCC (2006) also found that China failed to ratify four of the eight core
International Labor Organization Conventions, mostly those related to collective
bargaining and organization rights along with the prohibition of forced labor policies
(International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, as cited in USCC, 2006). These
policies, which prevent workers from demanding higher wages and greater protections
against injuries, result in the Chinese government “essentially subsidizing those firms that
take advantage of this Chinese laxity” (USCC, 2006, pp. 31-32).
The USCC did not always find fault with Chinese policy, commenting that there
were several areas which, by 2005, the Chinese enacted the reforms necessary to become
a responsible WTO member state. Specifically, the Commission (2006) found that China
with only few exceptions “made a good faith effort to comply with its WTO obligations
in the banking sector” (p. 46). In addition, the USCC (2006) noted that the Chinese
agreed to a December 11, 2006 deadline to open its financial system to “more outside
scrutiny and investment” which, if fully implemented, could lead to China financial
system experiencing “a liberalization whose scope and speed have seldom been seen
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before” (p. 47). In this way, despite the numerous concerns over US-China economic
relations, the USCC (2006) remained hopeful that the PRC could still experience a degree
of economic liberalization which it asserted would create a better and more responsible
China. Considering this, all actions taken by China that address those concerns related
towards government subsidies, IPR infringements, the valuation of the Renminbi, and the
continued acceptance and implementation of agreements made between China and the
World Trade Organization can be seen as soft power generating activities as they will
serve to improve the China’s image in the eyes of the United States government.
The Chinese began working in 2005 to change these policies, including those
which made it difficult for US firms to enter and compete in the Chinese market. For
example, the Chinese agreed to delay regulations which would cut off US firms from the
software procurement market, worth a potential $8bn, and sped up efforts to join WTO
Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) (“The U.S.-China Joint Commission on
Commerce and Trade (JCCT) Outcomes on Major U.S. Trade Concerns,” 2005). The
Chinese also reworked their “Regulations on Management of Direct Selling,” providing
US companies the legal basis to sell directly to Chinese consumer while working toward
the free distribution of US goods within the Chinese market (“The U.S.-China,” 2005).
Barriers to United States service companies’ exports were also addressed as the Chinese
leadership agreed to convene another meeting of the US-China Insurance Dialogue
before the end of 2005 in order to discuss barriers to US firms in the insurance market
and work to ensure US telecommunication firms access to the Chinese economy (“The
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U.S.-China,” 2005). In more specific areas, the Chinese also signed a Memorandum of
Understanding with the U.S. Department of Agriculture related to food quality and safety
and approved corn biotech regulations between it and the United States with the aim to
“facilitate cooperation on animal and plant health safety issues and improve efforts to
expand U.S. access to China’s markets for agricultural Commodities” (“The U.S.-China,”
2005, in “Addressing Barriers” para. 2). Regarding government subsidies, Chinese
efforts were somewhat lackluster as during the 2005 U.S.-China Joint Commission on
Commerce and Trade (JCCT) they only agreed to provide a detailed record of subsidies
to the WTO by the end of 2005, illustrating understanding of US concerns over the
subject but not exactly enacting real policy to combat it.
In combatting intellectual property rights violations the PRC was much more
vigorous, agreeing that the issue was worthy of the central government’s attention. In
2005, China “agreed to increase the number of criminal prosecutions for IPR violations
relative to the total number of IPR administrative cases” with the Supreme People’s
Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and the Ministry of Public Security issuing
guidelines to “ensure the timely referral of IPR violations from administrative bodies to
criminal prosecution” (“The U.S.-China,” 2005, in “Improving Enforcement” para. 2).
China also agreed to introduce regulations to reduce the export of infringing goods and
improve coordination of police in efforts to combat IPR infringement (“The U.S.-China,”
2005). By the end of 2005, the Chinese government guaranteed that “central, provincial
and local government offices” would exclusively use licensed software and all pirated
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versions would be replaced (“The U.S.-China,” 2005, in “Improving Enforcement” para.
7). Finally, the Chinese State Council planned “to submit to the National People’s
Congress the legislative package needed for China to accede to the WIPO Internet
Treaties” by June 30, 2006 (“The U.S. – China,” 2005, in “Improving Enforcement” para.
11).
In conjunction with these domestic efforts, the Chinese agreed to establish with
the United States a “bilateral IPR law enforcement working group whose members will
cooperate on enforcement activities to reduce cross-border infringing activities” (“The
U.S.-China,” 2005, in “Improving Enforcement” para. 5). This group includes officials
from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) paired with the Chinese Ministry of Public
Security and shares “infringement data” and “information on significant seizures” to
improve Chinese policing efforts against IPR infringement (“The U.S.-China,” 2005, in
“Improving Enforcement” para. 5).
In comparison, Chinese actions related to adjusting the value of the RMB in 2005
were limited, as it maintained the right to determine the value of the currency. Still,
before the meeting of the JCCT in 2005 “China engineered a 2.1 percent overnight rise in
the value of the renminbi and announced a policy that would allow a ‘managed float’ of
the renminbi within a very narrow daily trading band of 0.3 percent” (USCC, p. 30).
While this action did very little to address the high percentage that the RMB was
undervalued at, it is interesting to note that it was done shortly before China and the
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United States would meet together to discuss economic issues. In this sense, the action
was clearly meant to illustrate to an American audience that the Chinese were at least
attempting to placate the US, which would raise their opinion of China however briefly.
In order to further illustrate that China appreciated the United States’ concerns,
President Hu Jintao agreed with President Bush to the Strategic Economic Dialogue
(SED) which began in 2006 (“Fact Sheet Creation of the U.S.-China Strategic Economic
Dialogue,” 2006). With meetings occurring semi-annually and headed by the US
Secretary of the Treasury and Chinese Vice Premier the mission of the dialogues was to
guarantee the benefits of the economic relationship between the two countries were
“fairly shared by citizens of both countries” and provide a forum for discussing issues
between the two sides (“Fact Sheet,” 2006, para. 2). The Chinese also demonstrated that
the dialogue was of great importance to them by creating “its largest and the highest
ranking inter-ministerial working group” to participate in the dialogue, including the Vice
Premier, the Foreign Minister, the Finance Minister, the Deputy Secretary General of the
State Council, and various other ministers representing the Ministries of Commerce,
Agriculture, Health, etc. (“Fact Sheet,” 2006). The Chinese showed their seriousness in
working with their American partners to “discuss long-term strategic challenges” and
ensure that the United States could expect China’s cooperation with them at the highest
level (“Fact Sheet,” 2006, para. 6).
During the Strategic Economic Dialogue, the Chinese introduced even more
policies conducive to generating soft power in the US. In dealing with trade imbalances,
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the Chinese worked to ensure that specific areas of the Chinese economy would be
opened to US industries including resumption of trade in US beef (“The U.S.-China Joint
Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) Outcomes on U.S. Requests,” 2006).
China also eliminated “duplicative testing and certification requirement” which hindered
the export of medical devices to China from the US and agreed to issue licenses to all 3G
providers in China (“The U.S.-China, 2006,” in “Increasing U.S. Access” para. 2).
Furthermore, the United States and China agreed to establish a U.S.-China High
Technology and Strategic Trade Working Group within the JCCT which would “review
export control cooperation and facilitate high technology trade” (“The U.S.-China,” 2006,
in “Export Controls” para. 1). The two sides also “concluded an agreement facilitating
financing to support U.S. exports to China,” building on the previous year’s work to
address the United States’ concerns regarding the trade deficit (“The First U.S.-China
Strategic Economic Dialogue December 14-15, Beijing Fact Sheet,” 2006, para. 5).
In the fight against IPR violations China took actions against 14 factories
manufacturing pirated optical disks and promised to work harder to “combat copyright
piracy of films, music, and software” (“The U.S.-China,” 2006, in “Improving
Enforcement” para. 2). The Chinese also ensured that individual IPR cases raised by the
US government would receive the direct attention of the government of China while it
worked to rid public markets of infringing goods. After creating a plan of action to
improve enforcement of IPR rights, China also made it a requirement that all computers
imported to or produced in China be pre-loaded with legal software and that government
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agencies had to purchase these models (“The U.S.-China,” 2006). Yet, unlike actions
taken in 2005, many of these promises did not constitute actual agreements.
Furthermore, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) found that in 2006 piracy rates were
still between 85-93% “indicating little or no improvement over 2005.” (Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative, as cited in USCC, 2007, p. 32). It seems China did very little in
this area that would increase its soft power in the United States, limiting itself to gestures
and promises to do better in the future.
Negotiations over the value of the Renminbi also seemed to remain stagnant in
2006 as no actual agreements or policies were enacted which would lead to substantial
changes in the situation. During the First U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue, the
Chinese side did recognize US concerns of its monetary policy, reaffirming its
commitment “to pursuing macroeconomic policies, such as China's exchange rate regime
reform” (“The First U.S.-China,” 2006, para. 1). Outside of reiterating this statement, it
is unclear whether the Chinese did anything to shift their monetary policy toward an
exchange rate determined by the free market. In fact, following its 2005 announcement
that it would allow the RMB to “fluctuate within a narrow trading band against a basket
of currencies, the renminbi ha[d] appreciated less than 10 percent against the dollar” and
it was still undervalued by 20 to 50 percent (U.S. House of Representatives Committee
on Ways and Means, as cited in USCC, 2007; U.S. Trade Representative, as cited in
USCC, 2007, p. 21).
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This lack of effort in areas related to IPR violations and monetary policy was also
seen in China’s relationship with the World Trade Organization. The USCC (2006)
found during this time that efforts by Chinese Central Government to enforce WTO
obligations were sometimes not followed by the local government. The USCC (2007)
also noted that the Chinese maintained subsidies to Chinese industries and continued to
practice protectionist economic policies. However, the Chinese government did reiterate
its commitment to joining Government Procurement Agreement of the WTO and planned
to submit its offer of coverage no later than December 2007 (“The U.S.-China,” 2006). It
is clear the Chinese did not do much to increase their soft power in the United States
through economic policy in 2006, as it failed to pursue meaningful action in IPR,
exchange rate policy, or WTO agreements.
This seemed to change in 2007, as China worked harder to address issues related
to trade imbalances between the United States and China. In specific areas, the Chinese
agreed to eliminate the “remaining redundancies in its testing and certification
requirements for imported medical devices, and committed to implement a ‘one test, one
fee’ policy” which would remove more barriers to the US medical devices industries
from operating in China (“The U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade
(JCCT) Fact Sheet,” 2007, in “Medical Devices” para. 1). To facilitate this, the Chinese
agreed to suspend the implementation of the General Administration of Quality
Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) Decree 95, which would have
authorized redundant inspection and testing protocols toward imported medical devices
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(“The U.S.-China,” 2007). In telecommunications, the Chinese agreed to lower capital
requirements for US providers to operate in China (“The U.S.-China,” 2007).
Regarding financial services, China agreed to resume licensing securities
companies and to expand the scope of qualified joint-venture securities companies
allowing them “to be engaged in securities brokerages, propriety trading and asset
management” (“The Second U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue May 22-23,
Washington Joint Fact Sheet,” 2007). China also agreed to allow “qualified foreigninvested companies, including banks, to issue RMB denominated stocks; qualified listed
companies to issue RMB denominated corporate bonds; and qualified incorporated
foreign banks to issue RMB denominated financial bonds” (“The Third U.S.-China
Strategic Economic Dialogue December 12-13, 2007, Beijing Joint Fact Sheet,” 2007,
para. 10). Finally, the two countries agreed to begin high-level exchanges on investment
policies and to intensify discussions regarding the possibility of signing a Bilateral
Investment Treaty (“The Third U.S.-China,” 2007). In this sense, China continued in its
efforts to promote policies which would increase the ability of US firms to operate and
compete in the Chinese market, facilitating greater US exports and creating greater
possibilities for a more natural trade deficit.
Finishing the process to join the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
internet treaties and continuing to fight against sales of computers with illegitimate
software, China seemed more serious about combating IPR infringements in 2007 (“The
Third U.S.-China,” 2007). The PRC committed to exchange with the US information
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related to the seizure of counterfeit goods, of which 81 percent seized in the US
originated in China, so that they could better track the companies responsible for
producing them (“The Third U.S.-China,” 2007). The Chinese justice system also
worked directly with the US and in July 2007 a joint investigation by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and Chinese authorities resulted in “25 arrests and the seizure of 290,000
CDs containing counterfeit software” (Federal Bureau of Investigation, as cited in USCC,
2007, p. 33). This collaboration was set to increase as China’s General Administration of
Customs signed a Memorandum of Cooperation on IPR enforcement with United States
Department of Homeland Security’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection Section (“The
Second U.S.-China,” 2007). To further illustrate its commitment against IPR
infringement, the Chinese signed a letter of intent on “the establishment of a consultative
mechanism in standards and trade-related technical measures and [would] host a seminar
on the critical elements of technical innovation” guaranteeing that Chinese businesses
understood the laws related to copyright infractions (“The Second U.S.-China,” 2007,
para. 12).
On monetary policy, the Chinese still lagged behind but made some efforts to
ameliorate the situation. For example, in July 2007 the Chinese government announced
that it would cease attempting to buy all US dollars in China; allowing the dollars to go to
private Chinese citizens who could then invest with them (Xin, as cited in USCC, 2007).
This allows for dollars to more naturally flow in and out of Chinese markets, restricting
the government’s ability to control the value of its currency, and tying the Renminbi
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more to market interactions. The Chinese also revised their “managed float” program of
the Renminbi, increasing its daily trading band from 0.3 percent to 0.5 percent in May of
2007 (USCC, 2007). While this illustrates slightly more actions taken than in the
previous year, the USCC (2008) continued to express worries that the Chinese had not
done enough to address the problem and that while the RMB would appreciate over 18
percent in mid-2008 it would still be undervalued by about 30 percent (Cline & Johnson,
as cited in USCC, 2008). Despite this slow pace, it is important to note that the Chinese
were at least attempting to appease American interests by allowing their currency to
appreciate which definitely could be argued as attempts to at least satiate the US
government’s insistence that they do something. In this sense, I argue that the Chinese
did make an effort to generate higher soft power reserves in the US through monetary
policies in 2007 regardless of how warmly those efforts were received by the United
States.
China upheld many of its WTO obligations, particularly those related to
“lowering tariffs and made progress in removing such import barriers as its previous
restrictions on distribution and sales of foreign goods within China” (U.S. Trade
Representative, as cited in USCC, 2007, p. 23). The WTO, reviewing Chinese actions,
asserted “a large number of trade-related laws” had been “revised” and expressed
satisfaction for most of China’s efforts (U.S. Trade Representative, as cited in USCC,
2007, p. 24). Still, the USCC (2008) found that China had much more work to do and
that it continued to operate in ways which protected local industries and gave them an
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advantage over foreign competitors. The Commission (2007) also argued that “despite
promises to do so, China has not begun talks to join the WTO’s Agreement on
Government Procurement that ensures a fair and transparent system for bidding on
government contracts” (p. 24).
This reflects a general trend in the annual reports filed by the USCC, which
continuously find fault in Chinese efforts or claim that more needs to be done. This may
indicate that Chinese efforts to generate soft power have not been effective, but one must
remember that the purpose of this research is not to judge the effectiveness of China’s
soft power promotion policies but simply their efforts to do so. This is why that
agreements made by the Chinese, regardless of how little they may accomplish in
bringing about the sort of change desired by the federal government of the United States
are still important as they are clear signals to the United States that China understands
their concerns and that they are working to address them. In a way, this conforms to the
words of President Hu in 2006 as he stressed that the two sides must respect one another
and understand that there will be differences in interpretation of how best to act in the
international system.

Confucius Institutes:
Perhaps the clearest example of Chinese endeavors to increase soft power in not
just the United States but throughout the world is the establishment of Confucius
Institutes. In the first of a series of annual reports starting in 2006, the Office of Chinese
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Language Council International (Hanban) stated that the purpose of the institutes was the
“teaching [of the] Chinese language and spreading Chinese culture” (Chinese Language
Council International, 2006, p. 11). The report goes on to stipulate that the Institutes are
not only “helpful in better satisfying the demand for learning Chinese abroad” but also in
“promoting economic and cultural exchange and cooperation between China and other
countries, and contributing [to] China’s role in world peace and development” (Hanban,
2006, pp. 11-12). From these sentiments, it is clear that the Chinese intended to facilitate
building a peaceful and cooperative image of China in the world and improve the
attractiveness of the PRC within other states by establishing the Confucius Institutes.
These efforts are clearly directed at the United States, as the People’s Republic of China
established the first Confucius Institute at the University of Maryland in the United States
(Li, 2014).
The Confucius Institutes are themselves administered by Hanban and the
Confucius Institute Headquarters, both of which being subsections of the Ministry of
Education in the PRC. The influence of the state government over the Confucius
Institutes is quite clear, as during the first Confucius Institute Conference held in 2006,
several state officials participated and gave speeches outlining the priorities and goals of
the institutes. This allows researchers to tie the creation of Confucius Institutes to state
policy, illustrating that part of that policy is the generation of soft power abroad.
During the opening ceremony of the 2006 conference, State Councilor Chen Zhili
outlined the three principles of the Confucius Institutes, with the first focusing on
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promoting cooperation between the local community and the Institute (Hanban, 2006).
While reiterating that encouraging the study of Chinese language and culture is the main
purpose of the institutes, it is interesting to note that Chen makes the first principle
developing “exchange, cooperation, and friendship between Chinese people and the rest
of the world” (Hanban, 2006, p. 12). This focus on the recipient nation of the Confucius
Institute is further highlighted by her second principle, compelling all those involved to
“comply with the laws of the country in which each particular institute is located,
observing local customs and demonstrating flexibility by running the Institute in
accordance with local specification” (Hanban, 2006, p. 12). The third principle is simply
a commitment to meet regularly to discuss the work and experiences of the various
Institutes. The first two priorities illustrate that the Chinese are very aware that the
institutes serve as representations of their own country and they must work to ensure that
the local population sees itself as an equal partner in the enterprise, generating a view of
the Chinese as interested in exchange and friendship.
This viewpoint was echoed by then Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of
the National People’s Congress Xu Jialu, asserting that “[l]anguage is the best bridge for
friendship and exchange between people of different countries” (Hanban, 2006, p. 14).
To Xu, the establishment of Confucius Institutes serves to facilitate communication not
just through the study of language but also through an understanding of different
perceptions among cultures (Hanban, 2006). These cultural differences serve as an
important aspect of a future “harmonious” society which will ensure peaceful coexistence

46

for people all over the world (Hanban, 2006, p. 14). These views are clearly meant to
further establish that the Confucius Institutes are a force for peace and a representation of
China’s own desire for peace in the world, crafting an image of a responsible and friendly
China. Xu, however, also mentions that the Confucius Institutes serve the role of adding
Chinese culture to a new multicultural world, establishing the institutes as the foundation
for the understanding of Chinese culture in the outside world” (Hanban, 2006).
The Chinese Minister of Education, Zhou Ji, reiterated this goal during his
address at the closing ceremony of the Confucius Institute Conference stating that the
“Confucius Institute should be the central base for international study of Chinese
language” (Hanban, 2006, p. 17). This sentiment illustrates a common view of Confucius
Institutes as an attempt by China to control the study of Chinese language and culture in
the world, preventing any other possible interpretations of either historical or current
events in China (Pan, 2006). Indeed, in the Constitution and By-Laws of Confucius
Institutes provided in Hanban’s 2007 Annual Report, it is stipulated that classes must be
taught using “standard” Chinese characters, excluding the traditional characters used in
Taiwan (Confucius Institute Headquarters, 2007, p. 68). In addition to identifying
China’s simplified characters as the standard form of Chinese writing, this serves as a
small demonstration of how the Confucius Institutes can serve as a tool of the Chinese
government to promote their conception of China throughout the world as the accepted
view. While this adds to a certain degree of mistrust towards the institutes in other
countries, it is also noteworthy that the by-laws reiterate China’s peaceful intentions and
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dedication to adhere “to the principles of mutual respect, friendly negotiations, and
mutual benefit” (Confucius Institute Headquarters, 2007, p. 67). Therefore, while certain
aspects of the Confucius Institute program may arouse suspicion, it is clear that the
Chinese were trying to promote a better image of the PRC and increase its soft power
reserves in countries that might worry of its intentions.
With this in mind, Hanban’s efforts to promote Confucius Institutes in the United
States serve as powerful examples of its efforts to generate soft power. Analyzing
Hanban’s Annual Reports, which begin in 2006, the Chinese government was quite
committed to the Confucius Institute Program as it allocated 350 million RMB in funds to
Hanban in 2006 for the establishment of Confucius Institutes all over the world (Hanban,
2006). At this time, the amount of Confucius Institutes in the United States was 16,
giving it the most for any single country in 2006 (Hanban, 2006). 2006 also saw
numerous agreements signed between Hanban and US institutions and the promotion of
international exchanges between the two countries. In April 2006, Hanban signed the
2006 Chinese Language and Culture Initiative with the US College Board and also
cooperated with the College Board to organize two AP Chinese Teacher Summer
Institutes at Beijing Normal University and Shanghai International Studies University
(Hanban, 2006). As of 2006 these programs had 60 attendees from the United States and
in June 2006 the Chinese welcomed 400 president of 216 elementary and secondary
schools from 45 states to visit China and learn about its education system through the
“Chinese Bridge for American Schools Program” (Hanban, 2006). As part of the
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Chinese Language and Culture Initiative, Confucius Institutes also provided 100
scholarships to American college students majoring in Chinese teaching (Hanban, 2006).
In addition, Hanban signed agreements with the Delaware Department of Education, the
Department of Education of the State of Kansas, the University of California, the
National Association of Independent Schools (NAIS), the District of Columbia Public
Schools (DCPS), and worked on a proposal for an agreement with the National Council
of State Supervisors for Languages (NCSSFL). This represents an impressive amount of
work done by Hanban in 2006 to promote Chinese soft power and build relationships
with various institutions in the United States.
These efforts did not stop in 2007, as Hanban’s total funds increased to nearly 460
million RMB and the Confucius Institute Headquarters was officially founded (Confucius
Institute Headquarters, 2007). Like Hanban, it is a “non-profit organization” freeing it
from any purely economic motivations (Confucius Institute Headquarters, 2007, p. 69).
Despite this, its ties to the Chinese government are quite clear as 10 of the 15 council
members who govern the Headquarters are from candidates “recommended by the
education agency of the Chinese State Council and approved by the State Council,” with
the remaining five from Chinese partner institutions (Confucius Institute Headquarters,
2007, p. 69). Additionally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China “granted the
headquarters certain level of foreign affairs authority, including the rights to approve exit
permits, apply for visas on behalf of another, issue ‘going abroad’ certificates and the
rights to invite foreigners to China” (Confucius Institute Headquarters, 2007, p. 8). With
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the blessing of the government to act in this manner, it is clear that the Chinese leadership
believed strongly in the Confucius Institute program and was willing to increase its
support of its leadership organizations in 2007.
Figure 2.1 Confucius Institutes in the U.S. from 2006 through 2007
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By 2007, the number of Confucius Institutes in the US increased from 16 to 38,
with the addition of one Confucius Classroom in Denver (Confucius Institute
Headquarters, 2007). Excluding the Confucius Classroom, this represents an increase of
137.5%, showing that Chinese efforts to promote soft power through Confucius Institutes
were able to produce impressive results. Hanban and the Confucius Institute
Headquarters also continued to promote cultural exchange by signing cooperation
agreements with organizations in the United States such as the American Asia
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Association, the Association of Independent Schools, the American Foreign Language
Association, the Chinese Language Association of Secondary-Elementary School
Teachers, the Maine Department of Education, and others (Confucius Institute
Headquarters, 2007). March 2007 also saw three Chinese Language and Culture
Presentation Tours made to 70 elementary, middle, high schools, colleges, universities,
and other educational institutions across seven states (Confucius Institute Headquarters,
2007). In total, 120 activities were held which included cultural lectures and class
demonstrations among others (Confucius Institute Headquarters, 2007). Programs in
China also saw an increase in American attendance with 120 American teachers, as
opposed to 60 the previous year, participated in the AP Chinese Summer Institute in June
2007 (Confucius Institute Headquarters, 2007). Finally, the “Chinese Bridge Program for
American, Britain, and Korean schools tour” had 800 American school principals invited
to Beijing (only 200 each were invited from Britain and Korea) up from the 400
administrators that visited the previous year (Confucius Institute Headquarters, 2007).
This shows that between 2006 and 2007 China did increase its efforts to woo the United
States through Confucius Institutes and other education projects and improve its soft
power in the country.

Cultural Performances and Museum Exchanges:
When researching cultural exchanges through art between the United States and
China, there are numerous examples throughout the US in many different locations. This
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presents a problem in that it would be impossible to identify all of these exchanges and
that most of them would be ineffectual in producing any substantial change in China’s
soft power in the United States due to them occurring at only the state or municipal level.
To counter this problem, I have chosen to investigate exchanges in art through
performances and exhibitions at the Kennedy Center located in Washington D.C and the
Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City. Opened to the public in September of
1971, the Kennedy Center was initially to be named the National Cultural Center, which
first came into being through the National Cultural Center Act signed by President
Eisenhower in 1958 (“Explore the Center: History of the Living Memorial,” 2015). The
Center would be renamed in honor of President Kennedy following his assassination due
to his tireless promotion of the project and his assertion of the arts as “our contribution to
the human spirit” (“Explore the Center,” 2015, para. 3). In addition to its roots as a
national arts center, the Kennedy Center became host to numerous performance groups
and functions as the premiere performance center in the nation’s capital. In this sense, it
serves as an excellent venue for other countries to place a spotlight on their own culture
and art before audiences comprising not just ordinary Americans but also those with
leadership roles in the country.
China sought to do just this in 2005 as the Ministry of Culture paired with the
Kennedy Center to organize the “Festival of China.” Held throughout the month of
October, the festival was billed as “the largest celebration of Chinese performing arts in
American history” and featured 28 events and exhibitions dedicated to the promotion of
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Chinese performance arts found in traditional and modern Chinese culture (“The
Kennedy Center Festival of China October 2005,” 2016, para.1). During October, the
entire center was redecorated in red and photographs of Beijing while also featuring an
exhibition of two full terra cotta warriors and a horse along with several other pieces
from the terra cotta warrior site (“The Kennedy Center,” 2016). The grounds around the
Center also featured numerous contemporary sculptures from China which presented a
mix between traditional Chinese aesthetics and modern design.
As for the events, the Festival saw performances by the China National Acrobatic
Troupe, the China National Peking Opera Company, the National Ballet of China, and the
Beijing Modern Dance Company, among many other groups (“The Kennedy Center,”
2016). All of these groups’ performances had a distinct Chinese character, but, some also
incorporated Western-style performances. This was perhaps made most clear by the
performances of the National Ballet of China which featured The Yellow River by
Chinese choreographer Chen Zemei, but also the second act from the classic ballet
Giselle (“National Ballet of China,” 2016a). This fusion of Chinese and Western styles
was also seen in the performance by the Guangzhou Symphony Orchestra on October 2,
2005 which included Chen Qigang’s “Iris dévoilée” (“Guangzhou Symphony Orchestra,
with Lang Lang, Piano,” 2016).
There were also several exhibitions and performances which included participants
with Chinese American backgrounds. Specifically, the Ying Quartet performed a
selection of works that were meant to reflect their Chinese American heritage and designs
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by Vera Wang were featured in an exhibition dedicated to new Chinese fashion (“The
Kennedy Center,” 2016). While this did not form the bulk performances and exhibits on
display, it is interesting to note that the Chinese Ministry of Culture decided to include
this element of Chinese culture.
Despite this exceptional beginning to increasing Chinese soft power through art
and performances, the only other Chinese-themed performance held at the Center from
2005 through 2007 was a performance by the Beijing Wushu Team (“Beijing Wushu
Team 2005 Tour,” 2016). It is true that individuals such as Lang Lang, the Chinese
pianist who played with the Guangzhou Symphony Orchestra, did return to the Center,
but since these were individuals whose performance was not done with reference to
Chinese art or culture it is less likely that the audience would view it as indicative of the
attractiveness of Chinese culture as a whole but more so as the exceptional ability of the
individual. And while this seems to indicate that the Chinese did not place as much
importance on performance art in creating soft power, it should be noted that from 2005
to 2007 no other country or region specific event at the Kennedy Center lasted for an
entire month. This illustrates that the “Festival of China” was in many ways a unique
event for the Center, featuring groups which had not performed in the United States
before and those such as the China National Peking Opera Company which had not
performed at the Kennedy Center for 25 years (“The Kennedy Center,” 2016). So, while
performances by national performance groups from China did not become a regular
occurrence at the Kennedy Center at this time, the “Festival of China,” with its relatively
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long duration in comparison to other region specific events, represents an exceptional
attempt by China to increase its soft power in the capital of the United States.
The capital of the United States, however, is not the only place where a country
would be able to reach a large audience of Americans, as New York City also forms an
exceptional venue and, with regards to art and historical artifacts, there is perhaps no
greater stage than the Metropolitan Museum of Art. In 1866 Paris, France a group of
Americans led by John Jay began proposing the idea of establishing a “national
institution and gallery of art” in the United States (“Main Building,” 2015, para. 1). By
1870 the group accomplished their goal as the Museum opened at the Dodworth
Building, later moving to its current site at Fifth Avenue and 82nd street in New York
City on March 30, 1880 (“Main Building,” 2015). It did not take long for the Museum to
gain an impressive reputation as by the early 20th century it had become “one of the
world's great art centers,” and today it is home to the largest collection of Egyptian art
outside of Cairo and has “one of the greatest” collections of European art in the world
(“Main Building,” 2015, para. 5).
These impressive credentials extend to Asian art as well as the Metropolitan
Museum of Art is home to 35,000 objects of Asian art from the third millennium B.C. to
the current day with its collections of Chinese painting and calligraphy ranking “among
the finest outside China” (“Asian Art,” 2015, para. 3). This interest in Chinese pieces
also extends to Buddhist sculptures, jades, bronzes, lacquers, and all sorts of other
antiquities with some dating back to the third millennium B.C. (“Asian Art,” 2015). With
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such an impressive collection, the Met is one of the most widely visited Museums in the
world, with approximately 6.2 million visitors from all over the world in 2014 (“Main
Building,” 2015). High attendance and an exceptional reputation, the Metropolitan
Museum of Art represents an excellent chance for a country to promote the soft power of
their nation by displaying the greatest works produced by their culture for all to see.
In this sense, there is an issue with many of the exhibits presented at the
Metropolitan Museum of Art due to the fact that most of the artifacts are either from the
Museum’s private collection or they are on loan from private donors. While some of
these donors are Chinese citizens, the majority are either American citizens or individuals
living in the United States. This makes it difficult to link these exhibitions with actions
by China to promote its soft power as the state lacks any control and only perhaps the
slightest input regarding how and when these artifacts will be displayed. Still, it is
arguable that this form of soft power promotion is more in line with the original
conception of the term by Joseph Nye who stipulated that soft power originates from
NGOs or a country’s cultural heritage. It is possible that the Chinese government realizes
this as there is no clear indication that they protested any exhibits held at the
Metropolitan Museum on the grounds that they be in charge of the artifacts in the
Museum’s collection. Indeed, on the website of the State Administration of Cultural
Heritage, the department responsible for these artifacts within China, there is no mention
of issues between it and the Metropolitan Museum, with the current director of the
Museum, Thomas P. Campbell, even visiting with Chinese museums to discuss
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cooperation and exchange programs (“Metropolitan Museum of Art Director Thomas
Visits Shanxi’s Han Yangling Museum,” 2009).
The only real indication that the Chinese government has any issue with the
exhibition of Chinese objects from private collections comes from the work of the Poly
Culture and Arts Company. This company oversees the Poly Art Museum in Beijing and
is required to “rescue and protect Chinese cultural relics lost abroad” (“Poly Culture:
Poly Art Museum,” n.d., para. 1). These efforts have received great “approval and
support” from within China as the Poly Group’s retrieval of “three national treasures” in
May 2000 that were “robbed out of China by western powers…more than 100 years ago”
is credited with inspiring “patriotism among the Chinese people” (“Poly Culture,” n.d.,
para. 1). Accompanying this has been an increasing number of Chinese buyers at art
markets attempting to buy back Chinese artifacts taken abroad (Devlin, 2012). Yet, all of
these actions seem to be more directed at European collectors or museums as Devlin
(2012) notes that French and British looting during the Second Opium War has been the
great impetus for these actions and does not mention any actions by Americans or
specifically the Metropolitan Museum as being targeted for critique by the Chinese
government. Considering this, it would seem that the government at least tacitly
approves the exhibitions held at the Met and perhaps even considers them an exceptional
method to increase Chinese soft power in the United States. With this in mind, an
analysis of exhibitions of Chinese art and cultural artifacts at the Metropolitan Museum
of Art represents an acceptable example of Chinese soft power generation in the United
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States as the Museum attracts a great deal of visitors and the exhibitions seem to be
accepted by the Chinese.
Beginning in 2005, the Met held a total of four Chinese exhibits with the first
concentrating on imperial art of the early fifteenth century. Featuring art from the reign
of Emperor Yongle during the Ming Dynasty, the exhibit sought to illustrate the
Emperor’s interest in promoting the arts and was held from April 1 to July 10, 2005
(“Defining Yongle: Imperial Art in Early Fifteenth-Century China,” 2015). When
calculating the total number of days the exhibit was on display at the Museum, I will
subtract the first Monday in May, Thanksgiving, Christmas Day, and New Year’s Day as
these are the only official holidays for the Museum. Considering this, the Yongle
exhibition ran a total of 100 days due to the Museum being closed the first Monday in
May. The next exhibit began on August 28, 2004 but ran till February 20, 2005 and was
titled “Chinese Paintings: Masterpieces from the Permanent Collection” (“Chinese
Paintings: Masterpieces from the Permanent Collection,” 2015). As the title implies, the
exhibition focused on great Chinese paintings with those from the last four ruling
dynasties of China, a time period of more than thousand years, forming the core of the
exhibit (“Chinese Painting,” 2015). Considering the timeframe of this research starting at
2005, I will only count the days this exhibit was at the Met beginning on January 2, 2005
(as the Museum is closed on January 1) which leads to a total 50 days where this
exhibition was on display. During 2005 the Museum also presented an exhibition
beginning on September 10, 2005 which ran until January 8, 2006 titled “Secular and
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Sacred: Scholars, Deities, and Immortals in Chinese Art” featuring art from the twelfth to
twentieth century (“Secular and Sacred: Scholars, Deities, and Immortals in Chinese
Art,” 2015). Due to this exhibit ending after the end of 2005, I will only use the amount
of days it was on display during 2005 when calculating the length of Chinese exhibits
held in 2005; resulting in the exhibition being on display for 111 days excluding
Thanksgiving and Christmas.
The last Chinese exhibition presented by the Metropolitan Museum of Art during
2005 also began in 2004 and while it only ran until January 23, 2005 its title of “China:
Dawn of a Golden Age, 200-750 A.D.” exemplifies the importance of the exhibit in terms
of representing the greatness of Chinese civilization (“China: Dawn of a Golden Age,
200-750 A.D.,” 2015). Focusing not just on classic pieces of Chinese art, the exhibit also
granted visitors a look into China’s growing reach beyond China as it contained artifacts
with Persian, Hellenic, and even Roman features (“China: Dawn,” 2015). This exhibit
also has the distinction of being most tied with the Chinese government as of the three
hundred objects on display, the majority were “recent archaeological finds” which would
require the authorization of the Chinese government to come out of China (“China:
Dawn,” 2015, para. 1). And while it was on display for only 22 days in 2005, its total
span of 101 days starting on October 12, 2004 (subtracting Thanksgiving, Christmas, and
New Year’s day as official holidays of the Museum) illustrates that it was an important
exhibit within the Museum running for more than one fourth of one year. Factoring in
those days where exhibits were on display at the same time, the Metropolitan Museum of

59

Art in 2005 had a total of 261 days (out of a 361 day year of operation for the Museum)
where a Chinese exhibit was present, symbolizing that China was very much so an
important part of the year for the Met.
In 2006, the first Chinese exhibition, titled “The ‘Hundred Antiques’ in Chinese
Textiles” began on February 8, 2006 and ended July 30, 2006, leading to a total of 172
days exempting the Museum holiday of the first Monday in May (“The ‘Hundred
Antiques’ in Chinese Textiles,” 2015). It is also crucial to remember that the exhibit
“Secular and Sacred: Scholars, Deities, and Immortals in Chinese Art” beginning in 2005
also ran partially through 2006 ending on January 8, 2006. While this only represents 7
days when the exhibit was on display during 2006, it is still part of the total days an
exhibit related to Chinese culture was held at the Met and is therefore necessary to
include in exhibits held in 2006. The next exhibition was “Brush and Ink: the Chinese
Art of Writing” beginning on September 2, 2006 and continuing until January 21, 2007,
resulting in a total of 119 days during 2006 (“Brush and Ink: the Chinese Art of Writing,”
2015). As with the previous exhibit, those days of the exhibit that fell in 2007 will be
added to the days of Chinese exhibitions during 2007. The final exhibit related to China
to be held in 2006 began on December 2, and was titled “Mother-of-Pearl: A Tradition in
Asian Lacquer” (“Mother-of-Pearl: A Tradition in Asian Lacquer,” 2015). On display till
April 1, 2007 this exhibition featured artworks not just from China but from different
Asian countries such as Korea, Japan, India, and Thailand (“Mother-of-Pearl,” 2015).
While this results in the exhibit not being completely China focused, it should be noted
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that Chinese soft power would still be generated by it, as the presence of Chinese artifacts
would reflect positively on China regardless of the objects being seen in conjunction with
works of other countries. Furthermore, the art on display, a type of lacquerware which
made use of mother-of-pearl was found in China’s “earliest cultures” going back to the
Shang Dynasty circa 1600-1050 B.C. which far predates those examples found from the
other countries in the exhibit which began in the 8th century A.D. (“Mother-of-Pearl,”
2015, para. 4). If anything else, this reflects even better on Chinese culture as it shows its
influence all throughout Asia. Considering this, the exhibition is included in this
research, bringing the total number of days with Chinese exhibitions at the Metropolitan
Museum of Art in 2006 to 298, representing a 14.2 percent increase from the previous
year.
Figure 2.2: Chinese Exhibition at the Met from 2005 through 2008 Source: Metropolitan
Museum of Art Past Exhibitions 2005-2007
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In 2007, those exhibitions which began in 2006 but ended in 2007 represented a
total of 110 days of being on display in 2007. The first exhibit related to China in 2007
beginning on February 10 and ending on August 26 (“Journeys: Mapping the Earth and
Mind in Chinese Art,” 2015). This exhibition, titled “Journeys: Mapping the Earth and
Mind in Chinese Art,” focused on the importance of travel in Chinese art, featuring works
from not just China’s past but also from the modern period. In total, the exhibit was on
display for 197 days. The next exhibit in 2007 was “Excellence and Elegance:
Decorative Arts of the Eighteenth-Century Qing Court” which ran from August 25 to
November 25; a total of 92 days (“Excellence and Elegance: Decorative Arts of the
Eighteenth-Century Qing Court,” 2015). Beginning on September 15, 2007 and ending
on February 10, 2008 “Bridging East and West: The Chinese Diaspora and Lin Yutang”
was the next Chinese exhibit held at the Met, specializing in artworks and
correspondence from the collection of Lin Yutang a Chinese immigrant to the United
States (“Bridging East and West: The Chinese Diaspora and Lin Yutang,” 2015).
Totaling 107 days during 2007, this exhibition presented artwork related to the Chinese
diaspora and the blending of Chinese and Western styles of painting, particularly
showcasing the work of Xu Beihong, a leading proponent of this type of fusion of styles
(“Bridging East and West,” 2015).
The last Chinese exhibit, titled “Asian Lacquer: Masterpieces from the Florence
and Herbert Irving Collection,” began on November 3, 2007, ended on May 11, 2008,
and once again featured artwork from countries outside of China (“Asian Lacquer:
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Masterpieces from the Florence and Herbert Irving Collection,” 2015). However, like the
previous example that featured lacquerware, this art form began in China and its spread
to countries like Japan and Korea again is symbolic of China’s position in the Asian
world as a leader in culture; improving their stature and increasing their soft power. This
exhibit, excluding those days which occurred in 2008 had a total of 57 days on display in
2007.
Considering those days which there was overlap between the exhibits, a Chinese
exhibition was on display at the Met for the entirety of the 2007 fiscal year. This jump to
371 days represents a 24.5 percent increase from the previous year and corresponds with
the upward trend found in Chinese related exhibits presented by the Metropolitan
Museum of art from 2005 to 2007. Coinciding with the time frame when we would
expect an increase in soft power efforts by the Chinese this seems to add vindication to
the hypothesis that the Chinese government from 2005 to 2007 was very interested in
creating a positive image of itself in the United States.
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Chapter Three: Hu Jintao 2008-2011
Hu Jintao and Inconsistent Signals:
The United States and China reacted in fairly similar ways to the financial crisis
of 2008, enacting large stimulus programs in order to inject much needed funds into their
economies. For the Chinese, this meant encouraging many of the banks under state
control to lend out large amounts of money, totaling nearly $1.5 trillion in 2009 alone
(Prasad as cited in U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2011).
Actions such as this resulted in massive increases in investment in China and enabled the
Chinese economy to weather much of the economic storm of the crisis (USCC, 2011).
The United States’ stimulus, however, did not experience the same amount of success,
with the US economy only growing 1.0 percent in the second quarter of 2009 as opposed
to China’s 7.9 percent during the same time period (McGregor, as cited in U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, 2009; Bureau of Economic Analysis, as
cited in USCC, 2009). Clearly, the two countries were on very different economic
trajectories during this time, leading to possibilities that there might be certain changes in
their relationship with each other.
In spite of this speculation, Hu Jintao maintained that his country was still
committed to working with the United States and promoted close relations between the
two states. Much like during his 2006 state visit, Hu Jintao again attended a dinner
sponsored by the U.S.-China Business Council where he was once more introduced by
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Henry Kissinger. In his introduction, Kissinger borrowed from the vocabulary often
utilized by his Chinese counterparts in the past calling for a “harmonious world,”
asserting that if “our two countries work together most of the problems before us will
find a creative solution” (C-Span, 2011). President Hu concurred with this sentiment
calling for the people of China and the United States to “step up cooperation and work
with people across the world to share opportunities, meet challenges, and build a better
future for the entire world” (C-Span, 2011). Showing respect for the previous leaders of
his hosts, Hu once again mentioned President Franklin Roosevelt, tying Roosevelt’s calls
for enduring progress in the face of the Great Depression to continuing exchanges
between the United States and China in the realm of international diplomacy (C-Span,
2011).
Joint statements made between Presidents Obama and Hu during the Chinese
leader’s state visits to Washington in 2009 and 2011 seem to add more evidence that Hu
was determined China remain a friend to the US. According to the joint statement from
2009, the Chinese side affirmed that it resolutely “follows the path of peaceful
development and a win-win strategy of opening-up, and is committed to promoting the
building of a harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity.” (“U.S.China Joint Statement, November 2009,” 2009, in “Building and Deepening Bilateral
Strategic Trust” para. 2). During the same visit the Chinese stressed that the two
countries “should further strengthen coordination and cooperation” and even welcomed
the United States as an “Asia-Pacific nation that contributes to peace, stability and
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prosperity in the region” (“U.S.-China Joint Statement,” 2009, in “Building and
Deepening” para. 2). Such commitments were reiterated in 2011 when China and the
United States claimed they were committed to work together to “build a cooperative
partnership based on mutual respect and mutual benefit in order to promote the common
interests of both countries and to address the 21st century's opportunities and challenges.”
(“U.S.-China Joint Statement January 9, 2011,” 2011, para. 3).
In spite of these peaceful assurances, many US observers began to discern a shift
in Chinese behavior toward the United States shortly following the crisis. According to
Joshua Kurlantzick (2011), Chinese soft power grew throughout the world as the United
States felt the effects of the Great Recession, and the Chinese actively promoted their
economic model as an alternative to the United States’. In a discussion on the 2008
Olympic Games in China, Elizabeth Economy and Adam Segal also lamented China’s
further regression from more open policies as it cracked down heavily on dissent during
the games and refused US calls for greater transparency in territorial issues related to
Xinjiang and Tibet (“China's Olympic Nightmare,” 2008).
The U.S.-China Security and Economic Review Commission (USCC) also
became more convinced of Chinese aggression from 2008 through 2011. In 2010, the
Commission argued that China had become increasingly assertive in its dealing with
other countries, highlighting actions in the South and East China Seas while also claiming
that its “friendly neighbor” policies in Southeast Asia had not proven effective in the face
of China’s willingness to act unilaterally in pursuit of its own interests in these areas

66

(U.S.-China Security and Economic Review Commission, 2010, p. 139). By 2011, the
Commission was even more direct, claiming that the Chinese had begun to view
themselves as “ascendant” as the United States still felt the effects of the financial crisis
and appeared to China to be “in decline” (USCC, 2011, p. 17). Facing these beliefs, the
Commission (2011) openly stated that the United States was “in a global competition
with China, and U.S. policies should flow from this premise” in future dealings with the
Chinese (p. 19)
Considering these views, it is clear that there was a degree of disagreement
regarding China’s posture toward the US from 2008 through 2011. While the Chinese,
particularly President Hu, continued to claim that they sought only peaceful relations
voices from within the United States began to see China as more of a threat than a
possible friend; openly questioning their intentions regarding the US. Indeed, even Hu
himself does not seem to be completely immune from these concerns. In the joint
statements released during his visits to the US, the Chinese distinctly rebuked US
concerns on human rights stating there “should be no interference in any country’s
internal affairs” and that the people of different countries “have the right to choose their
own…development model” (“U.S.-China Joint Statement,” 2011, para. 7).
And yet, in 2011 the Chinese reasserted in other venues that they were committed
to the path of peaceful development. In articles released by the State Council in
September 2011, China stated it must “develop itself through upholding world peace and
contribute to world peace through its own development” (Information Office of the State
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Council, 2011, in “The Path of China's Peaceful Development: What It Is About” para.
4). The document goes on to proclaim that China “loves peace” and that China “never
engages in aggression or expansion, never seeks hegemony, and remains a staunch force
for upholding regional and world peace and stability” (Information Office of the State
Council, 2011, in “The Path” para. 8). Combining these sentiments with those expressed
by Hu and contrasting the assertions made by US commentators, it becomes clear that the
understanding of the diplomatic posture of China toward the US during this time did not
enjoy unanimity. This strengthens the argument that Chinese soft power initiatives
during this time frame should be investigated so as to gain a clearer picture regarding
Chinese intentions toward the United States during a period of Chinese growth and US
weakness.

Economic Relations:
Following the trends established from the start of 2005 to the end of 2007, exports
and imports between the two countries continued to grow from 2008 through 2011. In
2008, Chinese exports to the United States reached $337.8 billion while US exports to
China touched $69.73 billion; both increases from $321.5 billion and $65.2 billion in
2007 respectively (USCC, 2009). Due to the effects of the financial crisis, 2009 saw the
amount of exports and imports between the two actually decrease; something which did
not occur once from 2000 to 2008 (USCC, 2010). During 2009, Chinese exports fell to
$296.4 billion while US exports to China decreased to $69.5 billion (USCC, 2010). This
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decline was fleeting at best, however, as by 2010 exports to the US from China increased
to $364 billion and US exports climbed to $91 billion (U.S. Census Bureau, as cited in
USCC, 2011). This continued during 2011, with Chinese exports increasing 9.4 percent
to $399.3 billion, and US exports up 13.1 percent, reaching $103.9 billion (Office of the
United States Trade Representative, U.S-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, 2012).
Much like the previous years under investigation, however, the trade relationship
does not provide the full story regarding the economic relationship between the United
States and China. In its 2009 report to Congress, the USCC echoed several of the same
concerns it had from 2005 to 2007, arguing that China needed to follow its commitments
to the World Trade Organization (WTO) to open its economy to foreign markets, to push
intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, and to allow its currency to be more
influenced by the market than by the central government (Kang, as cited in USCC, 2009).
In particular, the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) found
that in 2009 the commercial value of unlicensed software marketed in China exceeded
$7.5 billion and in January of that year the WTO decided that most of China’s IPR
enforcement policies “did not comply with WTO obligations” (“2011 U.S.-China Joint
Commission on Commerce and Trade Outcomes,” 2011, in “Intellectual Property Rights”
para. 2; USCC, 2009). The Commission (2009) also found that the central government of
China still had control of foreign currency entering the country, buying these currencies
and “swapping them for newly printed RMB” to ensure the renminbi (RMB) stayed
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within the trading band mandated by the Chinese government (p. 23). Even more
problematic was that while the renminbi had appreciated nearly 20 percent from 2005 to
2008, it was stopped at “an effective peg at around 6.83 to the dollar” to guarantee
China’s continued advantage in exports (USCC, 2010, p. 22).
Several issues in particular became increasingly important during this time period;
specifically concerns about Chinese government procurement activities. The Chinese
had still failed to sign the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) of the World
Trade Organization (WTO), with its submission at the end of 2007 being criticized by
trading partners for exempting state-owned enterprises from the agreement and arguing
for a 15-year grace period where China would not be forced to implement any GPA
obligations (Inside U.S.-China Trade, as cited in USCC, 2010 p. 46). Pairing these
actions with Chinese backtracking on its currency undermines many of the soft power
generation efforts taken by China concerning these areas from 2005 through 2007;
making the US side more apprehensive of Chinese actions in these areas after 2007.
While the central issue between China and the United States remained the trade
deficit, a recurring complaint made by the Commission focused on China’s “indigenous
innovation” program (USCC, 2010, p. 13). The earliest concerns regarding this initiative
stemmed from notices issued by China’s Ministry of Finance in 2007 introducing
measures to limit “the procurement of imported products” by the government for use in
projects, guaranteeing that local companies had an edge in producing items needed by the
government (USCC, 2011, pp. 72). According to documents from the Chinese
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government, indigenous innovation products are those were the intellectual property is
“fully owned by a Chinese company and a trademark initially registered within China”
(USCC, 2011, p. 73). By limiting Chinese government agencies to purchasing these
materials, the indigenous innovation program effectively requires the government to
“shun even those goods manufactured in China by joint ventures with foreign affiliates”
and that those products that are bought from foreign firms must be those where the
corporations have already “transferred their technology” over to a Chinese company in
order to gain a Chinese patent (USCC, 2011, p. 73; USCC, 2011, p. 70).
Opposition to this transfer of technology was strong among American
corporations, and in 2010, 19 heads of business associations in the US sent a letter to
Obama Administration officials. They warned that American companies would be
unable to access the government procurement section of the Chinese market unless they
were “prepared to establish Chinese brands and transfer their research and development
of new products to China,” opening them to significant risk of intellectual property theft
(“Letter to the Obama Administration,” as cited in USCC, 2010, p. 48). Being excluded
from a market which the Chinese government estimated surpassed $100 billion1 in 2009
represents a significant blow to American business interests and if China were to respond

The USCC argues that this figure is largely underestimated as the Chinese Ministry of Finance’s limited
definition of government procurement spending does not include most government infrastructure projects
or procurement by state-owned enterprises, which form a substantial portion of government procurement
activities in China (USCC, 2010).
1
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for American calls for more openness in this area it would certainly improve their image
within in the United States.
In 2008, however, it appeared that the Chinese had not yet attempted to address
this issue. During the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade in
California in 2008, no mention was made of indigenous innovation and the Strategic
Economic Dialogue (SED) only commented that a second innovation conference would
be held between the two sides (“Joint U.S.-China Fact Sheet: The Fifth U.S.-China
Strategic Economic Dialogue,” 2008). This lack of action, however, may be due to the
fact that indigenous innovation had not yet become a serious issue, with the USCC first
mentioning it in its 2010 report, making it more prudent to begin analyzing Chinese
efforts in this area around the timeframe of late 2009 to 2010.
In other areas, the Chinese appeared to make some progress. During the first
meeting of the 2008 SED, the Chinese made numerous efforts to expand US access to
Chinese markets, particularly in the fields of agriculture and environmental products
(“Joint U.S.-China Fact Sheet Fourth U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue,” 2008).
In finance, the Chinese planned to finish an “assessment of foreign participation in
China’s securities, futures, and fund management firms” and to begin a pilot project
where “non-deposit taking foreign financial institutions to provide consumer finance to
local retail customers in China” (“Joint U.S.-China Fact Sheet Fourth,” 2008, in
Macroeconomic Cooperation and Financial Services para. 3; “Joint U.S.-China Fact
Sheet Fourth,” 2008, in “Macroeconomic Cooperation” para. 7).
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China also agreed to negotiations on a bilateral investment treaty and approved
the framework for the first meeting of the Investment Forum on June 16, 2008 (“Joint
U.S.-China Fact Sheet Fourth,” 2008). The two sides also announced the creation of the
Investment Promotion Initiative, meant to bring together parties from both countries
interested in mutual investment (“Joint U.S.-China Fact Sheet Fourth,” 2008). Despite
this seeming flurry of activity, the Chinese did less regarding IPR violations, confirming
compliance with WTO obligations, or concerns regarding RMB appreciation. The only
possibly substantial action in these areas during this meeting of the SED was the signing
of a work plan meant to implement the Memoranda of Agreement on drug and medical
device safety which could combat issues related to counterfeit medical supplies in China
(“Joint U.S.-China Fact Sheet Fourth,” 2008).
The Fifth U.S.-China SED on December 5, 2008 also focused more on access to
Chinese markets by US groups. It was announced that China would grant foreign
incorporated banks in China the ability to “trade bonds in the inter-bank market…on the
same basis as Chinese-invested banks” (“Joint U.S.-China Fact Sheet: The Fifth,” 2008,
in “Macroeconomic Cooperation and Financial Services” para. 2). The two sides also
held three rounds of bilateral investment treaty negotiations that they deemed to be
“productive” and hoped would lead to beneficial results for both sides (“Joint U.S.-China
Fact Sheet: The Fifth,” 2008, in “Trade and Investment” para. 6). These acts formed the
main substance of the meeting however, with once again nothing done about IPR, the
RMB, or WTO compliance. In fact, most of the results of the meeting were simply
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commitments to continue previous agreements or to hold discussions about issues at other
times.
Regardless, The USCC did not find much fault with Chinese actions during their
bilateral meetings with the US. Unlike past discussion which the USCC dismissed as
accomplishing very little, the Commission did not criticize the meetings for a lack of
accomplishment in 2008. Still, in the area of intellectual property rights, the Commission
noted Waldemeir’s assertion that a new amendment to China’s Patent Law could make it
more difficult to “obtain a Chinese patent for inventions that are already in use overseas”
(p. 34). There was also concern that the Chinese government, despite its actions to allow
access to its economy to the contrary, was still engaged in protectionist policies meant to
make it difficult to operate in China (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, 2008). Even with these concerns, the Commission commented that the
Chinese had done much to meet WTO standards and did not complain of lack of Chinese
commitment to address the issues between the US and itself as they had in the past.
2009 once again saw the United States and China meet for the Joint Commission
of Commerce and Trade, attended by Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan, U.S. Trade
Representative Ron Kirk, and the U.S. Secretary of Commerce and later ambassador to
China Gary Locke. During the meeting, China committed to allow US companies more
access to Chinese agricultural markets, removed certain requirements on US wind
turbines, and promised that medical devices entering the country would not be subjecting
to as much testing as they were in the past (“U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce
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and Trade,” 2009). While these efforts focused on market access much of the
discussions, however, concentrated on China’s accession to the WTO Government
Procurement Agreement, where the United States insisted that China submit a new
proposal (“U.S.-China Joint Commission,” 2009). In response to these requests, the
Chinese agreed to submit a revised offer as early as 2010 and to establish with the US a
working group which would “regularly conduct discussions on issues involving
government procurement and purchases by state-affiliated enterprises and organizations
and private parties” (“U.S.-China Joint Commission,” 2009). In response to all the
discussion regarding its government procurement policies, China reiterated that all
products made by foreign invested enterprises would be treated like domestic products in
the Chinese economy (“U.S.-China Joint Commission,” 2009).
On intellectual property rights, the Chinese announced several initiatives they
were willing to take including starting a four month campaign against internet piracy
(“U.S.-China Joint Commission,” 2009). The Chinese also announced that they would
work with the US side to strengthen exchanges regarding trademark filing and assured it
would establish broadcast tariff rate to protect IPR “as soon as possible” (“U.S.-China
Joint Commission,” 2009, in “Intellectual Property Rights” para. 3). Guarantees to hold
discussion or to enact policy eventually, however, formed the bulk of the discussion with
some commitments to hold dialogues on the issue.
The SED did not continue in 2009, replaced by the Strategic and Economic
Dialogue (S&ED) established by Presidents Obama and Hu shortly after President
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Obama entered office (“Fact Sheet: U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue,”
2009). While essentially the same as the Strategic Economic Dialogue held during the
Bush Administration, several key differences included that it would be held once every
year as opposed to twice, more senior-level officials would be involved, and that it would
be headed by the U.S. Secretary of State and a State Councilor of China (“Fact Sheet:
U.S.-China,” 2009). At its first meeting, the S&ED lacked an ambitious agenda;
addressing the issues which persisted between the two countries without proposing any
new measures to deal with them. Among many other statements, China agreed to
“continue to allow foreign-invested banks incorporated in China that meet relevant
prudential requirements to enjoy the same rights as domestic banks” while also to support
foreign and domestic joint-venture securities companies to “participate in A-share
brokerage” (“The First U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Economic Track
Joint Fact Sheet,” 2009, in “Foundations for a Strong Financial System” para. 3).
Regarding the WTO and the GPA, China recognized the importance of “nondiscriminatory government procurement policies” and assured that it would continue to
cooperate with the United States in drafting its new proposal for acceding to the
agreement (“The First U.S.-China,” 2009, in “Trade and Investment” para. 6).
Unsurprisingly, the USCC did not find much of the actions taken during either the
JCCT or the S&ED to be that encouraging. The Commission repeated its persistent
concerns that China would not uphold its promises regarding the issues it identified as
key to US interests in the economic relationship between the two countries (Neumann, as
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cited in U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2009, p. 31). It also
argued that the final communique from the Strategic and Economic Dialogue was
“repeated verbatim from the previous Strategic Economic Dialogue statement”
(Neumann, as cited in USCC, 2009, p. 31). In addition, the Commission (2009) also
noted that the Chinese indicated that the new accession agreement they were drafting
could still “exempt state-owned enterprises and subcentral government entities”
(Neumann, as cited in USCC, 2009, p. 31).
It seems the Chinese became less willing to take action during these meetings
than they were in the past. From 2005 to 2007, there were examples of the Chinese
signing new agreements or announcing new programs with specific plans to tackle the
issues brought up by the American side during their annual meetings. In 2009, however,
much of the effort was spent on making statements that they appreciated US concerns or
to agree to new dialogues to discuss the problems at a later date. While these dialogues
suggest continued cooperation, there is no evidence that anything has come from them,
hinting that the Chinese simply promised to discuss the problem without planning on
taking serious action against it. This is similar to some of the action China took in 2008
and if this behavior continues, it is doubtful that Chinese commitments to act will
promote soft power as they will understandably be seen as hollow from the US
perspective.
Another area of Chinese inaction from 2008 through 2009 was in the valuation of
its currency, which only seemed to receive attention in 2010. On July 19 of that year, a
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week before the G-20 meeting in Toronto, China’s central bank announced that it would
allow for more flexibility while ensuring the exchange rate would remain “basically
stable” (People’s Bank of China, as cited in USCC, 2010, p. 23). This promise, while
vague, did allow for some confidence that China might be more proactive this year in
adopting economic policy more amenable to the US, and it seemed this was partially the
case during the 21st meeting of the JCCT on December 15.
In increasing market access, not many additional actions were taken besides
resuming talks on opening the Chinese market to American beef in 2011 and the U.S.China Legal Exchange held in China earlier in the year serving as a platform for
promoting U.S. exports (“21st U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade,”
2010). In IPR, the Chinese announced that its judiciary branch would begin utilizing
information collected during exchanges from previous JCCT meetings to conduct a study
“on drafting relevant [sic] Judicial Interpretations” on the issue of intellectual property
rights (“21st U.S.-China,” 2010, in “Intellectual Property Rights” para. 6). Despite this
promising start, most of the rest of the discussions fell into the pattern established in
2009, where the American and Chinese sides simply agreed to continue exchanging
information on the issue and that China would take measures to prevent it without
stipulating what those measures would be (“21st U.S.-China,” 2010).
Regarding indigenous innovation, the JCCT saw further assurances from China
that the program did not constitute a threat to US business interests. China clarified that
it did not consider the point of origin of intellectual property a “direct or indirect
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condition for eligibility for government procurement preferences” and that it would
continue to discuss this issue with the United States (“21st U.S.-China,” 2010, in
“China’s ‘Indigenous Innovation’ Policies” para. 1). These discussions were paired with
further commitments to hold exchanges regarding the issue with China again confirming
that its regulations “would not be used as a basis to discriminate against any technology”
(“21st U.S.-China,” 2010, in “China’s ‘Indigenous Innovation’” para. 4). Tying this with
government procurement, China also agreed to submit a second revised off to the GPA
Committee of the World Trade Organization before the end of 2011, as the previous
submission had been met with criticism (“21st U.S.-China,” 2010).
The Second U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue turned out to be more
of the same. Specifically, China agreed to revise its “Catalogue Guiding Foreign
Investment in Industries” and to encourage greater foreign investment in numerous
economic sectors (“Second Meeting of the U.S.-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue
Joint U.S.-China Economic Track Fact Sheet,” 2010, in “Section II” para. 8).
Furthermore, the Export-Import Banks of both countries agreed to “establish cooperation
mechanisms on trade finance” and to promote communication in this area in both of their
countries (“Second Meeting,” 2010, in “Section II” para. 10). Besides these areas,
however, the rest of the meeting produced only vague promises to continue working to
solve issues related to the WTO or to continue existing dialogues between other areas of
the governments of the two countries on problems related to RMB appreciation,
indigenous innovation, etc.
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In response to these efforts, the USCC (2010) was even more critical than it had
been in the past, stating that dialogues in 2010 were unable to “secure any significant
agreements or Chinese policy changes” (p. 3). The Commission (2010) also noted that
even those actions the Chinese took were not especially substantial, arguing that the new
RMB policy remained in a narrow trade band decided by the Chinese government at +/0.5 percent per day; limiting the possibility of transition to a market economy (Smith, as
cited in USCC, 2010). China’s new offer to the GPA committee was also found to be
lacking by the USCC which argued it still would not cover provincial or local
governments or state-owned agencies and that it reserved “the right for the Chinese
government to ‘require the incorporation of domestic contents, offset procurement, or
transfer of technology,’” essentially continuing to allow the Chinese government to gain
access to foreign technologies (WTO, as cited in USCC, 2010, p. 47). The growing
frustration of the USCC seems to reflect a new acceptance by the United States side that
the Chinese did not intend to work with them to resolve issues. This eliminates dialogues
or exchanges as acceptable means to improve the image of the Chinese in the US as they
are only seen as delaying tactics to serve the interests of China. Facing these concerns,
China’s soft power generation efforts from 2008 to 2010 seemed to be very minimal.
This appears to have changed in 2011 as more demonstrable actions were taken in
the realm of economic relations by the Chinese. Importantly, the renminbi experienced
its first real appreciation against the dollar in several years where it rose by 11 percent
from June 2010 to December 2011 (Economist, as cited in U.S.-China Security and
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Economic Review Commission, 2012, p. 35). From July 16, 2010 to October 17, 2011
alone the RMB rose 6 percent, the second fastest rate of appreciation since the Chinese
ended the hard peg to the dollar in 2005 (Yung, as cited in USCC, 2011, p. 30). This
development led to praise from the U.S. Treasury which “duly noted” the “positive
contribution” it would have on relations between the two countries (U.S. Department of
the Treasury, as cited in USCC, 2012, p. 35).
The 2011 meeting of the JCCT also provided some significant developments,
particularly those concerning indigenous innovation. Specifically, the Chinese
announced that the State Council had introduced a measure “requiring governments of
provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions” to eliminate any rules tying
innovation policies to government procurement by December 1, 2011, effectively ending
the unfair exclusion of foreign firms from this market (“2011 U.S.-China Joint
Commission on Commerce and Trade Outcomes,” 2011, in “Technology and Innovation
Policies” para. 6). China further declared that it would use the JCCT Intellectual
Property Rights Working Group to “study investment, tax and other regulatory measures
outside of government procurement” detailing specific phases in 2012 and 2013 of the
discussion and what the two sides hoped to achieve from them (“2011 U.S.-China Joint
Commission,” 2011, in “Technology and Innovation” para. 6). While this may sound
similar to the previous commitments to engage in dialogues, it was much more concrete
regarding what would be discussed and the processes which would be adapted, making it
more believable that it was a serious action by the Chinese. The Chinese also announced
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improvements to the China Compulsory Certification (CCC) mark process used on all
imported goods to China and in response to a request by the US to allow “participation of
non-Chinese entities in the China Compulsory Certification…scheme,” China agreed to
exchanges with the United States (“2011 U.S.-China Joint Commission,” 2011 in
“Standards and Conformity Assessment” para. 2).
Regarding intellectual property rights the Chinese established a “State Councillevel leadership structure, headed by Vice Premier Wang Qishan, to lead and coordinate
intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement across China” (“2011 U.S.-China Joint
Commission,” 2011, in “Intellectual Property Rights” para. 1). With high-level
leadership, it appeared China was becoming more serious in combatting this issue and
Wang Qishan himself promised that the provincial legalization program would be
complete by the middle of 2012 and that legalization programs at the county and
municipal levels would be finished by 2013 (“2011 U.S.-China Joint Commission,”
2011). Promising even greater clarity in its actions, the Chinese announced plans to
“conduct enterprise software management pilot projects” and provide reports for US
firms to analyze (“2011 U.S.-China Joint Commission,” 2011, in “Intellectual Property
Rights” para. 5).
During the meeting of the S&ED, the Chinese continued to present a more
committed posture toward the issues raised by the United States, declaring it would revise
Article 9 of the Draft Regulations Implementing the Government Procurement Law to
reflect its decision to explicitly remove the link between indigenous innovation and
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government procurement (“Third Meeting of the U.S.-China Strategic & Economic
Dialogue Joint U.S.-China Economic Track Fact Sheet,” 2011). The Chinese also stated
they would “strengthen the government inspection mechanism” of pirated software using
the results of the 2011 campaign to target IPR infringing products (“Third Meeting,”
2011, in “Section III” para. 2). Finally, the Chinese agreed to guarantee equal status of
foreign banks in the Chinese market with domestic institutions (“Third Meeting,” 2011,
in “Section II” para. 7).
This year’s actions were received much more positively by the USCC (2011) than
in previous years, with particular focus on China’s clearer commitment to addressing US
concerns about the indigenous innovation program. Still, the Commission (2011)
remained worried that these new actions would illustrate the same lack of resolve as did
previous Chinese promises. After reading the reports on the JCCT and S&ED for 2011,
it appears that the Chinese did indeed increase their soft power through their actions, as
their efforts provided more believable reasons to expect China to act on its promises. By
being more specific and providing firm guarantees to amend those articles which the
United States identified as problematic, it was clear that the Chinese were more devoted
to addressing the concerns of the US, creating the image of a more cooperative partner
than they had from 2008 through 2010. Still, the trend in Chinese actions to rely on other
dialogues or exchanges to address certain issues remained, adding to the confusion
regarding Chinese efforts to generate soft power through economic policies in 2011.
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While my own interpretation of Chinese actions is certainly more positive than
those provided by the USCC, it is important to note that China did engage in certain
actions which arguably did much to decrease their soft power from 2008 to 2011. For
example, during the first meeting of the S&ED in Washington, Vice Premier Wang
Qishan stated that “the U.S. should properly balance and properly handle the impact of
the dollar supply on the domestic economy and the world economy as a whole,” directly
lecturing the US officials in attendance (USCC, 2009, p. 25). This was not the only
instance of rebukes from the Chinese side at the meeting and some argued that it
represented a “power shift between the two countries,” where China was more assertive
and the US was relatively “muted” (Landler & Sanger; and Barkley & Solomon, as cited
in USCC, 2009, p. 31).
Clearer examples of growing confidence on the part of the Chinese came from
Premier Wen Jiabao, who made numerous statements during this time that served to
rankle US officials. Regarding President Obama’s commitment to double US exports
over five years the Premier argued that the US demanding China to appreciate their
currency while depreciating their own constituted “a kind of trade protectionism” (Batson
et al., as cited in USCC, 2010, p. 22). Premier Wen paired this statements with
comments regarding the amount of money the Chinese had loaned the US stating that he
was “a little bit worried” and called on the US to “maintain its good credit, to honor its
promises, and to guarantee the safety of China’s assets” (Roberts, as cited in USCC,
2010, p. 34). Chinese leaders had not taken to speaking toward the US like this since
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before the beginning of Hu’s emphasis on a peaceful rise, leading to much speculation
that these types of comments reflected a growing certainty among China’s elite that they
were surpassing the United States as an economic power and did not owe them the sort of
deference they had displayed before. The President of the China Investment Corporation,
Gao Xiqing, seemed to confirm this view when he stated that the US economy was built
on “the gratuitous support…of a lot of countries,” claiming he would not encourage the
US to come “kowtow, but at least, be nice to the countries that lend you money”
(Fallows, as cited in USCC, 2010, p. 34).
When pairing these actions by China’s government officials with the lack of
action on the Chinese part from 2008 to 2010, it becomes clear that Chinese efforts to
promote soft power through economic measures is difficult to determine during this time
period; making it questionable whether the Chinese had moved away from soft power
promotion or not.

Confucius Institutes and the High-Level Consultation on People-to-People
Exchanges:
From 2004 to 2007 the Confucius Institute program enjoyed substantial growth
and began to expand its influence in the realm of Chinese instruction worldwide. With
visits to numerous opening ceremonies and other events held by Confucius Institutes, it
became clear by 2008 that the program had the support of President Hu Jintao and other
government officials as well (Hanban, 2009; Hanban, 2010). In 2008, Liu Yandong, a
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State Councilor, became the Chairwoman of the Council of the Confucius Institute
Headquarters while Zhou Ji, the Minister of Education, served as its Vice-Chairman
(Hanban, 2008). This government presence was supplemented by numerous Council
Member of the Institute Headquarters positions being filled by government officials, such
as the Deputy Secretary-General of the State Council, Vice Ministers of Culture, and
Education, etc. (Hanban, 2008). There were also early appearances by Xi Jinping and Li
Keqiang at Confucius Institute events as it became more clear that they would be selected
as the next President and Premier of China respectively (Hanban, 2009; Hanban, 2010;
Hanban, 2011).
It should also be noted that during this time Hanban and the Confucius Institute
Headquarters seem to have been effectively consolidated, with the author of the 2008
annual report on the Confucius Institute being credited as Hanban with the Confucius
Institute Headquarters following in parentheses (Hanban, 2008). Furthermore, the
Director-General of Hanban, Xu Lin, also served as the Chief-Executive of the Confucius
Institute Headquarters, making it more difficult to discern the differences between the
two organizations (Hanban, 2008). Even on Hanban’s website the two departments are
now referred to as the same (“About us: Hanban,” 2014). Considering this, Hanban and
the Confucius Institute Headquarters will be used interchangeably throughout the rest of
this thesis as the distinctions between them seemed to have all but disappeared by this
time.
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By 2008, Hanban launched several new initiatives to promote Chinese language
studies and became a bigger contributor to Chinese language education in the world,
including the establishment of the Secretariat of the International Society for Chinese
Language Teaching. Starting with 1,500 members, the Secretariat was dedicated to
bringing together educators to discuss Chinese language instruction and, by 2011, grew to
include 4,075 members from 68 countries and regions” (Hanban, 2008; Hanban, 2011, p.
48). The Chinese also launched the Confucius Institute Online website, giving it global
access to Chinese learners and attracting 309,809 members from all over the world by
2011 (Hanban, 2008; Hanban, 2011). 2008 to 2011 also saw the institutes collaborate
directly with the governments of other countries to hold the Year of Chinese Language in
Russia in 2010 and the Year of Chinese Language in Spain and France in 2011 (Hanban,
2010; Hanban, 2011). Paired with praise from former US President George H.W. Bush
and it seemed the Confucius Institutes were primed to increase their presence in the
United States from 2008 through 2011 (Hanban, 2008).
According to its annual data, Hanban (2008) had 81 Institutes in American
countries with the United States containing the vast majority. In total, the US had 52
Institutes and four Confucius Classrooms, giving the United States the highest amount of
Confucius Institutes in the world with the second highest numbers coming from Russia
and Thailand (12) (Hanban, 2008). The United States also received more Chinese
teachers dispatched from Hanban than any other country (30) and held more examination
sites for the Chinese Proficiency Test HSK (21), making it clear that the US was an
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important country in Hanban’s efforts to promote Chinese language and culture around
the world (Hanban, 2008).
Matched with total worldwide expenditures of RMB 819 million (approximately
$120 million in 2008) and the Confucius Institute Headquarters also hosted several events
for American students and educators throughout the year (Hanban, 2008). These
included a continuation of the “Chinese Bridge” Summer Camps for American students
while also continuing to work with the US College Board to establish more Chinese
learning activities in the United States (Hanban, 2008). The Institute Headquarters
(2008) dispatched 180 Chinese language volunteer teachers to the US and held more than
60 lectures at 36 elementary schools, middle schools, and other educational institutions
that were attended by 7,000 American students and education personnel. Hanban (2008)
also attended the 1st National Chinese Language Conference and the 42nd American
Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages (ACTFL) Meeting and Exhibition.
Paired with renewing or signing agreements with the ACTFL, Chinese Language
Association of Secondary-Elementary Schools (CLASS), the US Asia Society, and the
National Association of Independent Schools (NAIS) and it appears that Chinese soft
power generation efforts in the areas of education continued strongly in 2008.
Even with Hanban (2009) acknowledging that the financial crisis had “spread all
over the globe, affecting and impacting world economies” by 2009, they exulted that this
development did not decrease global interest in Chinese (p. 4). Demonstrating this,
Hanban (2009) announced that the institutes now accounted for 260,000 registered
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students, twice the number of students in 2008. Much of this increase can be attributed to
the dramatic rise in Confucius Classrooms throughout the world, which effectively
functioned as a Chinese class taught by Hanban-trained teachers using Hanban-approved
methods outside the official auspices of one Confucius Institute in particular (Hanban,
2009). This expansion of Confucius Classrooms was felt nowhere stronger than the
United States, where Classrooms skyrocketed from four to 174 in one year (Hanban,
2009). Confucius Institutes in the US also increased to 69 which combined with the
Classrooms in the country gave the United States the greatest number of Hanbanadministered Chinese language training centers in the world, with the UK being second
with only 37 (Hanban, 2009).
With increased expenditures of RMB 1.2 billion ($180.6 million), the
Headquarters (2009) continued to hold activities for US students and administrators,
inviting 800 college and high school students along with 800 principals to visit China for
the annual “Chinese Bridge” Summer Camp. These individuals were joined by
participants from other countries, with American students making up 20.5% of student
attendees and American principals accounting for 57.1% of administrative participants.
Hanban (2009) also offered 800 American students scholarships to study in China,
constituting the first mention of scholarship granting activities by Hanban in its annual
reports. Liu Yandong, the Chairwoman of the Council of Confucius Institute
Headquarters, announced these actions, personally inviting US students to come to China
to study (Hanban, 2009).
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The Institute Headquarters (2009) continued to dispatch representatives to the
United States, increasing the number of volunteer teachers to 165 in 2009. There was,
however, a decrease in the number of lectures given in US schools, only 22 occurring in
12 elementary and middle schools (Hanban, 2011). Regardless, Hanban (2009)
continued its participation in American conferences as it attended the 2nd National
Chinese Language Conference and held the 2009 Joint Conference of the Confucius
Institutes in North America in Chicago. Liu Yandong was particularly active in
exchanges, attending the unveiling ceremony of the Confucius Institute at New York
State University, Stony Brook while personally donating teaching materials and met with
attendees at the first “Chinese Bridge” for American college students winter camp
(Hanban, 2009).
2010 saw much the same in terms of progress, as the number of Confucius
Institutes in the United States grew to 72 and Confucius Classrooms increased to 215
(Hanban, 2010). It is interesting to note that growth in Confucius Institutes seemed to
decrease drastically from previous years, increasing 32.7% from 2008 to 2009 to only 4%
in 2010. Still, the amount of Confucius Institutes in Classrooms in the US continued to
be the highest on record with South Korea and Russia second with 17 institutes and the
UK behind in classrooms with only 57 (Hanban, 2010). Hanban (2010) continued to
work with the College Board and the Asia Society, sending 188 volunteer Chinese
instructors to “278 elementary and middle schools in 32 states” (p. 36). They also
increased the number of lectures coordinated, dispatching lecturers on Chinese culture

90

and language to 58 elementary and middles schools end other institutions to give 88
lectures to approximately 18,900 people (Hanban, 2010). These increases were in spite
of the fact that, for the first time, total expenditures decreased, reaching only $137
million.
The “Chinese Bridge Summer Camp for American High School Students” was
once again held in China, attracting 800 students to participate (Hanban, 2010). While
this number remained the same as it had in the past, it is interesting to note that while this
was the Year of Chinese Language in Russia only 500 students from Russia were able to
attend a similar camp for Russians studying Chinese (Hanban, 2010). This of course can
be argued to merely be the result of fewer institutes being in Russia than the US, but it
still illustrates that even when the Chinese were actively working to court other countries,
students and administrators from the US remained its biggest target in soft power
promotion.
This American focus seems to have led to substantial increases in American
interests in China, as during December of 2011, a new Chinese Bridge program started by
Confucius Institutes in South Carolina was held (Hu, 2011). Referred to as the “Chinese
Bridge for American Schools: A New Start,” 270 delegates, mostly school administrators
but also state congressmen, travelled to China where they were treated to tours of the
Chinese education system and participated in discussions with Chinese language
educators in China (Hu, 2011). The US delegation led by Mark Bounds, Deputy Director
of the South Carolina Educational Bureau, thanked their Chinese hosts and guaranteed
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the US side was interested in holding “further exchanges with the Chinese educational
system and to explore and put into practice many more Chinese language programs…in
the USA” (Hu, 2011, para. 5). Such an event also illustrates that Hanban was not only
reaching out to American educators, but also state officials, increasing its connections
with and appeal in at least state governments of the United States.
Confucius Institutes in the US once again experienced smaller growth in 2011 to
only 75, but those countries with the second most continued to only have 17 (Hanban,
2011). Confucius Classrooms, however, continued their impressive growth with 299 in
2011 which far outpaced the UK with only 60 (Hanban, 2011). Hanban (2011) further
renewed its cooperative agreements with US organizations signing the Annual
Cooperation Agreement 2011-2012 with the College Board, identifying that the two sides
would “work together to promote the Chinese Guest Teacher Program, and launch the
Guest Trainee Program in 2012” (p. 57). The Institute Headquarters (2011) also
continued their participation in conferences and dialogues held in the US, attending the
National Chinese Language Conference while also hosting the Joint Conference of
Confucius Institutes in North America and the U.S. National Confucius Classroom
Conference, attracting 200 delegates and representative from the College Board and the
US Asia Society.
In spite of an increase in funds to $164 million, fewer students from the United
States participated in its annual Chinese Bridge Activities, with only 687 teachers and
students participating in the Summer Camp for U.S. High School Students (Hanban,
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2011). There also seemed to be fewer volunteers dispatched to the United States, with
only 186 as opposed to the previous amount listed at 188 (Hanban, 2011). Hanban
(2011) appeared to concentrate more on education administrators and officials this year,
with 218 principals and education officials invited to China to participate in the New
Start Activities during June and an additional 417 arriving in China in November. In
addition to these groups, Hanban, cooperating with the Asia Society “invited 20
education officials from the U.S. to participate in the ‘Chinese Bridge for U.S. Education
officials’ program” (Hanban, 2011, p. 58). With these actions, it is clear that China was
still very much so interested in maintaining connections between it and the United States
in the realm of education and it follows a general trend of China increasing its soft power
generation activities in this area in the United States from 2008 to 2011.
China’s Confucius Institutes, however, did not form its only soft power initiatives
concentrated on exchanges between its people and the United States, as 2010 saw the
launch of the High Level Consultation on People-to-People Exchanges (CPE). The idea
of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and State Councilor Liu Yandong (Chairwoman of
the Council of the Confucius Institute Headquarters) the annual meeting was designed as
a forum for high-level individuals from each country to come together to discuss topics
such as education, culture, science and technology, sports, and other similar fields
(“Secretary Clinton and Chinese State Councilor Liu Celebrate People-to-People
Engagement in Beijing,” 2010). Councilor Liu celebrated the mechanism as a “bridge for
understanding trust between states and between peoples” and while Secretary Clinton
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acknowledged that the two sides “will not always agree,” she was confident that working
for greater understanding, finding new ways not only of communicating, but of
cooperating, is in the best interest of our nations and our people.” (“Remarks at the U.S.China Consultation on People-to-People Exchange (CPE),” 2011 in Hillary Clinton (2),
para. 9).
With this conviction, the states launched several important initiatives at the first
meeting on May 25, 2010 in Beijing. Key among these was the beginning of the 100,000
Strong Initiative, guaranteeing to send 100,000 American students to study in China
between 2010 and 2014 (“Secretary Clinton and,” 2010; “Frequently Asked Questions,”
n.d., in “What Role does the Chinese Government Play,” para. 1). In conjunction with
this effort, the Chinese side promised to provide 10,000 “Bridge Scholarships” to
American students studying Chinese language in China (“Secretary Clinton and,” 2010).
Additionally, the two sides renewed the Implementing Accord for Cultural Exchange as
well as the Agreement for Cooperation in Educational Exchanges (“Secretary Clinton
and,” 2010). These actions formed the bulk of those taken at this first session, as much of
the rest of the meeting was spent reminding the attendees of the importance of exchanges
and the beneficial effects they have on the Sino-US relationship.
At the second meeting in April, 2011 in Washington D.C., the two sides stipulated
several areas where they had made progress while guaranteeing more actions in the
future. The US Department of Education and the PRC Ministry of Education of the US
facilitated the meeting of 130 experts on education in order to discuss educational
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techniques and ways to improve educational systems (“U.S.-China CPE Cooperation on
Education,” 2011). This was paired with further support for the 100,000 Strong
Initiative, with the US announcing $3.25 million in donations from private enterprises
while the Chinese nearly matched that with $3 million from its own private sector (“U.S.China CPE Cooperation on the 100,000 Strong Initiative,” 2011). China supplemented
this with a pledge to provide 10,000 additional Bridge Scholarships to American students
in 2011 (“U.S.-China CPE Cooperation on the 100,000 Strong Initiative,” 2011).
The meeting also produced many results dedicated to women’s issues, with
Chinese and American women in government joining in delegations to travel to each
country to meet with their counterparts for discussion on the challenges they both faced
(“U.S.-China CPE Cooperation on Women's Issues,” 2011). These commitments were
paired with the formation of numerous dialogues such as the U.S.-China Women’s
Leadership Exchange and Dialogue (Women-LEAD) which “will be jointly led by the
Secretary’s Office of Global Women’s Issues and the All-China Women’s Federation
(ACWF)” (“U.S.-China CPE Cooperation on Women's Issues,” 2011, para. 3). Joining
with the ACWF, Yale University planned to organize “management and leadership
programs targeted at senior-level women leaders” in order to foster ties between the
leaders of these groups in both countries (“U.S.-China CPE Cooperation on Women's
Issues,” 2011, para. 8). Adding plans for US and Chinese organizations to come together
to discuss breast cancer awareness in China and significant links were clearly forged
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between Chinese and American women during the CPE (“U.S.-China CPE Cooperation
on Women's Issues,” 2011).
In the sciences, the two countries launched the Young Scientist Forum, meant to
“connect our brightest young scientists in order to enhance U.S.-China mutual
understanding in the field of science and technology” (“U.S.-China CPE Cooperation on
Science and Technology,” 2011, para. 3). This, however, formed the bulk of actions
taken in this area as the rest stood as commitments to continue working with the other
side to discover new mechanisms through which the two sides could share ideals and
exchange experiences.
In this way, the Consultation was somewhat similar to the bilateral dialogues held
between the two sides regarding economics, with some guarantees to initiate new
activities but mostly acknowledgement of important issues which the two sides will
continue to work on. Still, the Consultation paired with the efforts of Hanban to promote
Confucius Institutes in the US illustrates that China was very committed to creating a
cooperative image of China in cultural, educational, and other areas representative of
people-to-people exchange from 2008 to 2011.

Cultural Performances and Museum Exchanges:
During the 2005 to 2007 time period, the Kennedy Center hosted the “Festival of
China” in 2005, a month long event which celebrated both the traditional and modern
aspects of Chinese culture. Featuring nearly 900 artists the event was unique among
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performances held at the Kennedy Center during this time period as it lasted longer than
any other performance focused on a single country and it formed nearly the entire
repertoire of activities at the Center during its run (“The Kennedy Center Festival of
China October 2005,” 2016). And while the only other Chinese event was a performance
by the Beijing Wushu Team shortly after the Festival ended, it is clear that the Chinese
sought to take advantage of the Kennedy Center as a platform to promote it soft power
through culture, focusing its efforts in to a large-scale event which no other country
attempted during this time (“Beijing Wushu Team 2005 Tour,” 2016).
By 2009, it seems that other groups discovered the possibilities presented by the
Kennedy Center, with three events occurring from 2009 to 2011 centered on celebrating a
particular culture or state. The first of these was entitled “Arabesque: Arts of the Arab
World,” featuring performances and artworks from the Middle East with the states of
Kuwait, Qatar, and the Embassy of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) collaborating with
the Center to host the event and providing most of the funding for it (“Arabesque: Arts of
the Arab World,” 2016). Mexico sponsored the next of these country-specific occasions
as the National Council for the Arts and Culture, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the
Mexican Cultural Institute held their “Celebrate Mexico 2010” event from September 11
to October 1 of that year (“Celebrate Mexico 2010,” 2016). The final instance of a
country sponsoring a long term exhibition at the Kennedy Center during this time comes
from 2011’s “Maximum India” running 20 days with the support of the Indian Council
for Cultural Relations, New Delhi and the Indian Embassy (“Maximum India,” 2016).
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Clearly, these countries sought to emulate the sort of program established by “The
Festival of China” intimating at the success of this event and raising the question of
whether the Chinese would attempt a similar event from 2008 to 2011.
During 2008, the Kennedy Center would only host two Chinese-themed events
which both came from the same source: The Shen Wei Dance Company. Becoming a
“resident” dance company of the Center in 2008, the company was founded by Chinese
dancer and choreographer Shen Wei, focusing on the performance of modern dance
(“Shen Wei Dance Arts,” 2016a). Founding the company in New York City, Shen Wei
was long a resident of the United States by this time, calling to question the validity of
using performances by this group at the Kennedy Center as evidence of Chinese soft
power generation efforts (Fowler, 2008). It was clear, however, that the Chinese held
Shen in high regard as the government invited him to Beijing to help in the choreography
for the Opening Ceremony of the Beijing Olympics (Fowler, 2008). Specifically, Shen
was responsible for the Chinese Scroll section of the performance where dancers acted as
brushes on a page and illustrated the beauty of Chinese calligraphy (Fowler, 2008). This
performance was similar to the one held at the Kennedy Center earlier in the year from
March 21 to March 22, with dancers again performing on top of paper and adding ink
strokes to it through the performance (Shen Wei Dance Arts,” 2016a).
By inviting Shen Wei to China to essentially recreate this performance, it is clear
that the Chinese government found it to be an exceptional presentation of Chinese culture
and supported Shen Wei’s efforts in performance art. Due to this, I include the
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performances of the Shen Wei Dance Company at the Kennedy Center during the time
frame of this section, adding an additional performance in 2008 and one other appearance
in 2010. During the second group of performances in 2008, occurring on October 29th
through 30th and thus after the Olympics, Shen presented a new work entitled Re-, which
detailed his experiences and impressions while traveling through Tibet (“Shen Wei
Dance Arts,” 2016b). This illustrates that his time in China had a profound effect on him
and that he wished to share his experiences from his country with an American audience.
By his last performance during this section’s time frame in 2010, Shen had finished Reas a performance piece, to include segments dedicated to Angkor Watt and the Silk Road
(“Shen Wei Dance Arts,” 2016c). While Angkor Watt is not a part of Chinese cultural
heritage, the performance on the Silk Road featured a juxtaposition between this indelible
part of China’s past with a glimpse into modern day Beijing, blending both traditional
and modern Chinese elements and showing China as a state open to change (“Shen Wei
Dance Arts,” 2016c).
While Shen Wei’s ties to the Chinese government are somewhat difficult to
discern, the performance of the Qingdao Symphony Orchestra alongside the Choral Arts
Society of Washington on February 1, 2009 is much clearer. In collaboration with
International Management Group (IMG) artists and the Choral Arts Society of
Washington, the event was presented by the China Arts and Entertainment Group
(CAEG), which is a state-owned enterprise in China under the Ministry of Culture
(“Image China: Chinese New Year Concert 2009,” 2016; “CAEG: China Arts and
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Entertainment Group,” 2011). While on their official website this is not explicitly stated,
it is noted that the China State Council is an investor in the enterprise and the Ministries
for Culture and Finance serve as “administrative supervisor and state-assets supervisor
respectively” (“CAEG,” 2011, para. 1). The actual performance was a mixed repertoire
of American classics from West Side Story and concertos written by Chinese composers
Ye Xiaogang and Chen Yi, presenting a cooperative image of China and the US coming
together in production of each other artistic visions (“Image China,” 2016).
In 2010, another group, the AGIS Center, presented “Image China: Forbidden
Fruit Under the Great Wall, a dance-drama,” which ran from December 10th through the
12th (“AGIS Center presents: Image China: Forbidden Fruit Under the Great Wall, a
dance-drama,” 2016). Unlike the CAEG, the connections between this organization and
China are somewhat less clear, with AGIS (its website provides no information on what
this acronym stands for) identified as a non-profit organization based in Washington D.C.
dedicated to the promotion of Chinese performance groups in the United States (“About
Us,” 2016). Regardless of this, Forbidden Fruit under the Great Wall is a distinctly
Chinese story, focusing on the love between two people in Shanxi province in historical
China (“Forbidden Fruit-Under the Great Wall,” n.d.). Performed by the China Shanxi
Performing Arts Academy, the production centers on life in Shanxi province and gives
the audience insight into customs from the region and its history (“AGIS Center
presents,” 2016).
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2011 would see a large uptick in the amount of Chinese inspired performances,
AGIS being responsible for the first with a performance by the China Anhui Traditional
Orchestra on February 27 (“AGIS Center presents: China Anhui Traditional Orchestra,”
2016). This was followed by the main attraction for 2011, “China: The Art of a Nation,”
a collection of performances and exhibits running from September 12 through October 30
presented with the cooperation of the Chinese Ministry of Culture (“China: The Art of a
Nation,” 2016). Referencing the “flourishing” arts scene in China, the event promised to
allow audiences to “reconnect with the country’s most creative traditional and
contemporary offerings” (“China: The Art of a Nation,” 2016, para. 2). These offerings
included an exhibition of Chinese sculptures on the grounds of the Center from
September 17 through October 30 which meant to “ponder the relationship between art
and life in China today” (“CHINA: The Art of a Nation: Outdoor Exhibition: Landscape
in Mind,” 2016, para. 1). The exhibition was supplemented by performances from many
groups, including the Shenzhen Lily Children’s Choir, National Theatre of China, the
Inner Mongolia Chorus, the Northern Kunqu Opera Theatre, and the Beijing People's Art
Theatre among others (“China: The Art of a Nation,” 2016).
Of particular note were the performances of the National Ballet of China and the
Beijing Dance Theater, which presented two very different images of China. The
National Ballet, while performing a repertoire featuring Swan Lake and The Yellow River,
also held a performance of The Red Detachment of Women (“National Ballet of China,”
2016b). Based on a film from the same name from 1961, the ballet focuses on the story
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of an army detachment of women in the People Liberation Army of China containing
many pro-Communist sympathies and extolling the virtues of the CCP (Kourlas, 2015).
This performance was unique in that nothing had been so overtly supportive of the
Chinese government at previous performances at the Kennedy Center, mostly focusing on
classical aspects of Chinese culture favored in the US. This jolt of patriotism, however,
was balanced by the Beijing Dance Theater, making its debut at the Kennedy Center with
a performance entitled Haze (“Beijing Dance Theater,” 2016). Focusing on the
worsening environmental situation in China, the performance could not help but to
provide a counterargument to the idea of CCP greatness presented by The Red
Detachment of Women (“Beijing Dance Theater,” 2016). In fact, by encouraging such a
performance, it is arguable that the Chinese side was demonstrating that it was open to
criticism, a welcome sight for American audiences concerned with the openness of the
Chinese regime.
In addition to “China: Art of a Nation,” 2011 featured three more performances
with Chinese origins, including Qi Shu Fang Peking Opera Company on October 13, a
story of Emperor Qin’s soldiers by the Beijing Dance Company from November 17th
through the 19th, and a presentation of the Gansu Dance Theatre’s Silk Road on
December 9th and 10th (“Qi Shu Fang Peking Opera Company,” 2016; “Beijing Dance
Company,” 2016; “CPAA Productions, Ltd. presents: Gansu Dance Theatre's Silk Road,”
2016). While the Peking Opera performance group was formed in New York by a former
performer in China and seems to not have many ties to the Chinese government, one of
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the other performances is somewhat more ambiguous (“Qi Shu Fang,” 2016). Regarding
the performance of the Beijing Dance Company, it was presented by [sic] Chinus
Cultural Productions, a group started in Portland, Oregon by a former senior liaison
officer for the Ministry of Culture who relocated to the US to get her Master’s Degree in
journalism at New York University (“Team,” 2014) While this is not definitive evidence
of a connection, the group claims its founder’s connections within the Chinese
government as a key contributor to its ability to attract Chinese groups to perform in the
US, lending some proof that the government at least tacitly approves its actions (“Team,”
2014). Regarding the Gansu Dance Theatre production, the Kennedy Center held this
event in collaboration with the Chinese Performing Arts Agency (CPAA), a subsidiary of
the CAEG which has already been established as tied to the Chinese government (“China
Arts and Entertainment Group (CAEG),” 2014).
Initially, it appears that the Kennedy Center featured more events dedicated to
China from 2008 to 2011 (11) than it did from 2005 to 2007 (2). This discounts
individual presentations, however, where “The Festival of China” accounted for 28
exhibitions and events on its own, which was far greater than the 19 total productions and
exhibitions presented from 2008 to 2011. This seemingly contradicts the fact in the 2008
to 2011 timeframe, performances based on Chinese culture or history occurred every year
(as opposed to one in the previous timeframe) and many of them appeared to have ties to
the Chinese government itself, demonstrating that the Chinese government had a stronger
interests in increasing its soft power through the arts than it did before. Therefore, much
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like the economic indicators, there is a somewhat mixed message regarding Chinese
commitments to generating soft power from 2008 to 2011 in the area of performances at
the Kennedy Center.
The apparent greater involvement by the Chinese in presenting performances at
the Kennedy Center seemed to carry over to exhibitions at the Metropolitan Museum of
Art. Paired with exhibitions of Asian Lacquer and the works of Lin Yutang which started
in 2007 but ended in 2008, the Metropolitan Museum in 2008 presented “Landscapes
Clear and Radiant: The Art of Wang Hui (1632–1717),” which ran from September 9,
2008 to January 4, 2009 or a total of 115 days during 2008 (“Landscapes Clear and
Radiant: The Art of Wang Hui (1632–1717),” 2016). A Chinese painter from the late
17th century, Wang is credited with reinvigorating interest in landscape paintings during
the Qing Dynasty (“Landscapes Clear and Radiant,” 2016). Featuring not just work from
Wang but also those from the Song (960-1279), Yuan (1279-1368), and the Ming (13681644) Dynasties which served as his inspiration, the exhibit was noteworthy because it
features works loaned to the Museum from the Beijing Palace Museum; indicating clear
Chinese involvement in the exhibition (“Landscapes Clear and Radiant,” 2016).
During the previous timeframe of 2005 to 2008, it was never explicitly stated that
Chinese Museums or organizations had contributed to any of the exhibits, making this the
first instance where the Chinese actually took part in an exhibition at the Met in the time
periods investigated in this research. This indicates a seeming greater interest on the part
of the Chinese to generate soft power through loaning artifacts to American museums and
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their choice of the Metropolitan Museum reflects a growing desire to promote Chinese
culture and history at the United States’ most famous museum. The last exhibition for
2008 concentrated on Chinese paintings and calligraphies and it was entitled “Anatomy
of a Masterpiece: How to Read Chinese Paintings” (“Anatomy of a Masterpiece: How to
Read Chinese Paintings,” 2016). Unlike the exhibit dedicated to Wang Hui, this one only
made use of works in the Museum’s permanent collection, running for 162 days from
March 1st to August 10, 2008 (“Anatomy of a Masterpiece,” 2016). Examining all of the
exhibitions for 2008 together and, much like in 2007, the Metropolitan Museum featured
a display related to China everyday of operation during 2008, with one exhibit
specifically receiving support from a Chinese state institution.
The first exhibition of 2009, “Arts of the Ming Dynasty: China's Age of
Brilliance,” began on January 23rd, running 233 days through September 13, 2009 (“Arts
of the Ming Dynasty: China's Age of Brilliance,” 2016). Featuring works drawn from the
Museum’s collection from throughout the Ming Dynasty, art during this period was noted
to place particular emphasis on traditional Han Chinese culture, as the Ming Dynasty
came into power after the fall of the Mongol Yuan Dynasty in China (“Arts of the Ming
Dynasty,” 2016). While this presents a somewhat nationalistic image of the art on
display, an interesting aspect of this exhibit is that it began 19 days after the end of the
“Landscapes Clear and Radiant” exhibition which ended on January 4, 2009. This means
that 2009 was the first time in two years there would not be a Chinese exhibit in
operation throughout the entirety of the year at the Metropolitan Museum.
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The Met held three more Chinese events in 2009, with the next titled “Cinnabar:
The Chinese Art of Carved Lacquer.” Starting on August 6th and continuing through
February 21, 2010, the event once again featured many of the works it had displayed
previously at other Asian Lacquer exhibits, with the exception of tying lacquerware more
firmly to China (“Cinnabar: The Chinese Art of Carved Lacquer,” 2009). The Next
exhibition, “Silk and Bamboo: Music and Art of China” (Sept. 5, 2008-Feb. 7, 2010)
focused mostly on Chinese musical history dating from the 5th century B.C.E. to the
present (“Silk and Bamboo: Music and Art of China,” 2010). While the artifacts on
display for this exhibit came mostly from the Museum’s collection, the next event
featured works “drawn primarily from leading museums in China and features a number
of National Treasures that have never been shown in the West” (“Eccentric Visions: The
Worlds of Luo Ping (1733–1799),” 2016). Dedicated to the works of Luo Ping, the
youngest member of a group of artists referred to as the “Eccentrics of Yangzhou,”
“Eccentric Visions: The Worlds of Luo Ping (1733–1799)” was the second exhibition in
as many years at the Met to feature direct collaboration with Chinese Museums,
indicating a trend of increased cooperation between the Chinese and the Museum to
present American audiences with the finest artworks produced in Chinese history. On
display from October 6, 2009 to January 10, 2010 the exhibit does much to indicate
Chinese interest in promoting soft power at the Metropolitan Museum despite a decrease
in the number of days with a Chinese exhibit from 361 (out of a 361 day year) the
previous year to 342 in 2009.
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Direct Chinese collaboration with the Metropolitan Museum, however, did not
continue in 2010, with all of the Chinese exhibits being drawn from the Museum’s
permanent collection. The first exhibit to begin in 2010 was “Mastering the Art of
Chinese Painting: Xie Zhiliu (1910-1997).” Beginning on February 6th and ending
August 1st, the display focused on the works of Xie Zhiliu a modern day painter that
continued the practice of traditional Chinese painting styles in the modern era
(“Mastering the Art of Chinese Painting: Xie Zhiliu (1910-1997),” 2016). This
appreciation of tradition continued into the second exhibition “Celebration: The Birthday
in Chinese Art,” which was on display from February 27th to November 28th
(“Celebration: The Birthday in Chinese Art,” 2016). Featuring works dating back to the
Song Dynasty, the exhibit featured to importance of ageing in Chinese culture and the joy
the process invoked through birthday celebrations (“Celebration,” 2016).
The next two exhibitions were done as complementary exhibits to one another and
each focused on the Yuan Dynasty in China. “The Yuan Revolution: Art and Dynastic
Change” from August 21, 2010 to January 9, 2011 illustrated the profound effect foreign
rule had on Chinese art which continued to be felt even during the very pro-Han Chinese
Ming Dynasty (“The Yuan Revolution: Art and Dynastic Change,” 2016). This was
paired with “The World of Khubilai Khan: Chinese Art in the Yuan Dynasty” from
September 28, 2010 to January 2, 2011 which referenced not just foreign influences on
Chinese art as artists from all over the Mongol empire came to China, but also on the
impact it had on the Italian Renaissance as travelers like Marco Polo came in contact with
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the Yuan Imperial Court (“The World of Khubilai Khan: Chinese Art in the Yuan
Dynasty,” 2016).
This influence on the outside wide was reiterated in the last exhibit unveiled
during the year “Extravagant Display: Chinese Art in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth
Centuries” which began on December 5, 2010 and contained art work from the Qing
Dynasty which “informed Western perceptions of Chinese taste and imagery for
centuries” (“Extravagant Display: Chinese Art in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth
Centuries,” 2016, para. 1). With this last exhibit, the year 2010 still did not see any
exhibitions which were the result of clear collaboration between the Museum and
Chinese sources but there was a return to the pattern of a Chinese exhibition occurring
every day throughout the year at the Metropolitan Museum of Art.
The Chinese once again returned to collaborate with the Museum in 2011, loaning
artifacts related to the Qianlong Emperor of the Qing Dynasty. One of the most famous
emperors in Chinese history, the Qianlong Emperor was known for his great appreciation
for the arts and commissioned or purchased thousands of works during his lifetime. With
two exhibitions, “The Emperor's Private Paradise: Treasures from the Forbidden City”
and “Commemorating His Majesty,” the Met displayed artifacts on loan from the Palace
Museum which oversees the Forbidden City in Beijing (“The Emperor's Private Paradise:
Treasures from the Forbidden City,” 2016; “Commemorating His Majesty,” 2016).
These events were followed by “The Art of Dissent in 17th-Century China: Masterpieces
of Ming Loyalist Art from the Chih Lo Lou Collection” which featured art from
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supporters of the former Ming Dynasty after it had been conquered by the Qing (“The Art
of Dissent in 17th-Century China: Masterpieces of Ming Loyalist Art from the Chih Lo
Lou Collection,” 2016). Interestingly enough, this exhibit also seemed tied to Chinese
sources as it was organized by the Hong Kong Museum of Art of the Leisure and Cultural
Services Department of HKSAR Government which, while emanating from Hong Kong,
is certainly influenced by the central government of China in Beijing (“The Art of
Dissent,” 2016). Paired with another event on Chinese lacquerware and the year of 2011
was similar to 2009, where the Chinese actively participated in holding exhibits at the
Met but the Museum itself did not hold a Chinese exhibit every day, only accounting for
232 days during the year.
In this way, the data related to Chinese soft power promotion through museum
exhibitions seem to follow a similar pattern as the one established with performances
held at the Kennedy Center where the Chinese seem to involve themselves more in the
promotion of their soft power, yet the amount of performances or the length of
exhibitions decreased, presenting a mixed image regarding soft power promotion. This
mixed image further conforms to the economic data as the Chinese seemed to actively
move away from these area from 2008 through 2010 but returned to it vigorously in the
final year under investigation. In Confucius Institutes and people-to-people exchanges,
however, the Chinese continued if not increased their efforts, presenting a question of just
how committed the Chinese were to soft power generation during this time period.
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Chapter Four: Xi Jinping 2012-2014
Introduction: A New Leader
While Hu Jintao’s final year as President of the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) would not be until 2012, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) elders had already
chosen his likely successor as early as 2007 (Osnos, 2015). Beginning in the mid-2000s,
CCP elders began to believe that the country was moving too far from the traditional
ideals espoused by the Party and began searching for someone who would not only
actively promote these ideas, but would be easily controlled by the elders behind the
scenes (Osnos, 2015). With these requirements, the elders selected the relatively
unknown politician Xi Jinping in October of 2007 (Osnos, 2015). Xi’s status as a
princeling (the child of one of the original CCP members) indicated that he would be
more reliable in maintaining the purity of the party and his anonymity assured he would
not have the power to challenge the elders (Osnos, 2015). Over the next five years, Xi
would be groomed to assume his position as head of the CCP and leader of China and in
November, 2012, he was introduced to the Chinese people as the new General Secretary
of the CCP while the former frontrunner for the position, Li Keqiang, named as his
Premier (Osnos, 2015).
Xi’s father, Xi Zhongxun, was considered by many to be an advocate of reform
within the Chinese Communist Party (Osnos, 2015). Purged during the Cultural
Revolution, the CCP forcibly retired Xi Zhongxun from their ranks entirely in the wake
of a 1987 meeting of the Politburo for siding with the liberal politician Hu Yaobang
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(Osnos, 2015). Due to the actions of his father, Xi himself was also sent to the
countryside during the Cultural Revolution resulting in Xi’s relationship with the Party
appearing to be strained (Osnos, 2015). These dimensions of Xi’s history led some
foreign experts to optimistically claim that he could be a leader that would push for
economic and political reform in China.
However, warning signs began to emerge quickly that Xi would not be this type
of leader as evidenced by his earliest public speeches. After being introduced as China’s
new leader in 2012, Xi spoke during a news conference where he referred to China as a
“great nation” and the Chinese people as a “great people” that had made “an indelible
contribution to the civilisation and advancement of mankind” (“Xi Jinping’s Speech
After Appointment to Leadership,” 2012, para. 11, para. 16, para. 12). While such
statements could be considered standard nationalist sentiments appropriate to any leader
when addressing their people, Xi made a habit of using such comments in his speeches.
Consistent promoting Chinese people and history, Xi abetted a rise of nationalism within
China which had been more subdued in previous eras. These greater feelings of national
pride were expressed in his earliest remarks with US leadership as well during a meeting
with Vice-President Joseph R. Biden in 2012 shortly before Xi was announced as the
General Secretary. Xi agreed with Biden that the US and China should cooperate but that
they would “continue to compete” in other areas (“Remarks by Vice President Biden and
Chinese Vice President Xi, February 2012,” 2012, para. 6). While these remarks were
made by Biden in a joint statement, he attributes the statements to Xi which presents a
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departure from previous assertions from the Chinese side which had always insisted on
using the term “disagreements” in the past. This, it should be noted, does not contain the
same connotations as the word, “compete.” Competition also implies a level of equality
which previously the Chinese did not openly suggest existed between the United States
and China. This coincides with Xi’s later insistence that the United States and China
adopt a “new type of great-power relationship” in future dealings, a term which the US
declines to use and would undoubtedly serve as recognition of China’s more equal status
with the United States (Osnos, 2015, para. 53).
These subtle implications, however, are nothing like Xi’s more provocative
political activities. Shortly after becoming the General Secretary of the CCP, Xi
strengthened previous anti-corruption campaigns leading to the arrest and trial of
thousands of CCP officials (Osnos, 2015). Targets included important members such as
Zhou Yongkang, whom had previously been seen as untouchable by the Chinese justice
system (Osnos, 2015). While these actions initially seemed laudable, they coincided with
Xi consolidating more power around himself, promoting those loyal to him to the newly
vacant positions or simply taking over the positions himself. The former US ambassador
to China, Gary Locke, stated these actions placed Xi “at the center of everything” in
Chinese politics (Osnos, 2015, para. 8). This shift toward more centralized control has
also led to greater suspicion by the Chinese government of Western influence, in
particular the United States, with western culture and values being promoted in China
seen as a way to undermine the power of the CCP (Osnos, 2015). These suspicions were
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made clear in a Communist Party Communiqué released in 2013 which outlined how
“Western anti-China forces” had united with dissidents within China to challenge the
CCP (“Chinese Communist Party: Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological
Sphere,” 2013, para. 24). The authors of the Communiqué asserted that “Western
embassies, consulates, media operations, and NGOs operating inside China” all were part
of an intricate plot to bring down the CCP” warning against their influence (“Chinese
Communist Party,” 2013, para. 24). These sentiments, when paired with overt actions
such as the creation of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China
Sea and continued aggression in the South China Sea indicate that Xi is a leader that is
willing to challenge the United States more openly and more likely to abandon attempts
to court the US through soft power.

Economic Relations:
Despite Xi’s more confrontational approach towards foreign policy, the trade
relationship between the US and China continued to grow from 2012 through 2014. In
2012, the United States Census Bureau reported that the US was exporting $110.5 billion
worth of goods to China with imports up to $425.6 billion in value (“Trade in Goods with
China,” 2016). Both these numbers increased the next year with US exports climbing to
$121.7 billion and imports from China reaching $440.4 billion (“Trade in Goods with
China,” 2016). And while Chinese exports to the US continued to grow at an impressive
pace in 2014, ending the year at $466.8 billion, US exports to China did not experience
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nearly as much growth only increasing to $123.7 billion (“Trade in Goods with China,”
2016).
This slow increase in exports from the US may be linked to the Chinese economy
entering a period of slower development then they had experienced during the 1980s,
1990s, and 2000s when growth rates averaged 10% per year (U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, 2013). In fact, during the same year when exports from
the US experienced noticeably lower growth, the Chinese were forced to enact a “ministimulus” to guarantee that they would reach their target growth rate of 7.5%, leading to
government spending levels increasing 15.8% in May of 2014 as opposed to levels in
May 2013 (Wei, as cited in U.S.-China Security and Economic Review Commission,
2014, p. 44).
This increase in spending coincided with greater amounts of state control in the
Chinese economy, with the USCC in 2012 arguing that China was “backsliding [away]
from market reforms” (p. 25). The increased presence of the state led to continued
critiques of China’s economic policies from the USCC, which persisted in evaluating
China’s policy according to subsidies to domestic companies, occurrences of intellectual
property rights (IPR) violations, the valuation of the RMB, and China’s adherence to
World Trade Organization (WTO) regulations. Yet, as in the previous period from 2008
through 2012, new issues began to emerge that garnered special attention from US
investigators, including China’s anti-monopoly law, value-added taxes (VATs), and
excess capacity.
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The anti-monopoly law was originally enacted in China in 2008 and did not
initially draw much attention from the United States (USCC, 2013). The law itself
requires that the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the National Development and
Reform Commission (NDRC), and the State Administration for Industry and Commerce
(SAIC) collaborate to determine the level of competitiveness present in Chinese markets
(USCC, 2013). Unfortunately, the law maintains very broad and sometimes vague
definitions of competitiveness and what actions constitute violations of Chinese law,
which has led to multiple instances of firms prosecuted without understanding what they
have done wrong (USCC, 2013). By 2014, the law became infamous among foreign
companies in particular, as it appeared that some firms were targeted for prosecution at
higher levels than domestic Chinese firms, leading to speculation that the anti-monopoly
law had become another mechanism of the Chinese government to create barriers to
foreign companies in China to protect and promote domestic firms (USCC, 2014).
China’s use of VATs is related to its commitments in the WTO to decrease
subsidies to its industries, particularly in food and agriculture. In an effort to maneuver
around these commitments, China appears to be using VATs to impose taxes on foreign
firms which domestic businesses are able to avoid through a “complex rebate system,”
which the USDA found to be the effective imposition of a 13 or 17 percent tax on food
and agriculture imports to China (USCC, 2013, p. 175). This has led to primary goods
such as soybeans being cheaper to produce in China which then benefits soy bean
processors in China that utilize Chinese soybean in their products, creating a large
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advantage for Chinese producers in these areas (USCC, 2013). With this increased
strength of China’s food processing sector and its ability to procure cheaper foodstuffs,
foreign firms are unable to compete and much of the food processing industry has shifted
to China over the past decade (USCC, 2013).
Much like the previous two issues which both limit the access and
competitiveness of foreign firms in the Chinese market, excess capacity has been a long
utilized tactic in China to keep the prices of Chinese products cheap. To counteract
increases in prices, Chinese firms would intentionally engage in over-production,
flooding the market with goods which would increase supply and therefore lower prices
(USCC, 2013). Chinese firms are able to do this without incurring great economic costs
due to the active support of the Chinese government, with subsidies and easy access to
loans ensuring that they will be able to remain in business. While complaints over these
actions in the United States predate this time period, the issue became more prevalent
from 2012 through 2014 as the Chinese government itself began to identify the practice
as harmful to Chinese interests, acknowledging that “excess capacity was untenable” at
the National People’s Congress’ annual meetings in 2013 (Xinhua, as cited in USCC,
2013, p. 64). This presented a unique opportunity for the Chinese government to act on
an issue which was problematic for them but also for the United States, leading to greater
possible appreciation from the US and perhaps improved relations between the two.
China’s willingness to challenge those powerful state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that
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practiced overcapacity will be examined along with actions regarding the anti-monopoly
law and VATs in this section.
In 2012, the Chinese made several attempts to address or at the very least
recognize US concerns regarding its economic policy. The Chinese recognized during
the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) that the process to
obtain the China Compulsory Certification (CCC) mark2 for goods entering China
presented issues for foreign firms (“Fact Sheet: 23rd U.S.-China Joint Commission on
Commerce and Trade,” 2012). To combat this problem, both countries launched an
exchange program in April 2012 that focused on how to improve the CCC mark
mechanism and planned to invite US and Chinese businesses to engage in these
exchanges which would continue in 2013 (“Fact Sheet: 23rd,” 2012). The Chinese also
accepted a proposal by the United States to schedule further negotiations regarding a
Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) between them during the Strategic and Economic
Dialogue (S&ED), presenting some progress in this area (“Joint U.S.-China Economic
Track Fact Sheet- Fourth Meeting of the U.S. China Strategic and Economic Dialogue
(S&ED),” 2012).
Perhaps the most significant activities during this period were related to China’s
monetary policies as the renminbi (RMB) continued to appreciate against the dollar.

2

The China Compulsory Certification mark is required for goods such as industrial machinery,
telecommunications equipment, and automotive parts which requires that foreign companies provide
certain specifications and samples of their products for evaluation by Chinese inspectors, leading to
accusations of IPR violations (China Quality Certification Centre, as cited in U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, 2006, p. 35)
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During 2012, the Chinese widened the RMB’s daily exchange rate from +/- 0.5 percent to
+/- 1.0 percent leading the RMB reaching a record high against the dollar in February
2012 of 6.2284 RMB per dollar (U.S. Department of the Treasury, as cited in U.S.-China
Security and Economic Review Commission, 2012). Such progress on this issue was
“duly noted” by the U.S. Treasury, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) even
shifted from identifying China’s currency as “substantially undervalued” to only being
“moderately” undervalued (International Monetary Fund, as cited in USCC, 2012, p. 35).
The USCC (2012), was quick to argue that the undervaluation of the RMB remained a
significant problem and even slightly disputed the evaluation of the IMF regarding the
amount of its undervaluation. Despite these objections, it seems clear that Chinese
currency did achieve a level of appreciation which led to greater parity between it and the
dollar resulting in at least partial approval from the United States.
While this critique from the USCC can be ultimately disregarded, other criticisms
cannot be so easily dismissed, as the USCC notes that both the S&ED and the JCCT
followed a pattern established during the previous time periods where the Chinese made
many commitments to take action but provided only vague descriptions of what those
actions would be. The USCC (2012) dismissed the S&ED as ineffective, arguing that
many of the outcomes were “largely restated commitments made in the previous years”
and that no mention was made of what mechanisms the Chinese would utilize to
accomplish these commitments (U.S. Department of the Treasury, as cited in USCC,
2012, p. 39). Regarding the JCCT, despite acceptance by the Chinese to engage in
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bilateral dialogues with the US regarding further issues with government procurement
activities in China, the USCC (2012) largely dismissed efforts made by the Chinese in
this area and noted that China’s SOEs continued to maintain an advantage in the
government procurement market. When paired with no real action related to IPR,
adherence to WTO guidelines, the anti-monopoly law, value-added taxes, and excess
capacity, it appears that China did very little in 2012 to generate soft power in the realm
of economic policy in 2012.
This lack of activity in 2012 seemed to change in 2013, as in addition to the usual
commitments to enact market reforms and an exchange rate determined by the market,
there were several other more substantial actions. These included the signing of several
memorandums of understanding (MOU) such as a MOU between the U.S. Trade and
Development Agency (USTDA) and China’s Ministry of Commerce in Support of
Intellectual Property Rights Training and a MOU between the USTDA and China’s
National Energy Administration (NEA) in Support of U.S.-China Energy Cooperation
Program (ECP) (“Fact Sheet: 24th U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and
Trade (JCCT) Signings,” 2013). Beijing also announced the establishment of a policy
review mechanism which would allow the U.S. Trade Representative and the Department
of Commerce to communicate at any time with the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM)
about any regulations within China which they believe to be “inconsistent with China’s
multilateral or bilateral commitments” (“Joint U.S.-China Economic Track Fact Sheet of
the Fifth Meeting of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue,” 2013, in Section
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II. para. 7). The Chinese also planned to submit a revised offer to join the Government
Procurement Agreement (GPA) of the WTO in 2013 in response to US concerns with
their previous offers (“Joint U.S.-China Economic Track Fact Sheet of the Fifth,” 2013).
China’s most significant efforts to generate soft power in the US through
economic policies centered on their continued negotiations to sign a Bilateral Investment
Treaty (BIT) and the founding of the Shanghai Free Trade Zone (FTZ). By the S&ED
meeting in 2013, the United States and the PRC had already engaged in nine rounds of
technical discussions regarding the BIT and China indicated that it was now ready to
initiate “substantive” negotiations with the United States at the Strategic and Economic
Dialogue meetings (“Joint U.S.-China Economic Track Fact Sheet of the Fifth,” 2013, in
Section II. para. 2). Progress on the BIT was greeted with praise from both Jacob J. Lew,
the Treasury Secretary, and the US business community, indicating that Chinese actions
in this area presented desirable opportunities for the United States (USCC, 2013). The
Shanghai Free Trade Zone also met many of the characteristics that the US had requested
China adopt in moving its economy toward more liberal standards, as it promised to open
industries such as shipping, commerce, and travel to foreign investment and would allow
market based setting of exchange and interest rates within a predetermined zone within
the city of Shanghai (Davis & Silk, as cited in USCC, 2013). While this was hardly on
the national level desired by the United States, the FTZ represented a willingness by the
Chinese government to increase its experimentation with market-based economics and
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the Chinese assured the US that if the system proved to be successful, the model could be
implemented across China (USCC, 2013).
Regarding issues such as the anti-monopoly law, VATs, and excess capacity, the
Chinese only took action against the last two, and it is difficult to consider them soft
power generating activities. Specifically, both seemed to focus more on domestic issues
than on addressing the concerns of the US or the international community. This is
particularly the case with value-added taxes where the Chinese began its nationwide
reforms of the service industry tax system by introducing a VAT system (“Joint U.S.China Economic Track Fact Sheet of the Fifth,” 2013). Missing from the VAT reform
was anything regarding the concerns raised by US businesses that claimed they were
unfairly targeted by VATs in China which presents a new issue where they may now be
subjected to this form of discrimination not just in manufacturing but in services as well
(“Tax Reform: A Better Service Game,” 2013). On excess capacity, the Ministry of
Industry and Information Technology released reports identifying 1,400 companies
across 19 industries that needed to reduce production which was resulting in significant
costs to the Chinese economy (Xinhua, as cited in U.S.-China Security and Economic
Review Commission, 2015). While Chinese action to curtail this excess capacity would
allow prices to be determined more by the market, no indication is given that this is
China’s intention by acting against excess capacity and US concerns do not seem to be
motivating their actions against the issue. For these reasons, it is arguable that neither of
these actions can be considered as soft power generating activities for China as they
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largely reflect domestic concerns and do not consider the issues brought forth by the
United States.
Despite these problems, the progress of the BIT and the establishment of the
Shanghai Free Trade Zone were generally regarded as positive steps by the USCC, while
it continued to note several areas where it asserted the Chinese needed to improve. This
included many of the areas identified as concerns from the previous time periods where
the Chinese took no substantial steps to counter issues raised by the United State. These
included continuing IPR violations, the RMB appreciating less than 2% in the first half of
2013, China’s monetary reforms remaining ineffective, and that the revised GPA offer
still did not meet the qualifications deemed necessary by the US (USCC, 2014).
Regarding the anti-monopoly law, the USCC also discovered evidence that it unfairly
targeted foreign firms as information from an anti-monopoly law training session
revealed the NDRC officials pressured 30 foreign firms to confess antitrust violations and
advised them against hiring outside counsel to defend them in investigations” (CNBC, as
cited in USCC, 2013, p. 74).
Considering these critiques, 2013 produced mixed results regarding economic
activities as promoters of soft power. While the progress made on the BIT, the founding
of the FTZ, and greater efforts to expand communication such as the policy review
mechanism were greeted with praise, the majority of the results from the S&ED and the
JCCT in 2013 followed the pattern established during previous years of China making
vague commitments without providing plans for how these commitments would be
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reached. Pairing this with the fact that China did not engage in any soft power promotion
activities related to those issues identified during this time period as being of particular
importance, the anti-monopoly law, VATs, and excess capacity, and it appears that
whatever progress was made over the minimal efforts in 2012 was largely overshadowed
by limited action on the part of China to address US concerns and improve its image
within the United States.
2014 seemingly promised to change this as both President Xi and Premier Li
attended the initial meetings in Beijing for the Strategic and Economic Dialogue for the
first time (“Sixth Meeting of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue U.S. Fact
Sheet – Economic Track,” 2014). Establishing a sense of importance to this year’s
dialogues, the Chinese moved forward with the US in negotiations of the BIT,
guaranteeing to reach an agreement on the core text of the treaty by the end of 2014 and
to begin discussions regarding their respective “negative lists” to determine what areas
fell outside the agreement (U.S. Department of the Treasury, as cited in USCC, 2014, p.
63). The Chinese also announced intentions to engage in plurilateral negotiations with
the United States on expanding the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) which
would eliminate tariffs for most technological products and increase US access to
Chinese markets (“Sixth Meeting of the U.S.-China,” 2014).
Chinese representatives at the 25th meeting of the JCCT also showed a renewed
willingness to address issues related to IPR with MOFCOM announcing that Beijing
would continue to work with US agencies to combat IPR infringement, scheduling
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workshops and meetings between the two sides to discuss the issue (“U.S.-China Joint
Fact Sheet on 25th Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade,” 2014). Efforts to join
the GPA continued as well, with the Chinese submitting another offer which the USCC
(2015) identified as making “incremental improvement is the scope of coverage” (p. 55).
Chinese Officials at the S&ED also promising to release more information regarding the
Chinese budget dedicated to SOEs while also accelerating reforms that would enact
market-based prices for petroleum, electricity, and natural gas (“Sixth Meeting of the
U.S.-China,” 2014). Finally, the Chinese decreased the number of industries that faced
restrictions against foreign investment in the FTZ from 190 to 139, presenting greater
opportunities for market access (Silk, as cited in USCC, 2014)
Issues related to anti-monopoly law, VATs, and excess capacity were also more
strenuously addressed in 2014. China assured the United States that its anti-monopoly
law was not designed to unfairly target foreign firms and that its enforcement of the law
would not limit competition within the Chinese market (“Sixth Meeting of the U.S.China,” 2014; “U.S.-China Joint Fact Sheet on 25th,” 2014). Regarding value-added
taxes, the Chinese committed to continue their VAT reforms to “eliminate double
taxation” which they argued would improve the financial situation of many of China’s
poorest citizens (“Sixth Meeting of the U.S.-China,” 2014, in Promoting Rebalancing and
Consumption-led Growth, para. 4). On excess capacity, the Chinese announced the
introduction of a new mechanism to limit the expansion of crude steel production which
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will be in conjunctions with its other efforts to address excess production (“Sixth Meeting
of the U.S.-China,” 2014).
While these efforts present noticeably more attention to these issues than they
were given in the past, it is debatable whether they can be considered as soft power
generating efforts. Using commitments to guarantee that China’s anti-monopoly law
does not interfere with foreign business interests is similar to past commitments made by
the Chinese on issues such as government subsidies and IPR, which weaken their overall
effectiveness when they do not coincide with concrete proposals to address the issue.
Regarding Chinese actions related to VATs and excess capacity there is also no
indication that any of these activities are related to American concerns and they still
appear to be targeted at addressing domestic issues as opposed to improving China’s
image abroad.
These critiques are paired with those made by the USCC which noted that China
continues to only marginally address the issues raised by the United States. This is
exemplified by China’s latest offer to join the GPA, which the USCC (2015) contends
still does not meet the conditions outlined by the United States and the international
community particularly regarding the fact that China still refuses to include most SOEs in
the deal, which has always been the United States’ chief concern. The USCC (2015) also
argued that the Shanghai Free Trade Zone only achieved “minimal progress” in 2014
with experts finding little evidence that operating in the trade zone presented any
increased benefits as opposed to operating anywhere else in China (Rabinovitch, as cited
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in USCC, 2014, p. 50). In conjunction with this, the United States submitted reports to
the WTO of over 100 subsidies in China in October 2014 despite China’s insistence that
it was reforming its policy towards SOEs (USCC, 2015). In response to these
accusations, the Chinese refused to discuss the matter with the United States or to notify
any of the subsidies to the WTO (Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and United
States Department of Commerce, as cited in USCC, 2015).
Perhaps the bigger issue facing Chinese economic soft power efforts in 2014 was
related to the fact that China took noticeable steps to undermine its previous
commitments, specifically those related to the anti-monopoly law and its monetary
policy. In 2014, despite assurances from the Chinese at the S&ED, enforcement of its
anti-monopoly law against foreign firms increased drastically, with businesses located in
those sectors designated as “strategic and emerging” by the Chinese government under
particularly heavy scrutiny (Martina, as cited in USCC, 2014, p. 60). These actions led to
86 percent of member companies in the U.S.-China Business Council (USCBC)
indicating that they were “somewhat or very concerned” with the increased enforcement
and 56 percent listing the enforcement as a “primary concern regarding China’s
competition policy” (U.S.-China Business Council, as cited in USCC, 2015, p. 89).
MOFCOM itself reported that it reviewed 245 cases under the anti-monopoly law in
2014, the highest number of reviews since implementation of the law in 2008, and that of
the 1,062 transactions it reviewed, all of the 26 that were rejected or only conditionally
approved involved foreign firms (Wang, as cited in USCC, 2015, p. 90). This clearly
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illustrated that China was still engaging in discriminatory policies despite its assertions to
the contrary. By March 2014, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) announced that the
trading band for the RMB to dollars would be doubled to +/- 2% per day (U.S.
Department of the Treasury, as cited in USCC, 2014). Ordinarily, this would be viewed
as a positive development by the US as a move toward a market-oriented economy, but
Chinese actions indicated that they considered the trading band open to manipulation if
the situation called for it. Specifically, a month prior to the band widening the PBOC
intervened heavily to substantially weaken the RMB after it had reached high levels of
appreciation under the previous band (Financial Times, as cited in USCC, 2014). This
occurred right as the Chinese worried that they would not be able to reach their target
goal for growth of 7.5%, illustrating that the Chinese would be willing to go against their
economic commitments or policies dedicated to reform if they saw it necessary (USCC,
2014).
These actions form an apt metaphor for Chinese economic policy from 2005 to
2014 as the Chinese would often commit to engage in behavior that would be preferred
by the United States or the international community but either ignore these commitments
domestically or simply go against them if they believed the situation called for it. This
makes it very difficult for the United States to trust Chinese economic actions and heavily
undermines the amount of soft power they may generate regardless of positive actions
such as the continuing of negotiations for the BIT or the founding of the FTZ.
Ultimately, this has led experts to dismiss those actions discussed at dialogues such as the
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S&ED and the JCCT. Dr. Dereck Scissors argued that the S&ED’s meetings had become
“glorified talk shops” featuring groups and discussions where the Chinese often promise
to engage in discussion regarding issues but take little action (Scissors, as cited in USCC,
2014). The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) took this criticism one step
further, finding that of 298 trade and investment commitments made by China in JCCT
and S&ED dialogues, they were unable to determine the extent to which any had been
fulfilled (U.S. Government Accountability Office, as cited in USCC, 2014). While this is
attributed to poor tracking by US agencies, the fact that these commitments were not
noticeably implemented by China or that the US continued to demand the Chinese act on
the same issues year after year indicates that the Chinese most likely did not seriously
consider implementing policy favorable to the US during these dialogues, substantially
weakening the amount of soft power generating by economic policy by the Chinese
through these exchange mechanisms. Therefore, while 2014 may have seen some
positive steps such as 2013, the amount of distrust among the US side toward the Chinese
due to their continuing failure to act on US concerns effectively undermines their small
successes, presenting a period where very little soft power was created by the Chinese in
the US from 2012 to 2014.
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Confucius Institutes and the High-Level Consultation on People-to-People
Exchanges:
In 2012, the Confucius Institutes Headquarters continued the expansion of the
Confucius Institute program. This expansion included an increase of 41.8% in the
number of foreign Chinese language teachers trained to work at Confucius Institutes to
6,229 (Hanban, 2012). 287 Confucius Institutes and Classrooms also became certified to
conduct Chinese language tests such as the Chinese Proficiency Test (HSK), an increase
of 55% over the previous year (Hanban, 2012). The annual budget for the Confucius
Institutes also increased to $396 million, and France and Germany held the “Year of
Chinese Language” and the “Chinese Culture Year” respectively, attracting 500,000
participants to 200 cultural activities (Hanban, 2012). All of this represents substantial
growth for Hanban during 2012 and, considering the United States held the most
Confucius Institutes and Classrooms each year from 2006 to 2011, it is likely that
Confucius Institute activities would expand there as well.
This seems to have been the case in 2012, as the United States continued to house
the most Confucius Institutes and Classrooms in the world. The United States saw a 20
percent increase in Confucius Institutes over the previous year to a total of 90, with
Confucius Classrooms increasing 5.4% to reach 315 in 2012. In conjunction with these
increases, Confucius Institutes in the United States also attracted visits from Chinese
dignitaries including individuals such as Chen Zhili, Vice Chairwoman of the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress of China and Chairperson of All China
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Women’s Federation, and Xu Jialu, Vice-Chairman of the 9th & 10th Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress of the PRC and President of the
International Society for Chinese Language Teaching (ISCLT) (Hanban, 2012). Of great
significance were the two separate visits made by Xi Jinping to the Confucius Classroom
at the International Studies Learning Center in Los Angeles during February and
December of 2012, indicating Xi’s commitment to the program and presenting him an
opportunity to speak with students of Chinese language in the US (Hanban, 2012). In
conjunction with these visits by Chinese officials, Hanban continued its “Chinese Bridge”
activities for American students and administrators, hosting 617 American high school
students in July and 416 education officials and principals in November (Hanban, 2012).
Hanban also maintained its cooperation with US organizations such as the Asia Society
and the U.S. College board, hosting the 5th National Chinese Language Conference in
April, attracting 1,200 government officials, school presidents, and principals, and
renewing the Annual Cooperation Agreement with the College Board for 2012 through
2013). Paired with the North American Confucius Institute Directors’ Conference Held
in Washington D.C. in April 2012 and it appears that Confucius Institute activities
continued to grow in the United States during 2012.
However, there is one interesting event that occurred in 2012 that could be
considered as an indication of problems between the United States and the Confucius
Institutes. On May 17, 2012, the U.S. State Department issued a directive which argued
that Confucius Institutes in the United States must receive American accreditation and
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that certain Chinese teachers and volunteers had overstayed the terms of their visas,
requiring that they leave the country by the end of June (Hanban, 2012). This resulted in
strident opposition from Hanban and by May 25, the State Department reissued the
directive to “rectify its former statement” according to Hanban’s 2012 annual report
(Hanban, 2012). While this issue appears to have been solved, it is notable for the fact
that no negative events like this had ever been reported in Hanban’s annual reports before
this point. In general, the reports tend to focus on those positive developments related to
Confucius Institutes and the fact that this occurrence was included in the report details the
seriousness of the issue. Despite this incident, it still appears that Hanban was committed
to expanding Confucius Institutes and Classrooms in the United States in 2012 and would
continue to do so in 2013.
During 2013, the number of Confucius Institutes and Classrooms again grew in
the United States with Confucius Institutes reaching 100 and Confucius Classrooms
rising to 356 (Hanban, 2013). This, as with the previous years, was paired with visits
from Chinese officials such as Xu Lin, Chief Executive of Confucius Institute
Headquarters and Director General of Hanban, and Liu Yandong, Vice Premier of the
State Council of China and Chairperson of the Council of the Confucius Institute
Headquarters, to the official opening of Confucius Institutes in the United States
(Hanban, 2013). The Chinese also arranged for international singers to participate in the
“I Sing Beijing-Hanyu Academy of Vocal Arts” concert at the Lincoln Center in New
York City and then a subsequent tour of the United States (Hanban, 2013). The

131

performers in this event were drawn from Confucius Institutes from across the world that
participated in the “I Sing Beijing” competition in China with the best selected to travel
to the US to showcase their skills (Hanban, 2013).
This leads to an interesting new trend in the annual reports where international
events that do not focus on one region in particular, such as the United States, garnered
far more attention than they did in the past. In addition to touting the success of the “I
Sing Beijing” competition, Hanban (2013) made a point to discuss heavily events such as
the “Chinese Bridge Chinese Proficiency Competition for Foreign College Students” and
the “Chinese Bridge Chinese Proficiency Competition for Foreign Students in China”
among others without indicating the levels of participation for any specific country or
region. There was also much more emphasis on programs such as the Major in Teaching
Chinese Language being established in Chinese universities, the establishment of an
online Confucius Institute Digital Library, and 293 other Chinese language promotion
programs in 59 countries during 2013 (Hanban, 2013).
While it is undeniable that some of these programs garnered participation from
American citizens, the report departs from previous editions which made a point to boast
about American participation in these events, which now seems to be understated in the
face of international participation. This coincides with the fact that “Chinese Bridge”
events specifically for American students and administrators experienced lower
attendance, with only 502 high school students participating in the Summer Camp for
American High School Students as opposed to the 612 in 2012 and only 381 principals
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and education officials participating in the “Chinese Bridge” for American Schools event
in 2013 as opposed to 416 in 2013 (Hanban, 2013). These lower numbers were paired
with no mention of the renewal or signing of new agreements with American institutions
or organizations which had been always noted in previous reports (Hanban, 2013).
Finally, Xi Jinping made a total of four visits to Confucius Institutes in 2013 while
Premier Li Keqiang also visited three institutes and was present in Germany for the
Chinese-German Language Year celebrations but neither of them attended any signings
or events in the US (Hanban, 2013).
Despite these possible indications of decreasing interest in promoting soft power
through Confucius Institutes in the United States in 2013, it should be noted that other
events did occur which indicated a continuing interest in the United States. Specifically,
the Sixth National Chinese Language Conference was held which had 1,300 participants
attend the conference, including government officials as well as representatives from
numerous educational organizations (Hanban, 2013). Even more government officials
from the Oregon State Senate were invited to visit the Confucius Institute Headquarters
in September, with the same month also seeing the First Joint Meeting of the United
States Confucius Institutes which was attended by 260 representatives from Confucius
Institutes and Classrooms across the US (Hanban, 2013). Pairing this with discussions to
establish a Confucius Regional Center in the United States alongside one in Latin
America to manage the affairs of Confucius Institutes in these regions and it appears that,
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despite less attention paid to the United States in some areas, the United States remained
a key country in the plans of the Confucius Institute Headquarters (Hanban, 2013).
2014 saw the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Confucius Institutes and, to
celebrate its success, Hanban organized multiple activities under a global Confucius
Institute Day, which would draw participants from 1,200 Confucius Institutes across 126
countries (Hanban, 2014). In recognition of their achievements, both President Xi and
Premier Li sent congratulatory letters to the Confucius Institute Headquarters which held
an Open Day that included cultural seminars, academic lecture, and artistic performances
which attracted 3,000 foreigner and local residents in Beijing (Hanban, 2014). This focus
on the global reach of the Confucius Institutes, however, continued to overshadow
individual efforts within the United States as no mention was made of activities within
the United States during the year. Instead more emphasis was placed on the expansion of
“Chinese Bridge” activities to Scotland, France, and Mexico than on new activities
occurring in the US (Hanban, 2014). Xi and Li also did not visit any Confucius Institutes
in the United States in 2014 and the number of educational administrators from the US
participating in the “Chinese Bridge” for American Schools program continued to
decrease to 265. All of this was paired, again, with no mention of cooperation
agreements signed between Hanban and US organizations despite the fact that the US
continued to have the most Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms in the entire
world (Hanban, 2014).
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Figure 4.1: Confucius Institutes and Classrooms in the United States from 2012 through
2014

Source: Hanban Annual Reports 2012-2014
Regarding the exact number of Confucius Institutes and Classrooms, the United
States had 107 Confucius Institutes and 435 Confucius Classrooms by the end of 2014,
both increases from the previous year (Hanban, 2014). There was also an increase in the
amount of American students participating in the “Chinese Bridge” activities, jumping
from 502 during the previous year to 623 in 2014 (Hanban, 2014). Despite these
successes, however, Hanban’s 2014 annual report seems to follow the pattern established
in 2013 where a greater priority was placed on multinational events as opposed to those
which were confined to one country. While this does not necessarily indicate that less
effort was being focused in promoting soft power in the United States it does represent a
fundamental shift in the priorities of Hanban regarding their annual reports. Previously,
these reports always concentrated on touting their successes in promoting Confucius
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Institutes in the United States. Considering this, it is arguable that soft power promotion
through Confucius Institutes from 2012 through 2014 experienced somewhat mixed
results. On the surface, the Confucius Institute Program continued to expand in the
United States but there was evidence that the US was no longer at the same level of
importance that it had been in previous Hanban reports.
Building off of its meetings in 2011, the High-Level Consultation on People-toPeople Exchanges (CPE) announced numerous new efforts to increase exchanges
between Chinese and American citizens in the realms of science and education, the arts,
sports, and in women’s issues. In the sciences, the two sides formalized the Young
Scientist Forum, which began in 2011 and served as an opportunity for students
interested in the sciences from China and the United States to come together to discuss
research and even work together on specific research projects (“Third U.S.-China
Consultation on People-to-People Exchange,” 2012). The two sides also agreed to send a
delegation of young Chinese scientists to the United States to visit universities and
organizations in order to encourage careers in the sciences within the United States
(“Third U.S.-China Consultation,” 2012). In addition to this, the Department of
Education and the Ministry of Education held meetings under the Education
Development Forum between science and vocational education experts from the two
countries to discuss teaching methods in these areas and the promotion of studying these
topics in the US and the PRC (“Third U.S.-China Consultation,” 2012).
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China and the United States announced numerous activities between American
and Chinese athletic organizations, particularly exchanges centered on basketball. In
June 2012 the WNBA and the Women’s Chinese Basketball Association (WCBA)
planned to cooperate with the State Department’s SportsUnited Office to send three
basketball envoys to China to discuss the sport and meet with Chinese professional teams
(“Third U.S.-China Consultation,” 2012). The Chinese women’s Basketball Team also
toured the United States during 2012, skirmishing with professional WNBA teams to
promote Chinese basketball in the United States (“Third U.S.-China Consultation,”
2012). Men’s basketball in China also cooperated with US organizations as the Chinese
Basketball Association (CBA) joined with the NBA to participate in coach exchange
programs between the two countries to strengthen perceptions of sports philosophies in
the two countries (“Third U.S.-China Consultation,” 2012). Outside of basketball, the
Chinese and the US also sponsored exchanges between girls high school volleyball teams
from China, athletes with disabilities, the NFL and the Chinese Rugby Association,
Chinese Wushu and Qigong instructors with Americans interested in the martial arts, and
they even sponsored an exhibition match between the women’s national soccer teams
from the two countries in Pennsylvania (“Third U.S.-China Consultation,” 2012).
These exchanges continued in the arts as the US and China signed multiple
agreements to expand cooperation between museums in both China and the United
States. This included an extension of the MOU between the Institute of Museum and
Library Services and the Ministry of Culture to enhance information, library, and archival
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services between the US and the PRC (“Third U.S.-China Consultation,” 2012). Chinese
museum management professionals also agreed to meet with their American counterparts
to discuss and share their expertise on museum management (“Third U.S.-China
Consultation,” 2012). In addition to this, the CPE (2012) pointed to increased
cooperation between private organizations within the United States and China such as the
Philadelphia Orchestra agreeing to a one year pilot program with the National Centre for
the Performing Arts (NCPA) and the Meridian International Center’s work to promote a
public-private American-Chinese Cultural Initiative (“Third U.S.-China Consultation,”
2012).
Regarding women’s issues, China and the United States continued to demonstrate
an impressive ability to come together on issues facing women in their two countries with
agreements to engage in at least two annual exchanges between women’s groups from
China and the US going forward (“Third U.S.-China Consultation,” 2012). Exchanges in
2012 included an agreement to host a private event at the UN Commission on the Status
of Women on “Women and Sustainable Development, the All-China Women’s
Federation (ACWF) Vice-President Men Xiaosi leading a delegation to Washington D.C.
to participate in the fifth Women-LEAD Dialogue, and a ACWF delegation and public
health experts from China brought to the US by the Goldman Sachs Group and the Susan
G. Komen for the Cure Foundation to increase exchanges regarding breast cancer
between the United States and China (“Third U.S.-China Consultation,” 2012). Finally,
the ACWF and the State Department facilitated the creation of a program to be held in
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2013 at Mount Holyoke College centered on women and philanthropy professionals in
the field of development (“Third U.S.-China Consultation,” 2012). This program would
allow women in Chinese NGOs and philanthropic organizations to participate in
activities to improve management and leadership skills in designing developing programs
to help women and girls in China (“Third U.S.-China Consultation,” 2012). This was
scheduled to coincide with Beijing Normal University’s China Philanthropic Research
Institute hosting delegations from the US in 2013 to expand women’s ability to
participate in philanthropic pursuits in China (“Third U.S.-China Consultation,” 2012).
Pairing these initiatives with those under the previous sections illustrates that much was
accomplished by the CPE during 2012, resulting in an improved image of China within
the United States.
Following its efforts in 2012, the CPE continued to promote exchanges between
China and the United States in 2013, but, with slightly less results. In science and
education, the two sides continued to hold the Young Scientist Forum which met twice in
2013 in both the United States and China (“U.S.-China Consultation on People-to-People
Exchange (CPE),” 2013). While this represented the extent of CPE actions regarding the
sciences, education also saw a slight increase in attention with the U.S. Department of
Education and the Chinese Ministry of Education renewing their Memorandum of
Cooperation on Education while agreeing to continue to promote cooperation between
states and provinces in the realm of educational exchange (“U.S.-China Consultation,”
2013) Besides this, however, most of the actions described at the CPE are vague, with
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assertions that cooperation continues to expand but no indication as to how that
cooperation is expanding.
This issue becomes more pronounced in the case of exchanges related to the arts
and culture in which the CPE makes assertions that the Ministry of Culture continues to
work with American organizations and agencies to promote exchanges (“U.S.-China
Consultation,” 2013). This includes collaborations between the Palace Museum of China
and the Virginia Museum of Fine Arts, the National Theatre Company of China and the
Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts, and the Suzhou Kun Opera Theatre and the
Lincoln Center Festival but nowhere is it explained what these exchanges were or
whether there are plans to continue these activities in the future (“U.S.-China
Consultation,” 2013). Outside of this, the only specific project discussed was the
possibility that the Ministry of Culture and the National Endowment for the Humanities
of the United States would hold the Fourth U.S.-China Cultural Forum (“U.S.-China
Consultation,” 2013).
Actions related to sports did not have the same level of ambiguity, but there was a
noticeable decline in activities, particularly with regards to women’s athletics. Despite
this, several exchanges did occur including the NBA being scheduled to play pre-season
games in Beijing and Shanghai in October (“U.S.-China Consultation,” 2013). The CPE
also facilitated an agreement between the China Disabled Persons’ Federation (CDPF)
and its counterparts in the US to organize future exchanges between the Chinese
Paralympic Committee, the U.S. Paralympic Committee, the USA Deaf Sports
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Federation, and between Special Olympic China and Special Olympics USA (“U.S.China Consultation,” 2013). Finally the CPE hosted discussion on the establishment of
the U.S.-China Sports Seminar (“U.S.-China Consultation,” 2013. This annual forum
would gather the General Administration of Sport (GASC), the U.S. Government, and
“partners from academia and industry to promote information-sharing on various sportsrelated issues” (“U.S.-China Consultation,” 2013, in sports para. 5).
While efforts in the previous three areas seemed to lag behind those in 2012,
activities under the auspices of women’s issues continued to receive ample attention, with
several examples of exchanges between China and the United States. These included the
ACWF hosting the Sixth U.S.-China Women’s Leadership Exchange and Dialogue
(Women LEAD) meeting in Beijing which was attended by Ambassador Cathy Russell
and a delegation from the US and discussed topics related to violence against women
(“U.S.-China Consultation,” 2013). The China Women’s University from 2013 to 2015
with the support of the Ford Foundation also agreed to cooperate with the Woodrow
Wilson Center’s Women in Public Service Project in China to hold two workshops to
teach leadership skills for young women leaders throughout China (“U.S.-China
Consultation,” 2013). The 100,000 Strong Foundation also expanded its efforts outside
of the broad category of education to cooperation with the Wanxiang America
Corporation, the ACWF, and the Secretary's Office of Global Women's Issues (S/GWI)
to bring female science and technology students from both the US and China together at a
“Girls’ Tech Camp” in China (“U.S.-China Consultation,” 2013). In one final agreement
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the S/GWI, ACWF, and Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves came together in a more
specific activity to promote the use of clean and efficient cook stoves with “a view to
improving health and livelihoods of women and their families and combating climate
change” (“U.S.-China Consultation,” 2013, in Women’s Issues para. 5). Combining
these more strenuous effort with those more ambiguous actions taken regarding sports,
art, and science and it seems that the CPE had somewhat mixed results in 2013 but did
continue at least some efforts to generate soft power in the US through people-to-people
exchange.
At the 2014 meeting of the CPE, the creation of a new pillar for discussions and
exchanges between the two countries was announced related to health (“U.S.-China
High-Level Consultation on People-to-People Exchange (CPE),” 2014). The addition of
this new pillar promised to expand the level of exchanges to occur between China and the
United States and illustrated that the two sides believed that the CPE offered an effective
platform to promote people-to-people exchange. China and the United States also
continued to hold the semiannual Young Scientist Forum with the meeting in Beijing
focusing on careers in the sciences and the Washington meeting on science’s role in
disaster management (“U.S.-China High-Level,” 2014). In addition, the U.S. State
Department and the Chinese Ministry of Education renewed the Agreement for
Cooperation in Educational Exchanges and the two sides discussed plans to expand the
U.S.-China Fulbright program (“U.S.-China High-Level,” 2014). There was also an
announcement that the 100,000 Strong Foundation and the China Education Association
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for International Exchange (CEAIE) had jointly established a counterpart organization to
the 100,000 Strong Initiative in Beijing in order to support the goals of the initiative from
within China (“U.S.-China High-Level,” 2014). Besides these more tangible efforts, the
two sides renewed their commitments to promote cooperation between state and
provincial level K-12 education and hoped to expand that cooperation to the university
level in the future (“U.S.-China High-Level,” 2014).
In the realm of culture and the arts, the CPE mainly announced the continuation
of previous activities while also highlighting the United States’ success in attracting more
private sector participants such as Carnegie Hall, the National Geographic Society, and
the National China Garden Foundation (“U.S.-China High-Level,” 2014). Besides this,
however, the only substantial initiatives conducted by the two sides dealt with the
renewal of the Implementing Accord for Cultural Exchange for 2014-2018 between the
Ministry of Culture and the State Department and the second official visit of delegations
between the two countries to promote learning about each other’s cultural administrative
system and strengthen future exchanges (“U.S.-China High-Level,” 2014). An
interesting phenomenon also is that, at least in the realms of culture and the arts, the
United States was responsible for most of the initiatives, sending multiple arts groups to
China for performances or lectures while the Chinese did not appear to be sending any
counterpart groups to the United States.
This lack of activity on the part of China may also explain the ambiguous nature
of the accomplishments discussed under the sports pillar, where the CPE seemed to only
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mention the success of past exchanges without detailing any specific future activities.
Regarding those programs which occurred in 2014, the CPE Joint Fact Sheet simply
stated that more than a dozen sports leagues and federations from China and the United
States came together for competitions and athlete exchanges or that cooperation between
organizations such as the NBA and CBA “continued to thrive” without providing
examples of what exchanges occurred (“U.S.-China High-Level,” 2014, in Sports para. 2,
para. 4). While this may seem overly critical, it is worth mentioning that the factsheet in
both 2012 and 2013 did not use such ambiguous language, indicating that perhaps there
were less actual evidence of exchange in this pillar than in previous years.
Women’s issues, however, continued to provide clear evidence of exchange and
cooperation as the S/GWI and the ACWF once again met for Women LEAD and
collaborated on multiple projects between the two countries (“U.S.-China High-Level,”
2014). These included a program where 10 students from University of Chicago were
invited to Beijing by the China Women’s University (CWU) in Sept. 2014 and the
Woodrow Wilson Center’s Women in Public Service Project and CWU planned to
continue a partnership to engage women across five Chinese universities in leadership
training programs (“U.S.-China High-Level,” 2014). There was also greater
collaboration regarding the use of cooking stoves as the Alliance for Clean Cookstoves
worked with the ACWF on an MOU to improve access to clean and effective cooking
stoves to women in China (“U.S.-China High-Level,” 2014).
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Despite these activities, the seeming decline in the amount of programs discussed
at the 2014 CPE seems to follow a trend starting in 2013 where evidence of
accomplishments at the meetings became less clear and there was less indication of actual
programs initiated under the umbrella of the CPE. Considering this and the degree of
decline in American-centric events mentioned in Hanban’s annual reports and 2012
through 2014 witnessed mixed results in the realm of people-to-people exchanges
perhaps indicating lower Chinese commitment to generate soft power in the United States
through these methods.

Cultural Performances and Museum Exchanges
During the previous two time periods examined in this thesis, the Kennedy Center
was host to two extended China-themed events, with “The Festival of China” held in
2005 and “China: Art of a Nation” in 2011. While these two events were not the only
artistic performances and exhibitions related to China held at the Kennedy Center during
these two time frames, their presence represented a clear interest on the part of China to
utilize the Kennedy Center as a stage through which to promote Chinese art and culture
to an American audience and increase the appeal of China within the United States.
From 2012 through 2014, however, the Kennedy Center did not host an extended Chinathemed event.
This did not indicate, however, that the Kennedy Center was no longer interested
in such exhibitions as from February 19, 2013 to March 16, 2013 the Center hosted
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“Nordic Cool 2013,” which focused on exhibitions related to Nordic culture and featured
cooperation with Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden (Merry, 2013). It
should be noted that a Chinese performance group did participate in the other
multinational extended event held at the Kennedy during this time period at the “World
Stages: International Theater Festival 2014” from March 10, 2014 to March 30, 2014
(“March 2014,” 2016). However, this group only engaged in three performances, placing
them well below countries such as England and the United States but also far below
fellow BRICS countries Brazil and South Africa who each had at least seven times as
many performances then the Chinese group (“March 2014,” 2016).
In 2012, however, China was a part of several smaller performances at the
Kennedy Center including a performance at “Dance Asia 2012: Asia in Maskquerade” a
part of the Ninth Annual Dance DC Festival on August 25, 2012 (“Dance Asia 2012:
Asia in Maskquerade,” 2016). This event encompassed many different dance forms from
multiple countries in Asia where Chinese dance only formed a portion of the overall
performance (“Dance Asia 2012: Asia in Maskquerade,” 2016). The next event to
feature Chinese performances was a presentation from the Chinese Alumni Associations
of Greater Washington of dancers, artists, and even martial artists from Guizhou, China
on September 28 (“Chinese Alumni Associations of Greater Washington presents: A
Splendid Night of Guizhou, China,” 2016). Unlike the previous performance, this event
was solely about Chinese performance art and, while the sponsoring organizations has no
clear ties to the Chinese government, it is clear the event was able to engage a truly
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Chinese performance that would reflect positively on Chinese culture (“Chinese Alumni
Associations of Greater Washington,” 2016).
The final two events featuring Chinese artists in 2012 were both dedicated to
traditional folk music, with the first, “Hanggai,” illustrating a synthesis between modern
and classical styles with an emphasis on Mongolian folk music (“Hanggai,” 2016). The
last event, occurring on October 23, was sponsored by the America & China International
Foundation, a groups that started in the US and focuses on promoting exchange between
the US and China, and focused on the use of traditional jade instruments in Chinese folk
songs (“A&C International Foundation presents: Chinese Traditional Jade Musical
Instruments Recital & Folk Song Concert,” 2016). Combining this performance with the
others in 2012, and the Kennedy Center hosted four different events which featured
Chinese performers, all of which were only a one-day engagement.
During 2013, there appeared to be an increase in Chinese themed events, with six
distinct performances held during the year. The first production held in 2013 with
Chinese themes was a performance from the Hong Kong Dance Company of “Qingming
Riverside,” which was performed at the 2008 Beijing Olympics and has been named a
National Treasure class performance in China (“CPAA Productions Ltd presents: Hong
Kong Dance Company: Qingming Riverside,” 2016). This performance clearly is a
favorite of the Chinese and it was also presented by the Chinese Performing Arts Agency
(CPAA), a subsidiary of the Ministry of Culture which clearly links the performance to
Chinese soft power promotion efforts (“China Performing Arts Agency,” 2016). The

147

Shen Wei Dance Arts Company also presented another performance at the Kennedy
Center during 2013, continuing its commitment to the Center which began in 2008. With
a performance which was presented as “[b]lending a traditional Chinese aesthetic with
Western dance” Shen Wei’s Undivided Divided featured dancers interacting with a
multimedia display (“Shen Wei Dance Arts,” 2016d). On August 29, the Organization of
Chinese American Women presented a performance by the Macao Youth Symphony
Orchestra of select work by Mozart (“Organization of Chinese American Women
presents: Macao Youth Symphony Orchestra: A Nite of Mozart,” 2016). While this
performance again featured a performance from a Chinese group, it is interesting to note
that the organization which sponsored was not connected to China itself, which leads into
the issues with other Chinese themed performances held during 2013.
Specifically, 2013 saw two performances from Shen Yun, considered one of the
premier Chinese performance groups in the world (“Shen Yun 2013: Reviving 5,000
Years of Civilization: presented by Falun Dafa Association of Washington, D.C.,” 2016;
“Shen Yun Symphony Orchestra presented by Falun Dafa Association of D.C.,” 2016a).
While this would usually be considered a great source of soft power for China,
performances of Shen Yun’s work cannot be seen in China and the group was established
in New York City due to a desire to “freely express themselves and revive their ancient
Chinese culture” (“Frequently Asked Questions,” 2016, para. 1). Shen Yun, in fact, goes
so far as to accuse the Chinese Communist Party as treating traditional Chinese values as
a “threat to its existence” and that the Cultural Revolution nearly destroyed traditional
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Chinese culture entirely (“Our Story,” 2016, para. 6). Shen Yun is also linked to the
Falun Dafa movement in China which opposes the continued dominance of the CCP and
has been made illegal within the PRC (Fish, 2015).
Those sentiments from Shen Yun’s own website and its members’ association
with an illegal movement in China indicate an antagonistic relationship between them
and the Chinese government which presents a problem where their performances are a
soft power resource for Chinese culture but not for the Chinese state. Considering this,
these performances cannot be used as soft power generation activities by China as they
go against the current government of China’s conceptions of China. This is also true of
another performance which occurred in 2013 which was sponsored by the Taiwanese
American Charity & Education Association which, while it does not directly state its
opposition to the Chinese regime, promotes the idea of Taiwanese being distinct from
Chinese, which is something which the Chinese government could not accept
(“Taiwanese American Charity & Education Association: 2013 Annual Concert,” 2016).
In conjunction with these performances by groups with possibly problematic
relationships with China, there was another Chinese-themed performance scheduled for
July 21, 2013 that was cancelled which was to feature the Beijing Youth Performing Arts
Group (“CANCELLED: Agis Center for Arts and Humanities presents: Beijing Youth
Performing Arts Group,” 2016). While no explanation was given for the cancellation,
this does mark the first time a Chinese event was cancelled at the Kennedy Center from
2005 through 2013.
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This possibility continued into 2014 as, in addition to those few performances part
of the “World Stages: International Theater Festival 2014” event, there were only three
other Chinese-themed performances. This included the Wedding of Ordos presented by
CPAA on January 24 and 25 which featured the Inner Mongolia Ordos National Song
and Dance Theater and illustrated the art and culture of the ancient Mongolian city
(“CPAA Productions Ltd. presents: Wedding of Ordos,” 2016). This was followed by
two performances that formed a portion of the Smithsonian Folklife Festival which
featured the support of the China International Culture Association (CICA) and the China
Arts and Entertainment Group (CAEG) both of which fall under the Ministry of culture
(“China International Culture Association,” 2004). The first performance was on June
25, 2014 and focused on Zhejiang Wu Opera, a traditional opera style practiced in
China’s Zhejiang province (“Zhejiang Wu Opera,” 2016). The next performance was
from the Quanzhou Puppet Troupe and occurred on July 2, 2014 (“Quanzhou Puppet
Troupe,” 2014). These three performances, in addition to those that formed a portion of
the “World Stages” event, all enjoyed the support of organizations directly connected to
the Chinese government, indicating that while no extended Chinese event occurred
during 2014, the Chinese government still seemed to invest more interest in performance
at the Kennedy Center during the year.
However, 2014 also witnessed two more performances of Shen Yun at the
Kennedy Center with both of them being presented by the Falun Dafa Association of
Washington D.C., again presenting a challenge to China’s soft power promotion efforts at
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the Center with a group considered dangerous in China continuing to have a voice at the
Center (“Shen Yun 2014: Reviving 5,000 Years of Civilization: presented by Falun Dafa
Association of Washington, D.C.,” 2016; “Shen Yun Symphony Orchestra presented by
Falun Dafa Association of D.C.,” 2016b). Considering this and the lack of an extended
Chinese-themed event which enjoyed the support of the Chinese government and it
appears that performances at the Kennedy Center presented a disjointed image of China’s
willingness to use the Center as a venue for promoting Chinese soft power; perhaps even
moving away from the Center due to its association with groups with openly
confrontational attitudes towards Beijing and the regime.
The Metropolitan Museum of Art had several exhibitions carry over from 2011 to
2012 including “The Art of Dissent in 17th-Century China: Masterpieces of Ming
Loyalist Art from the Chih Lo Lou Collection” which ran for only 1 day in 2012 and
“Red and Black: Chinese Lacquer, 13th–16th Century” which ran for a much longer 160
days (“The Art of Dissent in 17th-Century China: Masterpieces of Ming Loyalist Art
from the Chih Lo Lou Collection,” 2016; “Red and Black: Chinese Lacquer, 13th–16th
Century,” 2016). The first exhibition to begin in 2012 detailed the artwork of Fu Baoshi,
described as one of the “most original figure painter and landscapist of China’s modern
period” (“Chinese Art in an Age of Revolution: Fu Baoshi (1904–1965),” 2016, para. 1).
Living through the warlord period, the Japanese invasion and the Communist Revolution,
Fu witnessed great changes within Chinese society as he attempted to blend traditional art
styles with modern techniques, creating a definitive and nationalistic style all his own
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(“Chinese Art in an Age of Revolution,” 2016). While he never fully embraced Sovietstyle Social Realism which became popular in China during his later life, his work was
embraced by the CCP as he was commissioned to paint pictures of Mao Zedong, the
Long March, and even a landscape panorama in the Great Hall of the People (“Chinese
Art in an Age of Revolution,” 2016). With China’s Nanjing Museum providing the
artwork on display it is clear that Chinese supported this exhibition which was on display
for a total of 86 days in 2012 (“Chinese Art in an Age of Revolution,” 2016).
The next exhibition held at the Met was entitled “The Printed Image in China,
8th–21st Century” and was on display for 85 days from May 5 to July 29 (“The Printed
Image in China, 8th–21st Century,” 2016). Printing on paper was invented in China in
about 700 A.D. and the art form has remained important from the dynastic period to even
the post-Communist Revolution (“The Printed Image in China,” 2016). It should be
noted, however, that unlike the previous exhibition the work on display here was drawn
from the British Museum, leaving no Chinese organization or institution responsible for
the event (“The Printed Image in China,” 2016). Besides this, there was only one
Chinese-themed exhibition which was related to Chinese gardens in paintings and ran
from August 18, 2012 through January 6, 2013 resulting in a total of 134 days in 2012
and only 5 in 2013 (“Chinese Gardens: Pavilions, Studios, Retreats,” 2016). Much like
the previous event, this exhibition is not listed as being tied to any Chinese institutions
with the works seemingly drawn from the Museum’s private collection (“Chinese
Gardens,” 2016). Combining these events with those previously discussed, and the
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Metropolitan Museum only featured three Chinese-themed exhibitions during 2012
which ran for at least 30 days, but, Chinese-themed exhibitions were on display 342 days
out of 361 days where the Museum was opened.
While this may seem like a small number of exhibits, 2013 saw even fewer as
only one of the exhibitions which began in 2013 was on display for more than 30 days.
This exhibit was entitled “Small Delights: Chinese Snuff Bottles,” which began on July
19, 2013 and continued until June 15, 2014 (“Small Delights: Chinese Snuff Bottles,”
2016). Although this exhibit highlighted greater amounts of contact between the West
and China during this period, as snuff was introduced to China by the West during the
Qing Dynasty, no indication is given that the artifacts on display for the exhibition came
from any Chinese institutions, again illustrating a lack of effort on the part of the Chinese
to promote Chinese culture through the Met during this time (“Small Delights,” 2016).
Two other exhibitions began at the end of 2013, each being on display for 20
days. However, while the amount of days they were on display in 2014 both results in
them being counted as 30-day events for that year, they will be described as part of 2013
as they form at least a portion of the total number of Chinese exhibition days during that
year. The first exhibition was entitled “Ink Art: Past as Present in Contemporary China,”
which began on December 11, 2013 and ended April 6, 2014 giving it a total of 20 days
in 2013 and 95 days in 2014 (“Ink Art: Past as Present in Contemporary China,” 2016).
This exhibit is particularly noteworthy in that it is touted as the “first major exhibition of
Chinese contemporary art ever mounted by the Metropolitan” and focused on attempts by
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Chinese artists to reimagine Chinese traditions through modern art styles (“Ink Art,”
2016, in Exhibition Overview, para. 1). While this presents an intriguing illustration of
the ability to blend Chinese and Western styles, this exhibition is not tied to any Chinese
institution or organization, with the main collaborators listed as The Andrew W. Mellon
Foundation, the Richard and Geneva Hofheimer Memorial Fund, and Marie-Hélène Weill
(“Ink Art,” 2016).
The final exhibition beginning in 2013 also stands as the longest running Chinese
exhibit held at the Met from 2005 through 2014 beginning on December 11, 2013 and
ending on March 8, 2015 (“Colors of the Universe: Chinese Hardstone Carvings,” 2016).
Entitled “Colors of the Universe: Chinese Hardstone Carvings,” the exhibit focused
mainly on headstone carvings from the Qing Dynasty, despite the art form existing in
China for many centuries before that (“Colors of the Universe,” 2016). While the
exhibition’s length indicates a greater ability to generate soft power for China, the
artifacts on display once again are not drawn from any Chinese institution and it appears
no Chinese organization aided in the presentation of this event (“Colors of the Universe,”
2016). Combining all of the events together and 2013 only featured one exhibition which
was on display for at least 30 days and only included 189 days where a Chinese
exhibition was on display at the Met, the lowest number for both of these categories from
2005 through 2014.
Fortunately, Chinese themed events would appear in greater numbers during
2014, aided by the fact that all three of the exhibitions which began in 2013 ran for more
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than 30 days in 2014. In addition to this, five exhibits began in 2014 which were
displayed for more than 30 days with the first concentrating on Chinese calligraphy from
the collection of Akiko Yamazaki and Jerry Yang (“Out of Character: Decoding Chinese
Calligraphy—Selections from the Collection of Akiko Yamazaki and Jerry Yang,” 2016).
Featuring works from the Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasty, the exhibits ran for 110 days in
2014 and contained an impressive display of Chinese calligraphy despite the fact that the
exhibition is itself not linked to Chinese organizations (“Out of Character,” 2016). The
next exhibition was titled “The Art of the Chinese Album,” which ran from September 6,
2014 to March 29, 2015, giving a total of 115 days in 2014 (“The Art of the Chinese
Album,” 2016). This exhibition also did not have ties to Chinese institutions but the next
exhibit, “Innovation and Spectacle: Chinese Ritual Bronzes” running from October 18,
2014 through March 22, 2015 did (“Innovation and Spectacle: Chinese Ritual Bronzes,”
2016). On display for a total of 73 days in 2014, this exhibition featured bronze works
dating back to the 5th century B.C. on loan from the Shanghai Museum that have never
been displayed together outside of China (“Innovation and Spectacle,” 2016).
Following this were two more exhibitions which both ran for 66 days in 2014
with the first focused on Asian lacquerware and the other on Chinese embroidery and
tapestries (“Sumptuous: East Asian Lacquer, 14th–20th Century,” 2016; “Painting with
Threads: Chinese Tapestry and Embroidery, 12th–19th Century,” 2016). Unlike
“Innovation and Spectacle,” these exhibitions did not have any links to Chinese
organizations, leading to “Innovation and Spectacle” and “Chinese Art in an Age of
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Revolution” as the only two events from 2012 through 2014 which had connections to
Chinese sources (“Sumptuous: East Asian Lacquer,” 2016; “Painting with Threads,”
2016). Still, unlike the previous year, the Metropolitan Museum once again had a full
year where a Chinese exhibit was on display
Combining all of the exhibitions which were presented for more than 30 days
during 2014 results in the highest number of Chinese exhibits at the Met from 2005
through 2014 at eight. This, however, does not obscure the fact that 2013 produced the
least amount of Chinese events while 2012 produced four, leading to an average of 4.3
Chinese exhibits from 2012 to 2014. This is a slight decrease from 2008 through 2011,
which averaged 4.8 events but, still higher than 2005 through 2007 which only averaged
3.3 events. However, it should be noted that this relatively higher average is mainly
achieved due to the large amount of events from 2014, which went against a pattern of
fewer events in 2012 and 2013. Furthermore, 2012 through 2014 was almost the first
time period which did not feature at least one year of Chinese exhibits at the Met, with
only the longest Chinese exhibition examined during the time frame of this thesis,
“Colors of the Universe: Chinese Hardstone Carvings,” preventing this from occurring.
Considering this, along with the fact that events with direct ties to Chinese institutions
and organization decreased from five in 2008 through 2011 to only two from 2012
through 2014 and the data from this time presents a disjointed image of China’s attempts
to produce soft power in the United State through the exchange of art.
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Chapter Five: Conclusions
Research Questions:
At the beginning of this thesis, I outlined two questions to serve as the guiding
principles for my research. The first asked whether economic crises could result in state
officials moving away from policies dedicated to promoting soft power in countries
affected by the economic impact of a crisis. The second concentrated on whether shifts
away from soft power promotion signified changes in a state’s foreign policy strategies.
To answer these questions, I selected China as an exemplary case study. China illustrated
a great deal of enthusiasm toward the concept of soft power while also focusing on a
country experiencing a rise (or return) to power. Initial research suggested that the 2007
Financial Crisis could serve as an important point in time for China to re-evaluate its
earlier commitments to soft power strategies and attempt to gain international influence at
the expense of the US. I hypothesized that data would confirm that the Chinese indeed
moved away from a trying to woo the United States in the wake of the crisis and that this
shift from soft power would indicate a new direction for Chinese foreign policy.
The results generated by my research presented a mixed image regarding Chinese
soft power promotion efforts and whether these actions truly conformed to state policy.
After examining Chinese soft power generation activities from 2005 through 2014 in the
areas of economics, people-to-people exchanges, and the arts, it became clear that the
data did not indicate a complete shift away from Chinese soft power promotion efforts,
nor did any shifts in foreign policy coincide with attempts to cease increasing China’s
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soft power in the United States. In general, Chinese soft power promotion strategies
illustrated periods of growth and decline across the timeframe of my research. These
mixed results did not present any clear patterns making it difficult to conclude that these
efforts presented evident decisions by Chinese leaders to move away from soft power
promotion in these areas.

Review of the Data:
Economic Relations:
Beginning in 2005, there still appeared to be a great amount of optimism
surrounding the economic relationship between the United States and China. Hu Jintao,
for example, referred to it as the “pillar sustaining China-US relations” (C-Span, 2006).
Trade between the two countries continued to grow and many in the business community
looked to China as a land of great opportunities. This positivity allowed for the Chinese
to establish a pattern when dealing with the Unites States’ concerns regarding the large
state presence within the Chinese economy. Both sides would often agree to discuss the
problem, such as those related to intellectual property rights (IPR) infringement and state
subsidies, with the Chinese even announcing their intentions to join in agreements within
the World Trade Organization, but, present very little evidence that they were actually
committed to acting on their promises. While this pattern did not escape the notice of the
U.S.-China and Economic and Security Commission (USCC), as it duly noted that the
lack of tangible results produced by bilateral dialogues such as the U.S.-China Joint
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Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) and the Security Economic Dialogue
(SED), the Commission did not openly criticize the Chinese for this, allowing for
sufficient good will to be generated by Chinese from 2005 through 2007.
This begins to change in the next time period of 2008 through 2011, when the
People’s Republic of China’s officials often presented less tangible initiatives. This was
particularly noticed from 2008 through 2010 when the Chinese only seemed to recognize
that the US had concerns regarding the continued failure of the Chinese to join in the
WTO government procurement agreement (GPA) and new laws related to indigenous
innovation within China while also failing to present any real efforts to solve the
problems which the United States identified as areas of concern. In the end, the Chinese
only managed to enact token policy measures during this time which were soon
discovered to be as flawed as earlier Chinese efforts. While these results by themselves
may indicate that Chinese leaders became less willing to generate soft power with
economic levers they did much more to address US concerns in 2011. For example, the
RMB increased in value, laws related to indigenous innovation were rewritten to prevent
local governments from using the law to exclude foreign firms from domestic markets,
and the establishment of a new IPR enforcement mechanism led by Vice Premier Wang
Qishan. These soft power promotion efforts garnered the appreciation of the US leaders,
which resulted in the 2008 through 2011 time period presenting a mixed image of
whether the Chinese were truly determined to move away from soft power promotion
strategies or not. These results follow my proposed path that Hu Jintao, being dedicated
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to the concept, would not so easily abandon soft power promotion and represent the
intricacies of how policy decisions are reached.
During the last time period under investigation, 2012 through 2014, it was
expected that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) under Xi Jinping would be more
willing to move away from soft power generation activities and conform to the more
aggressive stance Xi appeared to take in his speeches and foreign policy. Initially, this
appeared to be the case, as 2012 produced no substantial soft power promotion efforts.
By 2013, however, the Chinese began to announce certain initiatives which gained the
praise of the United States, particularly its greater efforts to join the United States in
signing a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) and the announcement of the creation of the
Shanghai Free Trade Zone (FTZ). 2014 followed this trend and it appears that in
economic issues, the Chinese actually increased the amount of effort they placed into
generating soft power within the United States during this time despite it occurring after
the Financial Crisis and under the more aggressive leadership of Xi. It should be noted,
however, that of the new issues which the USCC concentrated on from 2012 through
2014, anti-monopoly laws, value-added taxes (VATs) and excess capacity, the Chinese
tended to address them in ways that were more self-serving than actually confronting the
pieces of the issues which the US identified as concerns. This seemed to reinforce many
of the USCC’s critiques of the Chinese policies in economics, where the Chinese would
take little action against those problems which benefitted them.
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Confucius Institutes and the High-Level Consultation on People-to-People Exchanges
Throughout the timeframe of this thesis, the amount of Confucius Institutes and
later Confucius Classrooms in the United States continued to grow, beginning with 16
institutes in 2006 and 107 institutes and 435 Confucius Classrooms by 2014. These
numbers have led to the United States having the most institutes and classrooms in the
world, with the Chinese doing much to promote Confucius Institutes in the United States
from 2006 through 2007. Besides simply constructing institutes, Hanban worked to sign
agreements with many educational groups at both the national and local level within the
United States. Furthermore, American students and administrators featured prominently
in “Chinese Bridge” activities organized by Hanban with hundreds travelling to China to
participate in summer camps or the organization of cultural lecture tours in the United
States itself which attracted even more attendees. In this way, it is very clear that the
United States was an important target for Confucius Institutes to the Chinese and
represented a large investment in promoting Chinese soft power.
This continued from 2008 through 2011 as the United States continued to
experience large amounts of growth in the number of Confucius Institutes and
Classrooms and cooperation between Hanban and educational organizations such as the
U.S. College Board and the Asia Society. China also expanded the amount of lecturers
dispatched to the United States to present talks on Chinese culture and language, leading
to 18,900 participating in these activities in 2010. 2010 also saw “Chinese Bridge for
American Schools: A New Start,” an event organized in part by Hanban’s American
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partners illustrating the increased commitments by the two sides to work together to
promote stronger relations between the United States and the PRC. All of this is paired
with the continued attendance by Hanban at conferences such as the National Chinese
Language Conference while also hosting the Joint Conference of Confucius Institutes in
North America and the U.S. National Confucius Classroom Conference, continuing
trends established from 2005 through 2007.
In this way, Beijing appears not to have moved away from their efforts to
generate soft power in people-to-people exchanges following the 2007 Financial Crisis,
but instead to show even greater resolve to use Confucius Institutes as a way to increase
their soft power in the United States. When paired with the launching of the new HighLevel Consultation of People-to-People Exchanges (CPE) in 2010 and the Chinese
illustrated even greater commitment to generating soft power. While its first meeting did
not result in many accomplishments, it led to the beginning of the 100,000 Strong
Initiative to send 100,000 American students to study in China, which the Chinese agreed
to facilitate and announced the creation of scholarship opportunities for Americans
studying in China. By 2011, the CPE expanded to include areas such as science and
women’s issues and demonstrated greater efforts to promote soft power and an apparent
commitment to continue these efforts in the future.
This initially appears to be the case as the number of Confucius Institutes and
Classrooms in the United States continued to grow throughout 2012 to 2014. Upon
closer inspection, however, several trends began to emerge including the fact that fewer
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American students and administrators participated in “Chinese Bridge” activities than
they had in the past and less mention was made of those events dedicated to American
students than had been made in past Hanban reports. From 2012 through 2014, Hanban’s
annual reports shifted their focus more toward the multinational nature of their
organization, emphasizing greater progress made around the world as opposed to a
concentration on the US demonstrated by previous reports. This was not only seen in the
lack of attention placed on activities designed for American students, but also on the
amount of agreements signed with American organizations with only the College Board
appearing as a continuing partner with Hanban. Perhaps the most interesting indication
in a shift away from the United States hinted at during this time period was the mention
of a complaint made by the U.S. State Department about Confucius Institute Chinese
teachers violating the terms of their visas. While this did not lead to the expulsion of any
teachers, it was the first time a negative event was listed in Hanban’s timeline of
important events, illustrating a possible resentment toward US actions and perhaps an
explanation why the US featured less prominently in its efforts from 2012 through 2014.
Taken alone, this seems to indicate a slight shift away from the US during this
time period but not for a continued expansion of the CPE. From 2012 through 2014, the
CPE announced numerous achievements in bringing Chinese and American citizens
together in areas dedicated to science, sports, women’s issues, and in 2014 health.
Exchanges in sports and women’s issues were particularly numerous during this time and
presented the clearest evidence of Chinese efforts to generate soft power in the US
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through the CPE. These successes serve to bolster Chinese activities in people-to-people
exchanges during this time, but, a trend does begin to emerge which could represent
lower commitments. Specifically, the CPE overtime mentions fewer exchanges
occurring between the US and the PRC, with the sciences mostly focusing on the Young
Scientists Forum and sports experiencing a noticeable decline by the end of 2014.
Furthermore, many of the exchanges presented are simply the continuation of past efforts,
a pattern which exhibited itself in the JCCT and S&ED, causing possible suspicion that
the Chinese were not truly committed to promoting soft power in the US through the
CPE. Combined with the evidence from the state of Confucius Institutes in the US from
2012 through 2014, the results present a mixed picture for 2012 through 2014, lending
possible credence to the idea that China was beginning to move away from soft power
promotion in the US in this area under Xi Jinping.
Cultural Performances and Museum Exchanges:
In 2005, the Ministry of Culture collaborated with the Kennedy Center to present
the “Festival of China,” a month long event which featured 28 performances and
exhibitions dedicated to Chinese culture. The longest country-specific event during
2005, the festival presented China as a dynamic country whose future promised to be just
as vibrant as its past, presenting performances which blended both traditional Chinese
values with modern influences. While there would only be one other performance with
Chinese themes at the Kennedy Center during 2005, the large scale of the event and its
attempts to not only promote Chinese culture but present China as a nation open to
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change served as clear indications of China’s desire to improve its image in the United
States.
This direct Chinese involvement, however, was not seen with exhibitions held at
the Metropolitan Museum of Art, as only one exhibition from 2005 through 2007
featured any ties to the Chinese government or Museums within China. While this may
indicate a lack of interest among the Chinese in using the Met as a venue to generate soft
power within the United States, the museum continued to host numerous other
exhibitions which either featured Chinese themes or were dedicated to Chinese art forms.
This led to an average of 3.3 events which lasted at least 30 days per year during the three
year period and a steady increase in the number of days a Chinese event was present at
the museum, culminating in 2007 with an entire year with a Chinese-themed exhibit at
the Met. Considering Nye’s belief that culture is able to generate soft power regardless
of whether a government intends to use it to increase its soft power, those exhibitions
which did not feature ties to Chinese institutions still form evidence of soft power
promotion activities, leading to the conclusion that, when paired with China’s clear
efforts to promote its culture through the Kennedy Center, the Chinese did indeed pursue
opportunities to generate soft power in the United States from 2005 through 2007.
Chinese interest in promoting soft power through art appeared to grow from 2008
through 2011 as the Chinese sponsored four events at the Kennedy Center including
“China: Art of a Nation,” another month long event similar to 2005’s “Festival of China.”
This was buoyed by several more performances without direct ties to China held at the
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Center from 2008 through 2011 which brought the total number of events to 11 and
ensured that a Chinese event occurred every year during the time period. All of this
appears to indicate that the 2007 Financial Crisis did not lead to any cessation of Chinese
efforts to promote soft power through performances at the Kennedy Center and instead
was followed by an increase in Chinese commitment to using the Center as a stage to
promote Chinese soft power in America. However, upon close examination it becomes
clear that the “Festival of China” by itself featured more individual performances than all
of the productions which occurred at the Center from 2008 through 2011, presented a
disjointed image of Chinese intentions regarding the promotion of its soft power during
this period.
Increased Chinese efforts to generate soft power in the United States through art,
however, appear to be supported by Chinese-themed exhibitions held at the Met from
2008 through 2011. During this time, there was not only an increase in the average
number of 30-day events held at the Met to 4.8, but also an increase to five exhibitions
with ties to Chinese institutions and the Chinese government. Despite this general rise in
the number of Chinese-themed exhibitions held at the Met during 2008 through 2011, it
is interesting to note that during the last year under investigation, the number of days with
a Chinese exhibit at the Met decreased dramatically, dropping from a full year during
2010 to only 232 days (out of 361) in 2011. This conforms to the results from the
Kennedy Center where increased Chinese ties to efforts dedicated to promoting Chinese
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soft power did not necessarily increase the amount of activities to generate soft power,
presenting a disjointed image regarding Chinese intentions from 2008 through 2011.
This image become more confused at the Kennedy Center from 2012 through
2014, as there continued to be a number of performances supported by groups with ties to
the Chinese government, but there would also be those presented by organizations that
were openly hostile toward the government. Specifically, the performance group Shen
Yun appeared at the Kennedy Center multiple times from 2013 through 2014 and is
known for denouncing the actions of the Chinese government during the Cultural
Revolution, a topic which remains taboo in China. In addition to this, 2012 through 2014
was the first time period under investigation that did not feature a month long event
dedicated to China, with the Chinese instead participating in the “World Stages:
International Theater Festival 2014” event where they participated in only three
performances. Therefore, despite a continued Chinese presence at the Kennedy Center,
the lack of a large-scale event and the appearance of groups with anti-Chinese
government sympathies creates an image of the Chinese continuing to operate at the
Center, but not possessing as strong of a presence as they did in previous years.
This trend appears in the exhibitions held at the Met as well, as Chinese
institutions and the government were only connected to two exhibits at the museum from
2012 through 2014. In addition to this, 2012 through 2014 was very nearly the first time
period under examination to not have a single year where a Chinese-themed exhibit was
on display for the entirety of the year, with only the presence of the longest Chinese-
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themed exhibit during the timeframe being studied, “Colors of the Universe: Chinese
Hardstone Carvings,” preventing this from occurring. Furthermore, while the average
number of 30-day events over the three years was 4.7 therefore demonstrating only a
slight decrease in the average number of events when compared with 2008 through 2011,
this average is inflated by 2014 witnessing eight Chinese-themed exhibitions, which was
much higher than the four and two exhibits which occurred during 2012 and 2013
respectively. Considering this, it is again difficult to determine whether Chinese efforts
to promote soft power increased or decreased during this time, conforming to the patterns
established by performances held at the Kennedy Center.

Interpretation of Results and Discussion of Soft Power:
Following analysis of the data it becomes apparent that, despite evidence of
decline of soft power promotion activities in the realms of economics, Chinese efforts
through people-to-people exchanges and in the arts present an image that is more difficult
to define. Immediately following the Financial Crisis, it is clear that Chinese efforts to
generate soft power through Confucius Institutes and the activities announced at the CPE
continued to expand, illustrating little evidence that the Chinese were interesting in
moving away from a soft power generation strategy. Regarding performances at the
Kennedy Center, it is evident that several aspects of China’s overall strategy in promoting
soft power through these activities presented a less clear pattern, with the Center seeing
more Chinese-supported events but less individual performances from 2008 through
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2011. This is compounded by the fact that Chinese-themed exhibitions at the Met
increased during this time and the number of exhibits with direct ties to China increased
as well, despite 2011 having very few days with a Chinese exhibition present.
The presence of such a disjointed image can possibly be explained as
representative of Hu Jintao, the Chinese leader most dedicated to a soft power promotion
strategy, remaining in power from 2008 through 2011 and encountering greater
speculation regarding the continued utility of the strategy. By this time, many in China
were beginning to believe that the crisis provided China an opportunity to move beyond
placating the United States and practicing a more assertive foreign policy, with figures
such as Premier Wen Jiabao even publicly chastising the US. Such beliefs and actions
could lead to speculation that debates were occurring within the Chinese government
about soft power. If a re-evaluation of soft power did occur it might explain why there
seemed to be a commitment to the strategy in some areas, but, upon closer inspection,
there seemed to be indicators of a shift in policy as well.
Considering this possibility, 2012 through 2014 becomes critical in determining
whether the Crisis would eventually lead to a change in soft power promotion strategies
as Xi Jinping, with his strong nationalist tendencies, would be more willing to abandon
wooing the US and openly challenging them. Initially, this does seem to be the case as
economic activities that might have been considered as soft power generating continued
to be ignored in 2012. However, by 2013 there appeared to be a greater willingness on
the part of the Chinese to enact policy that the US deemed favorable, with the
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announcement of the FTZ and continuation of BIT negotiations. While this continued
into 2014, these actions appeared to be dedicated more toward domestic concerns within
China and were not entirely accepted by the USCC due to China’s previous inability or
apathy toward following through on their promises.
2012 through 2014, however, is also the first period when Hanban indicates a lack
of interest in activities designed for American students in the United States or China and
American attendance at these events decreases. Pairing this with the mention of
complaints by the State Department, it initially appears that the Chinese were slowly
moving away from soft power promotion efforts. This is complicated, however, by the
continuation of the CPE which, while it did seem to experience a decline in areas such as
sciences and sports, continued to exhibit promising areas of exchanges in women’s
issues.
Concerning performances at the Kennedy Center and exhibitions at the Met, it
seemed clearer that the Chinese were moving away from soft power promotion, as from
2012 through 2013 there was a clear decline in the amount of events at the Kennedy
Center and exhibits at the Met which enjoyed Chinese support. For both venues,
however, this changes in 2014 as the Chinese sponsored more performances at the
Kennedy Center despite the presence of a group with hostile feelings toward the Chinese
government in Shen Yun and the Met held the largest number of Chinese-themed exhibits
from 2005 through 2014 including the longest running exhibition to occur during the
timeframe of this research. Ultimately, these results, when combined with data from
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economics and people-to-people exchanges, make it difficult to discern whether the
Chinese truly moved away from soft power strategies following the 2007 Financial Crisis
or whether such a move would indicate a shift in China’s foreign policy toward the
United States.
Regarding the general decline in economic efforts to generate soft power, it also
becomes clear that economic policies are not an effective indicator of Chinese efforts to
generate soft power within the United States. This refers to Nye’s original assertion that
government actions related to hard power in the form of military power or economic
activities could not form a source of soft power due to their ties to the government and
the greater possibility that these actions would come with conditions attached to them.
Nye himself argued that the overbearing presence of China’s government made it
difficult for its civil society to present a truly attractive image of the country which could
compete with the negative image derived from the many human rights abuses perpetrated
by the state (“Interview: Joseph Nye,” 2013).
Barthélémy Courmont (2013) argues despite a greater willingness to accept
certain economic activities as a form of soft power that economics are still mostly
connected to hard power, making it more difficult for them to be accepted as soft power
generating. In fact, Courmont (2013) also contends that while the Chinese may consider
economic activities as part of their soft power strategies, these activities may only be
truly applicable toward specific countries, such as developing nations. Arguing that these
states are more likely to accept investment due the increased need for resources, such
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economic actions would be an acceptable way to improve a country’s image within
another state, much like China was able to do in the early 2000s in Southeast Asia
(Courmont, 2013; Kurlantzick, 2007; Lum et al., 2008). In more developed countries like
the United States, however, Chinese economic activities are less likely to generate
goodwill as China is seen more as a competitor, leading to increased Chinese actions
within a developed country resulting to increased suspicion (Courmont, 2013). This
coincides well with the suspicions raised by the USCC throughout the timeframe of this
research as China’s every action was met with scrutiny and subject to criticism during
bilateral dialogues. As became clear during the course of the research, actions that might
have been considered soft power generating efforts in the past were later greeted with
skepticism if not open derision as they were seen as more of the same and were never
meant to truly address American concerns.
This skepticism generated by economics being more attached to a state’s hard
power and governmental concerns also extends to Chinese attempts to use Confucius
Institutes as a method to increase its soft power abroad. Within the United States, many
academics have argued against the establishment of Confucius Institutes on college
campuses due to the possibility of censorship against speech related to sensitive topics
within China (Guttenplan, 2012; Levine et al., 2014). These topics include such matters
as Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, and China’s domestic policies related to human rights abuses,
leading many in academia to worry about the possible implications of allowing
essentially a mouthpiece of the Chinese government to operate on campuses within the
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United States (Guttenplan, 2012). The American Association of University Professors
(AAUP) goes on to even compare Confucius Institutes to the British Council, the Goethe
Institut, and L’Alliance Franςaise, which they identify as “connected to imperial
pasts…[and] ongoing geopolitical agendas” which should prevent Confucius Institutes
from operating on university or college campuses (Committee A on Academic Freedom
and Tenure, 2014). While others have argued that Confucius Institutes pose no threat of
censorship in academic discourse, these suspicions reflect the problematic nature of
governments being so clearly connected to their soft power generation efforts and
illustrate how such efforts could even be counterproductive (Levin et al., 2014).
American pushback against Confucius Institutes may also explain lower American
attendance at “Chinese Bridge” events held for American students and administrators and
the lack of attention toward Hanban’s presence in the United States in its reports from
2012 through 2014. Ultimately, this may not reflect a lack of interest to establish
Confucius Institutes in the US, which remains the country with the most institutes and
classrooms in the world, but a rejection on the part of the US against an organization with
possibly dubious ties to a foreign government.
Considering these issues, the difficulty of determining a pattern of behavior in
soft power generation activities before and after the 2007 Financial Crisis becomes even
greater and leads to an over-reliance on exchanges in the arts as the CPE was launched
midway through the timeframe under investigation. This results in the problem that
Chinese ties to exhibitions at the Met increased following the Financial Crisis despite
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fewer days that witnessed a Chinese-themed exhibit in 2011. Furthermore, regardless of
the decrease in Chinese participation in exhibitions from 2012 through 2014 and the near
complete absence of a full year Chinese-themed exhibit in 2014, Chinese participation
was still higher than it was from 2005 through 2007 which only had one exhibit with
possible ties to China while 2012 through 2014 contained two and possessed a higher
average number of 30-day events. All of this leads to the problematic image constructed
by the data, revealing that despite greater aggression on the part of the Chinese leadership
and the appearance of some downward trends in soft power generation measures, no
definite pattern emerged from the information making it impossible to prove or disprove
that the Chinese moved away from soft power generation efforts after the Financial Crisis
or that this shift would represent a change in Chinese foreign policy.

Possibilities for Future Research:
Despite this, several new possibilities for future study did appear through the
course of the research, many related to potential areas where the United States and China
could exhibit a greater ability to cooperate and represented plausible areas where Chinese
leaders could succeed in promoting an appreciation for China within the United States.
The appearance of cooperative exchanges related to climate change clearly represented
this as the United States and China consistently showed a willingness to work together.
Throughout the timeframe under study, the Chinese and the Americans showed a regular
commitment to working together on these issues with the signing of numerous
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memorandums of understanding (MOUs) related to climate change at the 2012 S&ED
and the JCCT in 2014 leading to collaboration between the two states regarding the
construction of green cities to cite a few examples (“U.S.-China Strategic and Economic
Dialogue 2010 Outcomes of the Strategic Track,” 2010; “U.S.-China Joint Fact Sheet on
25th Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade,” 2014).
Another area which showed increased potential to improve China’s image was
through the collaboration on women’s issues. While the CPE only began in 2010, the
vast majority of cooperation and exchanges generated by it concentrated on women’s
issues. This was demonstrated by the two countries frequently hosting conferences,
promoting exchanges regarding women’s health, and dispatching delegations to travel to
either the US or the PRC to meet with like-minded organizations. This leads to an area
where the United States and China appear to be committed to cooperation and presents an
ample opportunity for the two countries to improve their soft power within the other
state. This also leads to the possibility that these women’s issues may form an area of
common ground between the United States and China, resulting in greater opportunities
to discuss the future of the relationship between the two countries while also opening the
activities of Chinese women up to study by American researchers.
One final area that could present an interesting opportunity for future research is
in realm of sports diplomacy. With Ping Pong Diplomacy serving as the beginning of
official diplomatic relations between the United States and the PRC, sport exchanges
form a fascinating avenue through which the United States and China would be able to
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come together in efforts to improve their soft power among the other nation. And while
exchanges in sports did appear in the CPE, I initially planned on conducting a more indepth investigation of Chinese attempts to promote their soft power in the United States
through sports. Unfortunately, my access to the necessary data was limited and I was
unable to incorporate sports diplomacy more into this thesis. Despite this, I believe that
exchanges in sports represents a unique opportunity for China to continue to improve its
image in the United States and research into Chinese efforts in this area will prove very
useful in discerning Chinese soft power strategies and goals within the United States.

Conclusions:
Following the 2007 Financial Crisis, it appeared as though the world had
approached a new era in history, as the United States entered a prolonged recession and
its chief economic rival, China, continued to experience high growth rates. Seemingly
sensing an opportunity, scholars noted that the Chinese leadership became much bolder
in their dealings with the United States, determined to express themselves more
assertively. As the Chinese openly criticized the United States’ economic missteps and
promoted the Chinese economic model as a viable alternative speculation that China had
abandoned its policy of a peaceful rise and was ready to claim its place as an equal to the
United States began. In the face of these claims, it seemed natural that China would also
move away from promoting its soft power in the United States as it could now rely on its
advantages in economic hard power to get what it wanted out of the US. However, upon
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examination of China’s soft power generation efforts from 2005 through 2014, it is
inconclusive as to whether they have truly abandoned soft power promotion in the USA
as no definitive trends have emerged to indicate that such a departure has been made.
Despite this lack of evidence, recent events have led to new possibilities regarding
the study of China’s soft power promotion efforts in the US. On June 12, 2015, the
Chinese stock market began to fall after an investment bubble burst which led to the
Shanghai Index losing close to a third of its value before rebounding (Riley & Yan,
2015). In spite of an initial rebound and massive intervention on the part of the Chinese
government to combat its effect on the economy, the stock market continued to
experience rapid declines, leading to a period of increased economic uncertainty in China
(Riley & Yan, 2015). While the markets would eventually recover, they would again
experience a steep drop off in January 2016 which, paired with slower growth as China
shifts from an export economy to one more concentrated on services, has led many to
speculate the continued stability of the Chinese economy (Bradsher & Tsang, 2016;
“Why China’s Economy Will Be So Hard to Fix,” 2016). On the other hand, the
American economy has maintained its slow recovery from the 2007 Financial Crisis as it
has continued to add jobs and has remained mostly isolated from the negative effects
generated by the volatility of the Chinese stock market (“At Last, a Proper Recovery,”
2015). Considering this seeming role reversal with regards to what occurred during the
2007 Financial Crisis, it will be interesting to see whether in the coming years China
retreats from it more bellicose foreign policy as its economy experiences greater
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uncertainty. Perhaps there will even be greater efforts on the part of the Chinese
leadership to placate the United States and concentrate more clearly on trying to improve
China’s image within the United States. Regardless of the outcome, the relationship
between China and the United States represents one of the most fascinating areas of study
for political science and how these two powers choose to approach each other in the
future, whether it be through trying to generate soft power or through relying on hard
power, will have profound implications for the rest of the world.
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